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What is Cultural Studies Anyway?

RICHARD JOHNSON

Cultural studies is now a movement or a network. It has its own degrees in several colleges and universities and its own journals and meetings. It exercises a large influence on academic disciplines, especially on English studies, sociology, media and communication studies, linguistics and history. In the first part of the article,¹ I want to consider some of the arguments for and against the academic codification of cultural studies. To put the question most sharply: should cultural studies aspire to be an academic discipline? In the second part, I'll look at some strategies of definition short of codification, because a lot hangs, I think, on the *kind* of unity or coherence we seek. Finally, I want to try out some of my own preferred definitions and arguments.

The Importance of Critique

A codification of methods or knowledges (instituting them, for example, in formal curricula or in courses on “methodology”) runs against some main features of cultural studies as a tradition: its openness and theoretical versatility, its reflexive even self-conscious mood, and, especially, the importance of critique. I mean critique in the fullest sense: not criticism merely, nor even polemic, but procedures by which other traditions are approached both for what they may yield and for what they inhibit. Critique involves stealing away the more useful elements and rejecting the rest. From this point of view cultural studies is a process, a kind of alchemy for producing useful knowledge; codify it and you might halt its reactions.

In the history of cultural studies, the earliest encounters were with literary criticism. Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart, in their different ways, developed the Leavisite stress on literary-social evaluation, but turned the assessments from literature to everyday life.² Similar appropriations have been made from history. The first important moment here was the development of the post-war traditions of social history with their focus on popular culture, or the culture of “the people” especially in its political forms. The Communist Party Historians' Group was central here, with its 1940s and early 1950s project of anglicizing and historicising old marxism. In a way this influence was paradoxical; for the historians were less concerned with contemporary culture or even with the 20th century, putting energies instead into

understanding the long British transition from feudalism to capitalism and the popular struggles and traditions of dissent associated with it. It was this work which became a second matrix for cultural studies.

Central in both literary and historical strands was the critique of old marxism. The recovery of “values” against Stalinism was a leading impulse of the first new left, but the critique of economism has been the continuous thread through the whole “crisis of marxism” which has followed. Certainly cultural studies has been formed on this side of what we can call, paradoxically, a modern marxist revival, and in the cross-national borrowings that were so marked a feature of the 1970s. It is important to note what different places the same figures have occupied in different national routes. The take-up of Althusserianism is incomprehensible outside the background of the dominant empiricism of British intellectual traditions. This feature helps to explain the appeal of philosophy, not as a technical pursuit, but as a generalised rationalism and excitement with abstract ideas.³ Similarly, it is important to note how Gramsci, a version of whose work occupies a place of orthodoxy in Italy, was appropriated by us as a critical, heterodox figure. He provided mighty reinforcements to an already partly-formed cultural studies project, as late as the 1970s.⁴

Some students of culture remain “marxist” in name (despite the “crisis” and all that). It is more interesting, however, to note where cultural studies has been Marx-influenced. Everyone will have their own checklist. My own, which is not intended to sketch an orthodoxy, includes three main premises. The first is that cultural processes are intimately connected with social relations, especially with class relations and class formations, with sexual divisions, with the racial structuring of social relations and with age oppressions as a form of dependency. The second is that culture involves power and helps to produce asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups to define and realise their needs. And the third, which follows the other two, is that culture is neither an autonomous nor an externally determined field, but a site of social differences and struggles. This by no means exhausts the elements of marxism that remain active and alive and resourceful in the existing circumstances, provided only they, too, are critiqued, and developed in detailed studies.

Other critiques have been distinctly philosophical. Cultural studies has been marked out, in the British context, for its concern with “theory,” but the intimacy of the connection with philosophy has not been obvious until recently. Yet there is a very close cousinhood between epistemological problems and positions (e.g. empiricism, realism and idealism) and the key questions of “cultural theory” (e.g. economism, materialism, or the problem of culture’s specific effects). Again, for me, a lot of roads lead back to Marx, but the appropriations need to be wider ones. Lately there have been attempts to go beyond the rather sterile opposition of rationalism and empiricism in search of a more productive formulation of the relation between theory (or “abstraction” as I now prefer) and “concrete studies.”⁵

More important in our recent history have been the critiques deriving from the women's movement and from the struggles against racism.⁶ These have deepened and extended the democratic and socialist commitments that were the leading principles of the first new left. If the personal was already political in the first phase of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), it was oddly ungendered. The democratic foundations of the early movements were therefore insecurely based as a new form of politics. Similarly there were (and are) deep problems about the ethno- and anglo-centricity of key texts and themes in our tradition.⁷ The contemporary salience in Britain of a conservative-nationalist and racist politics means these flaws are all the more serious. It is incorrect therefore to see feminism or anti-racism as some kind of interruption or diversion from an original class politics and its associated research programme. On the contrary, it is these movements that have kept the new left new.

The specific results for cultural studies have been no less important.⁸ Much more has been involved than the original question: "what about women?" Feminism has influenced everyday ways of working and brought a greater recognition of the way that productive results depend upon supportive relationships. It has uncovered some unacknowledged premises of "left" intellectual work and the masculine interests that held them in place. It has produced new objects of study and forced a rethinking of old ones. In media studies, for example, it has shifted attention from the "masculine" genre of news and current affairs to the importance of "light entertainment." It has aided a more general turn from older kinds of ideology critique (which centred on maps of meaning or versions of reality) to approaches that centre on social identities, subjectivities, popularity and pleasure. Feminists also seem to have made a particular contribution to bridging the humanities/social science divide by bringing literary categories and "aesthetic" concerns to bear on social issues.

