


A Dictionary of

CULTURAL AND
CRITICAL THEORY



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is a questioning of the project of self-unification and the power the moral and the ideal seems to have over us. Williams none the less explicitly distances himself from Nietzsche's comments about politics (Williams, 1993, pp. 10f.). And yet there is another, perhaps even more important difference: Nietzsche claimed that modern natural science had not yet "de-deified" nature enough, and so would be skeptical of Williams's claim that modern natural science can offer us an "absolute conception of the world" (Williams, 1985, chapter 8). Nietzsche was thereby led to a perspectivism more radical than that of Williams, whose apparently unshakable commitment to some form of scientific realism also distinguishes him from contemporary thinkers following the path of Richard RORTY. For Williams, modern natural science is decidedly not "just one more story" about the way the world is.

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JEFFREY S. TURNER

Williams, Raymond (1921–88) British cultural critic. One of the most significant socialist intellectuals in postwar British history, Raymond Williams's work had a major influence on CULTURAL THEORY and history from the late 1950s. He was born in the Welsh border village of Pandy, the son of a railway signalman, and after a local schooling went to Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1939, from which he was called up from 1941 to 1945. After leaving Cambridge he worked in adult education from 1946 until 1961, when he returned to Cambridge as a Fellow of Jesus College, where he stayed for the rest of his working life. He always saw himself as an active socialist, and as a "Welsh European" occupying the "border country" between different cultural and social worlds. His writing ranges across cultural and literary history, studies of drama and society, theories of cultural formations and institutions, and the changing social significance of language and the media. He also wrote fiction alongside and in dialog with his theoretical work.

Williams's work both grows out of and against the dominant cultural traditions that he analyzed. *Culture and Society* (1958) emphasized the notion of CULTURE as *process* – not simply the highest products of a society, the great works of an individual genius – and traced a history of the cultural critique of industrial capitalism (which, he argued, was profoundly politically contradictory) from Burke and Cobbett, through Ruskin, ARNOLD, Morris, ELIOT, and LEAVIS. Its sequel, *The Long Revolution* (1961), emphasized and developed the broader definition of culture as a way of life. It analyzed the evolving history of cultural forms and institutions in Britain over the previous 200 years and developed a theoretical framework within which to explore this process of dynamic change. Here Williams develops his concepts of STRUCTURES OF FEELING and DOMINANT, RESIDUAL, AND EMERGENT cultures to help understand the complex ideological negotiations which might exist at any particular moment and the uneven ways these structures of feeling shift historically, and both dominant and oppositional forms emerge.

These concepts, elaborated and developed throughout his work, became central to what Williams was to later term CULTURAL MATERIALISM. He argued that cultural forms are not simply the effect of a primary economic process but also actively constitute that process, and that cultural struggle and the acknowledgement of the diversity of cultural identity are central to any genuinely democratic society. Thus studies of the politics of language are crucial to this analysis: *The Long Revolution* traces the development of standard English as a key process in the establishment of the HEGEMONY of a dominant metropolitan culture; *Keywords* (1976) teases out these questions in a more intricate way by looking at the complex history of specific notions and concepts. Also crucial is his analysis of the broadcast media; he refuted both technological determinism, whereby mass communications become a monolithic agent of control, and the elitist perception of users of the media as "telly-glued masses," manipulated by the state and consumer capitalism.

Raymond Williams's work flourished on TENSION, COMPLEXITY, and CONTRADICTION – between "HIGH" and "POPULAR" CULTURE, between tradition and MODERNITY, between a sense of cultural roots and the experience of their dislocation, between public and private, region and metropolis. As in his analysis of the changing meanings of rural and

urban life, *The Country and the City* (1973), he wanted to analyze the structural formation of economic and cultural divisions and identities, without losing sight of the lived experience in which these identities are embodied, or the "resources of a journey of hope" which can look optimistically toward the future, as he does in *Towards 2,000*. "Community" is a key word throughout his writing, but it is a shifting term: it is made up of the combination of relations, place, mutual recognition, shared experience, and class identity. See also CULTURAL MATERIALISM; DOMINANT/RESIDUAL/EMERGENT; STRUCTURE OF FEELING.