I hope these cases show how central critique has been and how connected it is with political causes in the broader sense. A number of questions follow. If we have progressed by critique, are there not dangers that codifications will involve systematic closure? If the momentum is to strive for really useful knowledge, will academic codification help this? Is not the priority to become more "popular" rather than more academic? These questions gain further force from immediate contexts. Cultural studies is now a widely taught subject, thus, unless we are very careful, students will encounter it as an orthodoxy. In any case, students now have lectures, courses and examinations in the study of culture. In these circumstances, how can they occupy a critical tradition critically?

This is reinforced by what we know—or are learning—about academic and other disciplinary dispositions of knowledge. Recognition of the forms of power associated with knowledge may turn out to be one of the leading insights of the 1970s. It is a very general theme: in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault, in the radical philosophers' and radical scientists' critiques of science or scientism, in radical educational philosophy and sociology and in feminist critiques of the dominant

academic forms. There has been a marked change from the singular affirmation of science in the early 1970s (with Althusser as one main figure) to the dissolution of such certainties (with Foucault as one point of reference) in our own times. Academic knowledge-forms (or some aspects of them) now look like part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. In fact, the problem remains much as it has always been—what can be won from the academic concerns and skills to provide elements of useful knowledge.

Pressures to Define

Yet there are important pressures to define. There is the little daily politics of the college or the school—not so little since jobs, resources and opportunities for useful work are involved. Cultural studies has won real spaces here and they have to be maintained and extended. The context of (“big”) politics makes this still more important. We also have a Conservative Counter-Reformation in Britain and the U.S. One manifestation is a vigorous assault on public educational institutions, both by cutting finance and by defining usefulness in strictly capitalist terms. We need definitions of cultural studies to struggle effectively in these contexts, to make claims for resources, to clarify our minds in the rush and muddle of everyday work, and to decide priorities for teaching and research.

Most decisively, perhaps, we need ways of viewing a vigorous but fragmented field of study, if not as a *unity* at least as a *whole*. If we do not discuss central directions of our own, we will be pulled hither and thither by the demands of academic self-reproduction and by the academic disciplines from which our subject, in part, grows. Academic tendencies, then, tend to be reproduced on the new ground: there are distinctively literary and distinctively sociological or historical versions of cultural studies, just as there are approaches distinguished by theoretical partisanship. This would not matter if any one discipline or problematic could grasp the objects of culture as a whole, but this is not, in my opinion, the case. Each approach tells us about a tiny aspect. If this is right, we need a particular kind of defining activity: one which reviews existing approaches, identifies their characteristic objects and their good sense, but also the limits of their competence. Actually it is not definition or codification that we need, but *pointers* to further transformations. This is not a question of aggregating existing approaches (a bit of sociology here, a spot of linguistics there) but of reforming the elements of different approaches in their relations to each other.

Strategies of Definition

There are several different starting-points. Cultural studies can be defined as an intellectual and political tradition, in its relations to the academic disciplines, in terms

of theoretical paradigms, or by its characteristic objects of study. The last starting-point now interests me most; but first a word about the others.

We need histories of cultural studies to trace the recurrent dilemmas and to give perspective to our current projects. But the informed sense of a “tradition” also works in a more “mythical” mode to produce a collective identity and a shared sense of purpose. To me, a lot of powerful continuities are wrapped up in the single term “culture,” which remains useful not as a rigorous category, but as a kind of summation of a history. It references in particular the effort to heave the study of culture from its old inegalitarian anchorages in high-artistic connoisseurship and in discourses, of enormous condescension, on the not-culture of the masses. Behind this intellectual redefinition there is a somewhat less consistent *political* pattern, a continuity that runs from the first new left and the first Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to the post-1968 currents. Of course there have been marked political antagonisms within the new left and between new left politics and the intellectual tendencies it has produced. The intellectual detours have often seemed politically self-indulgent. Yet what unites this sequence is the struggle to reform “old left” politics. This includes the critique of old marxism but also of old social-democracy too. It involves a constructive quarrel with dominant styles within the Labor Movement, especially the neglect of cultural conditions of politics, and a mechanical narrowing of politics itself.

This sense of an intellectual-political connection has been important for cultural studies. It has meant that the research and the writing has been political, but not in any immediate pragmatic sense. Cultural studies is not a research programme for a particular party or tendency. Still less does it subordinate intellectual energies to any established doctrines. This political-intellectual stance is possible because the politics which we aim to create is not yet fully formed. Just as the politics involves a long haul, so the research must be as wide-ranging and as profound, but also as politically-directed, as we can make it. Above all, perhaps, we have to fight against the disconnection that occurs when cultural studies is inhabited for merely academic purposes or when enthusiasm for (say) popular cultural forms is divorced from the analysis of power and of social possibilities.

I have said a lot already about the second definitional strategy—charting our negative/positive relation to the academic disciplines. Cultural processes do not correspond to the contours of academic knowledges, as they are. No one academic discipline grasps the full complexity (or seriousness) of the study. Cultural studies must be inter-disciplinary (and sometimes anti-disciplinary) in its tendency. I find it hard, for example, to think of myself as an historian now, though perhaps historian-of-the-contemporary is a rough approximation in some contexts. Yet some historian’s virtues seem useful for cultural studies—concerns for movement, particularity, complexity and context, for instance. I still love that combination of dense description, complex explanation and subjective even romantic evocation, which I find in the best

historical writing. I still find most sociological description thin and obvious and much literary discourse clever but superficial! On the other hand, the rooted empiricism of historical practice is a real liability often blocking a properly cultural reading. I am sure it is the same for other disciplines too. Of course, there are lots of half-way houses, many of them serviceable workshops for cultural study, but the *direction* of movement, to my mind, has to be out, and away, and into more dangerous places!

Our third definitional strategy—the analysis and comparison of theoretical problematics—was, until recently, the favorite one.⁹ I still see this as an essential component in all cultural study, but its main difficulty is that abstract forms of discourse disconnect ideas from the social complexities that first produced them, or to which they originally referred. Unless these are continuously reconstructed and held in the mind as a reference point, theoretical clarification acquires an independent momentum. In teaching situations or similar interchanges, theoretical discourse may seem, to the hearer, a form of intellectual gymnastics. The point appears to be to learn a new language, which takes time and much effort, in order, merely, to feel at ease with it. In the meantime there is something very silencing and perhaps oppressive about new forms of discourse. I think that this has been a fairly common experience, for students, even where, eventually, “theory” has conferred new powers of understanding and articulation. This is one set of reasons why many of us now find it useful to start from concrete cases, either to teach theory historically, as a continuing, contextualised debate about cultural issues, or to hook up theoretical points and contemporary experiences.

This leads me to my preferred definitional strategy. The key questions are: what is the characteristic *object* of cultural studies? What is cultural studies *about*?

Simple Abstractions: Consciousness, Subjectivity

I have suggested already that “culture” has value as a reminder but not as a precise category; Raymond Williams has excavated its immense historical repertoire.¹⁰ There is no solution to this polysemy: it is a rationalist illusion to think we can say “henceforth this term will mean. . .” and expect a whole history of connotations (not to say a whole future) to fall smartly into line. So although I fly culture’s flag anyway, and continue to use the word where imprecision matters, definitionally I seek other terms.

My key terms instead are “consciousness” and “subjectivity” with the key problems now lying somewhere in the relation between the two. For me cultural studies is about the historical forms of consciousness or subjectivity, or the subjective forms we live by, or, in a rather perilous compression, perhaps a reduction, the subjective side of social relations. These definitions adopt and gloss some of Marx’s simple abstractions, but value them also for their contemporary resonance. I think of consciousness, first, in the sense in which it appears in *The German Ideology*. As a (fifth) premise for

understanding human history, Marx and Engels add that human beings “also possess consciousness.” This usage is echoed in later works too. Marx implies it when in *Capital*, volume I, he distinguishes the worst architect from the best bee by the fact that the architect’s product has “already existed ideally” before it is produced. It has existed in the consciousness, the imagination. In other words, human beings are characterised by an ideal or imaginary life, where will is cultivated, dreams dreamt, and categories developed. In his 1844 *Manuscripts* Marx called this a feature of “species being,” later he would have called it a “general-historical” category, true of all history, a simple or universal abstraction.” Although the usage is less clear Marx also habitually refers to the “subjective side” or “subjective aspect” of social processes.

In marxist discourse (I am less sure of Marx) consciousness has overwhelmingly cognitive connotations: it has to do with knowledge (especially correct knowledge?) of the social and the natural worlds. I think Marx’s consciousness was wider than this! It embraced the notion of a consciousness of self and an *active mental and moral self-production*. There is no doubt, however, that he was especially interested in conceptually-organised knowledge, especially in his discussions of particular ideological forms (e.g., political economy, Hegelian idealism, etc.). In his most interesting text on the character of thinking (the 1857 Introduction to the *Grundrisse*) other modes of consciousness, the aesthetic, the religious, etc., were bracketed out.

“Subjectivity” is especially important here, challenging the absences in consciousness. Subjectivity includes the possibility, for example, that some elements or impulses are subjectively active—they *move* us—without being consciously known. It highlights elements ascribed (in the misleading conventional distinction) to aesthetic or emotional life and to conventionally “feminine” codes. It focuses on the “who I am” or, as important, the “who we are” of culture, on individual and collective identities. It connects with the most important structuralist insight: that subjectivities are produced, not given, and are therefore the objects of inquiry, not the premises or starting-points.

In all my thinking about cultural studies I find the notion of “forms” also repeatedly recurs. Lying behind this usage are two major influences. Marx continuously uses the terms “forms” or “social forms” or “historical forms” when he is examining in *Capital* (but especially in the *Grundrisse*) the various moments of economic circulation: he analyses the money form, the commodity form, the form of abstract labour, etc. Less often he used the same language in writing of consciousness or subjectivity. The most famous instance is from the 1859 *Preface*:

a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological *forms* in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out (emphasis added).

What interests *me* about this passage is the implication of a different parallel project to Marx's own. His preoccupation was with those social forms through which human beings produce and reproduce their material life. He abstracted, analysed and sometimes reconstituted in more concrete accounts the economic forms and tendencies of social life. It seems to me that cultural studies too is concerned with whole societies (or broader social formations) and how they move. But it looks at social processes from another complimentary point of view. *Our* project is to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings "live," become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively.