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JENNY BOURNE TAYLOR

Winnicott, Donald Woods (1896–1971) British pediatrician, child psychiatrist, and psychoanalyst associated with the OBJECT-RELATIONS school and influenced by KLEIN.

Winnicott often remarked that there is no such thing as a baby, meaning that a baby cannot exist outside a relationship with a carer. The successful development of the child depends upon the provision of a facilitating environment by a "good enough" mother – the choice of terminology reflects an attempt to avoid an idealization of the maternal function. Good enough mothering permits a gradual development toward independence; its absence may result in the creation of a false self which colludes with environmental demands and hides the true self.

Winnicott is noted for the introduction into psychoanalytic thought of the notion of the transitional object. Typically, this is a material object such as a blanket to which the child develops a powerful emotional attachment. It allows the child to begin the transition from the initial oral relationship with the mother to true object-relations. As it is the child's first "not-me possession," the transformational object permits an initial spatial differentiation between me and not-me.

Reading

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Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951) philosopher, born in Vienna, studied at Cambridge with Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. He received his PhD in 1929 and was Fellow of Trinity College in 1930. Losing touch with academic life, he was comfortable with it and constantly sought being many years away from Cambridge. His philosophical work was done outside environments, and he often felt the need to completely give up his work in favor of other things. He spent six years (1920–26) teaching in an Austrian school children (mainly age 11–14), an experience that resulted in the publication in 1926 of a small dictionary *Wörterbuchs schulen*, which he developed for use by children. Shortly thereafter he spent two years in the United States and build a house for his sister. Wittgenstein's journals and desires to leave academic life continued throughout his life, he was pulled back to Cambridge to lecture, and his fame and reputation grew greatly through his lectures. He was, however, dissatisfied with his efforts and often remarked that he was teaching but harm and that he was teaching but a new jargon. Only two of his works (other than the dictionary) were published during his lifetime, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922, by Moore) and "Some remarks on the foundations of probability" (1929). His central work *Philosophical Investigations* (which he began writing while living in Cambridge in Norway in 1936) was published posthumously in 1953. Several other influential works of his include *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (1956), *Zettel* (1967), and *Remarks on the Foundations of Probability* (1969), all named and organized by his students.

It is sometimes convenient to distinguish between an early and a late Wittgenstein, with the former referring to his work in logic and the latter to the second looks at the *Investigations*. Wittgenstein's concerns with language. While convenient, this perspective can be misleading. Wittgenstein's work of "grave mistakes" in his first work does not repudiate that work or cease to be his topics. Rather he situates these concerns within his broadened and continuing work about language. (He had hoped, in

plex, and no longer exclude more main-
cultural forms – say the cultures of the
The study of cultural policy and the
on of cultural studies to policy issues, or
different instance the cultural study of
r religion, have scarcely begun.
urrent situation is, as before, paradoxical.
udies” has become a widely recognized
nced body of work, of interest to many
tudents but at times also outside educa-
acterized by a rich (and not yet absorbed)
of approaches and interests and also by a
(possibly cherished) marginality. There
orking in this area and with few resources.
has been made, with difficulty, for the
n of important issues outside the exist-
ional agenda, but the previous disciplines
ng (deceptively fracturing) while cultural
w has its own languages and institutional
not always conducive to participation in
d public debate. Work in cultural studies
remain volatile, self-reflexive, and alert
estions, but may need now to help contri-
d more of a common agenda with at-
riorities, across the specialist interests of
ities and social sciences, and to respond
eriod in which the hegemony of the New
l also of the West, is fast breaking up.