The stress on forms is reinforced by some broad structuralist insights. These have drawn out the structured character of the forms we inhabit subjectively: language, signs, ideologies, discourses, myths. They have pointed to regularities and principles of organisation—of form-ful-ness if you like. Though often pitched at too high a level of abstraction (e.g. language in general rather than languages in particular) they have strengthened our sense of the hardness, determinancy and, indeed, actual existence of social forms which exercise their pressures through the subjective side of social life. This is not to say that the description of form, in this sense, is enough. It is important to see the historical nature of subjective forms too. Historical in this context means two rather different things. First, we need to look at forms of subjectivity from the point of view of their pressures or tendencies, especially their contradictory sides. Even in abstract analysis, in other words, we should look for principles of movement as well as combination. Second, we need histories of the forms of subjectivity where we can see how these tendencies are modified by the other social determinations, including those that work through material needs.

As soon as we pose this as a project, we can see how the simple abstractions which we have thus far used, do not take us very far. Where are all the intermediate categories that would allow us to start to specify the subjective social forms and the different moments of their existence? Given our definition of culture, we cannot limit the field to specialised practices, particular genres, or popular leisure pursuits. *All social practices* can be looked at from a cultural point of view, for the work they do, subjectively. This goes, for instance, for factory work, for trade union organisation, for life in and around the supermarket, as well as for obvious targets like "the media" (misleading unity!) and its (mainly domestic) modes of consumption.


Circuits of Capital—Circuits of Culture?

So we need, first, a much more complex model, with rich intermediate categories, more layered than the existing general theories. It is here that I find it helpful to pose a kind of realist hypothesis about the existing state of theories. What if existing theories—and the modes of research associated with them—actually express different sides of the same complex process? What if they are all true, but only

as far as they go, true for those parts of the process which they have most clearly in view? What if they are all false or incomplete, liable to mislead, in that they are only partial, and therefore cannot grasp the process as a whole? What if attempts to “stretch” this competence (without modifying the theory) lead to really gross and dangerous (ideological?) conclusions?

I certainly do not expect immediate assent to the epistemological premises of this argument. I hope it will be judged in the light of its results. But its immediate merit is that it helps to explain one key feature: the theoretical and disciplinary fragmentations we have already noted. Of course these could be explained by the political, social and discursive differences we have also considered: especially the intellectual and academic divisions of labour and the social reproduction of specialist forms of cultural capital. Yet I find it more satisfactory to relate these manifest differences to the very processes they seek to describe. Maybe academic divisions also correspond to rather different social positions and viewpoints from which different aspects of cultural circuits acquire the greatest salience. This would explain not merely the fact of different theories, but the *recurrence* and *persistence* of differences, especially between large *clusters* of approaches with certain affinities.

The best way to take such an argument further would be to hazard some provisional description of the different aspects or moments of cultural processes to which we could then relate the different theoretical problematics. Such a model could not be a finished abstraction or theory, if such can exist. Its value would have to be heuristic or illustrative. It might help to explain why theories differ, but would not, in itself, sketch the ideal approach. At most it might serve as a guide to the desirable directions of future approaches, or to the way in which they might be modified or combined. It is important to bear these caveats in mind in what follows. I find it easiest (in a long CCCS tradition) to present a model diagrammatically (see below). The diagram is intended to represent a circuit of the production, circulation and consumption of cultural products. Each box represents a moment in this circuit. Each moment or aspect depends upon the others and is indispensable to the whole. Each, however, is distinct and involves characteristic changes of form. It follows that if we are placed at one point of the circuit, we do not necessarily see what is happening at others. The forms that have most significance for us at one point may be very different from those at another. Processes disappear in results.¹² All cultural products, for example, require to be produced, but the conditions of their production cannot be inferred by scrutinising them as “texts.” Similarly all cultural products are “read” by persons other than professional analysts (if they weren’t there would be little profit in their production), but we cannot predict these uses from our own analysis, or, indeed, from the conditions of production. As anyone knows, all our communications are liable to return to us in unrecognisable or at least transformed terms. We often call this *mis*understanding or, if we are being very academic, *mis*-readings. But these “misses” are so common (across the range of a whole society) that we might well call



them normal. To understand the transformations, then, we have to understand specific conditions of consumption or reading. These include asymmetries of resources and power, material and cultural. They also include the existing ensembles of cultural elements already active within particular social *milieux* ("lived cultures" in the diagram) and the social relations on which these combinations depend. These reservoirs of discourses and meanings are in turn raw material for fresh cultural production. They are indeed among the specifically cultural *conditions* of production.

In our societies, many forms of cultural production also take the form of capitalist commodities. In this case we have to supply specifically capitalist conditions of production (see the arrow pointing to moment 1) and specifically capitalist conditions of consumption (see the arrow pointing to moment 3). Of course this does not tell us all there is to know about these moments, which may be structured on other principles as well, but in these cases the circuit is, at one and the same time, a circuit of capital and its expanded reproduction *and* a circuit of the production and circulation of subjective forms.

Some implications of the circuit may be clearer if we take a particular case. We can, for example, whiz a Mini-Metro car around it. I choose the Mini-Metro because it is a pretty standard late 20th-century capitalist commodity that happened to carry a particularly rich accumulation of meanings. The Metro was the car that was going to save the British car industry, by beating rivals from the market and by solving British Leyland's acute problems of industrial discipline. It came to signify solutions to internal and external national threats. The advertising campaigns around its launching were remarkable. In one television ad, a band of Mini-Metros pursued a gang of foreign imports up to (and apparently over) the White Cliffs of Dover, whence they fled in what looked remarkably like landing-craft. This was a Dunkirk in reverse with the Metro as nationalist hero. Certainly these are some of the forms—nationalist epic, popular memory of World War II, internal/external threat—that I would want to abstract for further formal scrutiny. But this raises interesting questions too about what constitutes the “text” (or raw material for such abstractions) in these cases. Would it be enough to analyse the design of the Metro itself as Barthes once analysed the lines of a Citroen? How could we exclude ads and garage showroom displays? Shouldn't we include, indeed, the Metro's place in discourses upon national economic recovery and moral renaissance?

Supposing that we answered these questions affirmatively (and gave ourselves a lot more work) there would still be some unposed questions. What was *made* of the Metro phenomenon, more privately, by particular groups of consumers and readers? We would expect great diversity of response. Leyland workers, for example, were likely to view the car differently from those who only bought it. Beyond this, the Metro (and its transformed meanings) became a way of getting to work or picking the kids up from school. It may also have helped to produce, for example, orientations towards working life, connecting industrial “peace” with national prosperity. Then, of course, the products of this whole circuit returned once more to the moment of production—as profits for fresh investment, but also as market researcher's findings on “popularity” (capital's own “cultural studies”). The subsequent use, by British Leyland management, of similar strategies for selling cars and weakening workers suggests considerable accumulations (of both kinds) from this episode. Indeed the Metro became a little paradigm, though not the first, for a much more diffused ideological form, which we might term, with some compression, “the nationalist sell.”

Publication and Abstraction

So far I have talked rather generally about the transformations that occur around the circuit without specifying any. In so brief a discussion, I will specify two related changes of form indicated on the left and right hand sides of the circuit. The

circuit involves movements between the public and the private but also movements between more abstract and more concrete forms. These two poles are quite closely related: private forms are more concrete, and more particular in their scope of reference; public forms are more abstract but also apply over a more general range. This may be clearer if we return to the Metro and, thence, to different traditions of cultural study.

As a designer's idea, as a manager's "concept," the Metro remained private.¹³ It may even have been conceived in secret. It was known to a chosen few. At this stage, indeed, it would have been hard to separate it out from the social occasions at which it was discussed: board-room meetings, chats at the bar, Saturday's game of golf? But as ideas were "put on paper" it started to take a more objective and more public form. The crunch came when decisions were made to go ahead with "the concept" and, then again, to "go public." Finally, the Metro-idea, shortly followed by the Metro-car, moved into "the full glare of publicity." It acquired a more general significance, gathering around it, in fact, some pretty portentous notions. It became, in fact, a great public issue, or a symbol for such. It also took shape as an actual product and set of texts. In one obvious sense it was made "concrete": not only could you kick it, you could drive it. But in another sense, this Metro was rather abstract. There it stood, in the showroom, surrounded by its texts of Britishness, a shiny, zippy thing. Yet who would know, from this display, who conceived it, how it was made, who suffered for it, or indeed what possible use it was going to have for the harassed-looking woman with two children in tow, who has just walked into the showroom. To draw out more general points, three things occurred in the process of public-ation. First, the car (and its texts) became *public* in the obvious sense: it acquired if not a *universal* at least a more *general* significance. Its messages too were generalised, ranging rather freely across the social surface. Second, at the level of *meaning*, publication involved *abstraction*. The car and its messages could now be viewed in relative isolation from the social conditions that formed it. Thirdly, it was subjected to a process of public *evaluation* (great public issue) on many different scales: as a technical-social instrument, as a national symbol, as a stake in class war, in relation to competing models, etc. It became a site of formidable struggles over meaning. In this process it was made to "speak," evaluatively, for "us (British) all." Note, however, in the moment of consumption or reading, represented here by the woman and her children (who have decided views about cars), we are forced back again to the private, the particular and concrete, however publicly displayed the raw materials for their readings may be.

I want to suggest that these processes are intrinsic to cultural circuits under modern social conditions, and that they are produced by, and are productive of, *relations of power*. But the most germane evidence for this, lies in some repeated differences in the forms of cultural study.

Forms of Culture—Forms of Study

One major division, theoretical and methodological, runs right through cultural studies. On the one side there are those who insist that “cultures” must be studied as a whole, and *in situ*, located, in their material context. Suspicious of abstractions and of “theory,” their practical theory is in fact “culturalist.” They are often attracted to those formulations in Williams or E.P. Thompson that speak of cultures as whole ways of life or whole ways of struggle. Methodologically, they stress the importance of complex, concrete description, which grasps, particularly, the unity or homology of cultural forms and material life. Their preferences are therefore for social-historical recreations of cultures or cultural movements, or for ethnographic cultural description, or for those kinds of writing (e.g. autobiography, oral history, or realist forms of fiction) which recreate socially-located “experience.”