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MICHAEL GREEN

cultural theory See INTRODUCTION

culture A term of virtually limitless application,
which initially may be understood to refer to every-
thing that is produced by human beings as distinct
from all that is a part of nature. However, it has
often been observed that since nature is itself a
human abstraction, it too has a history, which in
turn means that it is part of culture. In his efforts
to deal with the apparently universal occurrence of
incest prohibitions in human societies, Claude LÉVI-
STRAUSS candidly admits that the distinction be-
tween culture and nature is an instance of theoretical
BRICOLAGE, in the sense that the distinction is simul-
taneously inadequate and indispensable. Two ex-
treme attempts to limit the meaning of the term
can be found in its technical use by North Ameri-
can anthropologists to refer to the primary data of
anthropology, and in its honorific use, from the
seventeenth to the nineteenth century (for example,
by Matthew ARNOLD) to refer to the finest products
of civilization. In a bold effort to avoid these ex-
tremes, Clifford Geertz defines culture by way of
SEMIOTICS as the “webs of significance” spun by
human beings (1973, p. 5). Yet even such an open
definition as this presupposes an extraordi-
narily powerful (but perhaps justifiable) role for the
semiotic in human life.

Raymond WILLIAMS begins his famous essay on
“culture” by admitting that it is “one of the two or
three most complicated words in the English lan-
guage” (1983, p. 87). The complexity, however, is
not just a matter of the utility of a term or the
efficacy of a concept. For those who confront the
living reality of cultural conflict, the issue may be
one of having –or not having – oneself or one’s
relations recognized by another culture’s definition
of the human. Homi Bhabha, accordingly, concludes
that “there can be no ethically or epistemologically
commensurate subject of culture.” If it is not possi-
ble to identify a transcendent humanity that is not
itself based on a particular culture’s sense of value,
then all that is left is what Bhabha calls “culture’s

archaic undecidability” (1994, p. 135). If one ethnic
or national group can define another as nonhuman
or subhuman, then culture becomes suddenly and
tribally specific and exclusive. The definition itself
is an act of violence and an invitation to potential
if not actualized genocide. When one culture elimi-
nates what it considers not human, it identifies itself,
according to its own definition, as human. Cultural
identification in such a context takes on ultimate
power.

Although some of the initial violence of cultural
definition has been recognized as an instance of
ORIENTALISM, or a Western effort to define and
specify Asian culture as the alien – or idealized –
other, more recent politically active efforts have
been exerted to draw cultural definitions within
what were once unified nation states in Eastern
Europe or Africa. Just as Nazi definitions of the
human required efforts to exclude Jews and just as
southern American definitions of humanity once
excluded blacks, so now in South Asia, Africa, and
elsewhere in the world cultural definitions are in-
struments of the political power of identity exclu-
sion. To define “culture” is to define the human;
to be excluded from the definition can have an
ultimate cost.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century,
culture has been subjected to a range of definitions
that extend from Arnold’s all-embracing sense of
the possibility of human perfection to Pierre
Bourdieu’s systems of symbolic violence. In *Culture
and Anarchy* (1869) Arnold thought of culture as a
redemptive pursuit through a principally literary
education of the best that human beings had thought
and said. In his view, culture in this sense has the
potential of harmoniously unifying all of human
society. In part transmitted by T.S. ELIOT, this
mission for literary culture has been very influential
in Britain and the United States. Not surprisingly,
the intellectual revolutions brought about by the
thought of Charles Darwin, Karl MARX, Friedrich
ENGELS, Friedrich NIETZSCHE, and Sigmund FREUD
have had profound effects on post-Arnoldian theo-
ries of culture. In a perverse version of Darwin’s
theory of evolution, the American anthropologist
Lewis Henry Morgan in 1877, despite his humani-
tarianism and efforts on behalf of native American
culture (See NATIVE AMERICAN STUDIES), developed
a system for hierarchically classifying cultures
according to evolutionary stages. Other early cul-
tural evolutionists included Edward Burnett Tylor
(1832–1917), who founded the British school of

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or national group can define another as nonhuman
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MICHAEL PAYNE

culture, consumer See CONSUMER CULTURE

culture, counter See COUNTERCULTURE

culture, enterprise See ENTERPRISE CULTURE

culture, folk See FOLK CULTURE

culture, high See HIGH CULTURE

culture industries Culture industries can be de-
fined, simply enough, as those industries which
produce cultural goods. Or, to put it the other way
round:

Generally speaking, a cultural industry is held
to exist when cultural goods and services are