On the other side, there are those who stress the relative independence or effective autonomy of subjective forms and means of signification. The practical theory here is usually structuralist, but in a form which privileges the discursive construction of situations and subjects. The preferred method is to treat the forms abstractly, sometimes quite formalistically, uncovering the mechanisms by which meaning is produced in language, narrative or other kinds of sign-system. If the first set of methods are usually derived from sociological, anthropological or social-historical roots, the second set owe most to literary criticism, and especially the traditions of literary modernism and linguistic formalism.¹⁴

In the long run, this division is, in my opinion, a sure impediment to the development of cultural studies. But it is important first to note the logic of such a division in relation to our sketch of cultural processes as a whole. If we compare, in more detail, what we have called the public and private forms of culture, the relation may be clearer.¹⁵

Private forms are not necessarily private in the usual sense of personal or individual, though they may be both. They may also be shared, communal and social in ways that public forms are not. It is their particularity or concreteness that marks them as private. They relate to the characteristic life experiences and historically-constructed needs of particular social categories. They do not pretend to define the world for those in other social groups. They are limited, local, modest. They do not aspire to universality. They are also deeply embedded in everyday social intercourse. In the course of their daily lives, women go shopping and meet and discuss the various doings of themselves, their families and their neighbours. Gossip is a private form deeply connected with the occasions and relations of being a woman in our society. Of course, it is *possible* to describe the discursive forms of gossip abstractly, stressing for instance the forms of reciprocity in speech, but this does seem to do a particular violence to the material, ripping it from the immediate and visible context in which these texts of talk arose.

An even more striking case is the working-class culture of the shop floor. As Paul Willis has shown there is a particularly close relationship here between the physical action of labour and the practical jokes and common sense of the workplace.¹⁶ The whole discursive mode of the culture is to refuse the separations of manual practice and mental theory characteristic of public and especially academic knowledge forms. In neither case—gossip and shop-floor culture—is there a marked division of labour in cultural production. Nor are there technical instruments of production of any great complexity, though forms of speech and the symbolic uses of the human body are complex enough. Nor are the consumers of cultural forms formally or regularly distinguished from their producers, or far removed from them, in time or space.

I would argue that particular forms of inquiry and of representation have been developed to handle these features of private forms. Researchers, writers and all kinds of rapporteurs have adjusted their methods to what have seemed the most evident features of culture in this moment. They have sought to hold together the subjective and more objective moments, often not distinguishing them theoretically, or, in practice, refusing the distinction altogether. It is this stress of “experience” (the term that perfectly captures this conflation or identity) that has united the practical procedures of social historians, ethnographers and those interested, say, in “working-class writing.”

Compared with the thick, conjoined tissue of face-to-face encounters, the television programme “going out on the air” seems a very abstracted, even ethereal product. For one thing it is so much more plainly a *representation* of “real life” (at best) than the (equally constructed) narratives of everyday life. It takes a separated, abstracted or objective form, in the shape of the programme/text. It comes at us from a special, fixed place, a box of standardised shape and size in the corner of our sitting room. Of course, we apprehend it socially, culturally, communally, but it still has this separated moment, much more obviously than the private text of speech. This separated existence is certainly associated with an intricate division of labour in production and distribution and with the physical and temporal distance between the moment of production and that of consumption, characteristic of public knowledge forms in general. Public media of this kind, indeed, permit quite extraordinary manipulations of space and time as, for example, in the television revival of old movies.

I would argue that this apparent abstraction in the actual forms of public communication underlies the whole range of methods that focus on the construction of reality through symbolic forms themselves—with language as the first model, but the key moment as the objectification of language in text. It would be fascinating to pursue an historical inquiry linked to this hypothesis which would attempt to unravel the relationship between the real abstractions of communicative forms and the mental abstractions of cultural theorists. I do not suppose that the two processes go easily hand in hand or that changes occur synchronously. But I am sure that the notion of text—as something we can isolate, fix, pin down and scrutinise—depends upon the

extensive circulation of cultural products which have been divorced from the immediate conditions of their production and have a moment of suspension, so to speak, before they are consumed.

Public-ation and Power

The public and private forms of culture are not sealed against each other. There is a real circulation of forms. Cultural production often involves public-ation, the making public of private forms. On the other side, public texts are consumed or read in private. A girls' magazine, like *Jackie* for instance, picks up and represents some elements of the private cultures of femininity by which young girls live their lives. It instantaneously renders these elements open to public evaluation—as for example, “girls stuff,” “silly” or “trivial.” It also generalises these elements within the scope of the particular readership, creating a little public of its own. The magazine is then a raw material for thousands of girl-readers who make their own *re*-appropriations of the elements first borrowed from their lived culture and forms of subjectivity.

It is important not to assume that public-ation only and always works in dominating or in demeaning ways. We need careful analyses of where and how public representations work to seal social groups into the existing relations of dependence and where and how they have some emancipatory tendency. Short of this detail, we can nonetheless insist on the importance of *power* as an element in an analysis, by suggesting the main ways it is active in the public-private relationship.

Of course there are profound differences in terms of access to the public sphere. Many social concerns may not acquire publicity at all. It is not merely that they remain private, but that they are actively privatised, *held* at the level of the private. Here, so far as formal politics and state actions are concerned, they are invisible, without public remedy. This means not only that they have to be borne, but that a consciousness of them, as evils, is held at a level of implicit or communal meanings. Within the group a knowledge of such sufferings may be profound, but not of such a kind that expects relief, or finds the sufferings strange.

As often, perhaps, such private concerns do appear publicly, but only on certain terms, and therefore transformed and framed in particular ways. The concerns of gossip, for example, do appear publicly in a wide variety of forms, but usually in the guise of “entertainment.” They appear, for instance, in soap opera, or are “dignified” only by their connection with the private lives of royalty, stars or politicians. Similarly, elements of shop-floor culture may be staged as comedy or variety acts. Such framings in terms of code or genre may not, as some theorists believe, altogether vitiate these elements as the basis of a social alternative, but they certainly work to contain them within the dominant public definitions of significance.

Public representations may also act in more openly punitive or stigmatising

ways. In these forms the elements of private culture are robbed of authenticity or rationality, and constructed as dangerous, deviant, or dotty.¹⁷ Similarly the experiences of subordinated social groups are presented as pathological, problems for intervention not in the organisation of society as a whole, but in the attitudes or behaviour of the suffering group itself. This is representation with a vengeance: representation not as subjects demanding redress, but at objects of external intervention.

If space allowed it would be important to compare the different ways in which these processes may occur across the major social relationships of class, gender, race and age-dependence. One further general mechanism is the construction, in the public sphere, of definitions of the public/private division itself. Of course, these sound quite neutral definitions: “everyone” agrees that the most important public issues are the economy, defence, law and order and, perhaps, welfare questions, and that other issues—family life, sexuality for example—are essentially private. The snag is that the dominant definitions of significance are quite socially specific and, in particular, tend to correspond to masculine and middle-class structures of “interest” (in both the meanings of this term). It is partly because they start fundamentally to challenge these dispositions that some feminisms, the peace movements and the Green parties are amongst the most subversive of modern developments.

I have stressed these elements of power, at the risk of some diversion from the main argument, because cultural studies practices must be viewed within this context. Whether it takes as its main object the more abstracted public knowledges and their underlying logics and definitions, or it searches out the private domains of culture, cultural studies is necessarily and deeply implicated in relations of power. It forms a part of the very circuits which it seeks to describe. It may, like the academic and the professional knowledges, police the public-private relation, or it may critique it. It may be involved in the surveillance of the subjectivities of subordinated groups, or in struggles to represent them more adequately than before. It may become part of the problem, or a part of the solution. That is why as we turn to the particular forms of cultural study, we need to ask not only about objects, theories and methods, but also about the political limits and potentials of different standpoints around the circuit.

From the Perspective of Production

This is a particularly wide and heterogeneous set of approaches. For I include under this head, approaches with very different political tendencies, from the theoretical knowledges of advertisers, persons involved in public relations for large organisations, many liberal-pluralist theorists of public communication and the larger part of writings on culture within the marxist and other critical traditions. As between disciplines, it is sociologists or social historians or political economists, or those

concerned with the political organisation of culture, who have most commonly taken this viewpoint.

A more systematic approach to cultural production has been a relatively recent feature of the sociology of literature, art or popular cultural forms. These concerns parallel debates about the mass media and were originally deeply influenced by the early experiences of state propaganda under the conditions of the modern media, especially in Nazi Germany. Crossing the more aesthetic and political debates has been the pervasive concern with the influence of capitalist conditions of production and the mass market in cultural commodities on the “authenticity” of culture, including the popular arts. Studies of production within these traditions have been equally varied: from grandiose critiques of the political economy and cultural pathology of mass communications (e.g. the early Frankfurt School) to close empirical inspections of the production of news or particular documentary series or soap operas on television.¹⁸ In a very different way still, much modern social history has been concerned with ‘cultural production,’ though this time the cultural production of social movements or even whole social classes. It is important to accept E. P. Thompson’s invitation to read *The Making of the English Working Class* from this cultural standpoint; Paul Willis’ work, especially *Learning to Labour*, represents in many ways the sociological equivalent of this historiographical tradition.

What unites these diverse works, however, is that they all take, if not the viewpoint of cultural producers, at least the *theoretical* standpoint of production. They are interested, first and foremost, in the production and the social organisation of cultural forms. Of course, it is here that marxist paradigms have occupied a very central place, even where continuously argued against. Early marxist accounts asserted the primacy of production conditions and often reduced these to some narrowly-conceived version of “the forces and the relations of production.” Even such reductive analysis had a certain value: culture was understood as a social product, not a matter of individual creativity only. It was therefore subject to political organisation, whether by the capitalist state or by parties of social opposition.¹⁹ In later marxist accounts, the historical forms of the production and organization of culture—“the superstructures”—have begun to be elaborated.

In Gramsci’s writing the study of culture from the viewpoint of production becomes a more general interest with the cultural dimensions of struggles and strategies as a whole. The longstanding and baneful influence of “high-cultural” or specialist definitions of “Culture” *within* marxism was also definitively challenged.²⁰ Gramsci was, perhaps, the first major marxist theorist and communist leader to take the cultures of the popular classes as a serious object of study and of political practice. All the more modern features of culture organisation also start to appear in his work: he writes of cultural organisers/producers not just as little knots of “intellectuals” on the old revolutionary or Bolshevik model but as whole social strata

concentrated around particular institutions—schools, colleges, the law, the press, the state bureaucracies and the political parties. Gramsci’s work is the most sophisticated and fertile development of a traditional marxist approach via cultural production. Yet I think that Gramsci remains much more the “Leninist” than is sometimes appreciated in new left or academic debates in Britain.²¹ From the work available in English, it seems to me he was less interested in how cultural forms work, subjectively, than in how to “organise” them, externally.

Limits of the Viewpoint of Production

I find two recurrent limits to looking at culture from this viewpoint. The first difficulty is the familiar one of “economism,” though it is useful, I hope, to restate the problem in a different way. There is a tendency to neglect what is specific to *cultural* production in this model. Cultural production is assimilated to the model of capitalist (usually) production in general, without sufficient attention to the *dual* nature of the circuit of cultural commodities. The conditions of production include not merely the material means of production and the capitalist organisation of labour, but a stock of already existing *cultural* elements drawn from the reservoirs of lived culture or from the already public fields of discourse. This raw material is structured not only by capitalist production imperatives (i.e., commodified) but also by the indirect results of capitalist and other social relations on the existing rules of language and discourse, especially, class and gender-based struggles in their effects on different social symbols and signs. As against this, marxist political economy still goes for the more brutally-obvious “determinations”—especially mechanisms like competition, monopolistic control, and imperial expansion.²² This is why the claim of some semiologies to provide an alternative materialist analysis does have some force.²³ Many approaches to production, in other words, can be faulted on their chosen ground: as accounts of *cultural* production, of the production of *subjective* forms, they tell us at most about some “objective” conditions and the work of some social sites—typically the ideological work of capitalist business (e.g. advertising, the work of commercial media) rather than that of political parties, schools, or the apparatuses of “high culture.”

The second difficulty is not economism but what we might call “productivism.” The two are often combined but are analytically distinct. Gramsci’s marxism, for instance, is certainly not economic, but it is, arguably, productivist. The problem here is the tendency to infer the character of a cultural product and its social use from the conditions of its production, as though, in cultural matters, production determines all. The common sense forms of this inference are familiar: we need only trace an idea to its source to declare it “bourgeois” or “ideological”—hence “the bourgeois novel,” “bourgeois science,” “bourgeois ideology” and, of course, all the

“proletarian” equivalents. Most critics of this reduction attack it by denying the connection between conditions of origin and political tendency.²⁴ I do not myself wish to deny that conditions of origin (including the class or gender position of producers) exercise a profound influence on the nature of the product. I find it more useful to question such identifications not as “wrong” but as *premature*. They may be true as far as they go, according to the logics of that moment, but they neglect the range of possibilities in cultural forms especially as these are realised in consumption or “readership.” I do not see how any cultural form can be dubbed “ideological” (in the usual marxist critical sense) until we have examined not only its origin in the primary production process, but also carefully analysed its textual forms *and* the modes of its reception. “Ideological,” unless deployed as a neutral term, is the *last* term to use in such analysis, certainly not the first.²⁵

I still find the debate between Walter Benjamin and Theodore Adorno about the tendency of mass culture a very instructive example.²⁶ Adorno swept on in his majestic polemic identifying capitalist production conditions, tracing effects in the “fetishized” form of the cultural commodity and finding its perfect compliment in the “regressive listening” of fans for popular music. There is a highly deductive or inferential element in his reasoning, often resting on some giant theoretical strides, plotted first by Lukacs. The conflations and reductions that result are well illustrated on one of his (few) concrete examples: his analysis of the British brewer’s slogan—“What We Want is Watneys.”

The brand of the beer was presented like a political slogan. Not only does this billboard give an insight into the nature of the up to date propaganda, which sells its slogans as well as its wares . . . the type of relationship which is suggested by the billboard, by which the masses make a commodity recommended to them the object of their own action, is in fact found again in the pattern of reception of light music. They need and demand what has been palmed off on them.²⁷

The first four lines of this are fine. I like the insight about the parallel courses of political propaganda and commercial advertising, forced on as it was by the German situation. The reading of the slogan is also quite interesting, showing how advertising works to produce an *active* identification. But the analysis goes awry as soon as we get to “the masses.” The actual differentiated drinkers of Watneys and readers of the slogan are assumed to act also as the brewer’s ventriloquists’ dummy, without any other determinations intervening. Everything specific to the enjoyment of slogans or the drinking of beer is abstracted away. Adorno is uninterested, for example, in the meaning of Watneys (or any other tittle) in the context of pub sociability, indexed by the “we.” The possibility that drinkers may have their own reasons for consuming a given product and that drinking has a social use value is overlooked.²⁸

This is quite an extreme case of productivism but the pressure to infer effects or

readings from an analysis of production is a constant one. It is a feature, for example, of a rich vein of work in cultural studies which has mainly been concerned to analyse particular fields of public discourse. Among CCCS publications, *Policing the Crisis* and *Unpopular Education*²⁹ both were analyses of our first two moments—of texts, in this case the fields of discourse about law and order and about public education—and of their conditions and histories of production—law and order campaigns, media *cause celebre*, the work of “primary definers” like judges and the police, the role of a new political tendency, “Thatcherism,” etc. Both studies proved to have considerable predictive value, showing the strengths and the popularity of new right politics before, in the case of *Policing*, Mrs Thatcher’s first electoral victory in 1979.³⁰ Similarly, I believe that *Unpopular Education* contained what has turned out to be a perceptive analysis of the fundamental contradictions of social-democratic politics in Britain and therefore of some of the agonies of the Labour Party. Yet, as political guides, both studies are incomplete: they lack an account of the crisis of ‘1945-ism’ in the lived culture of, especially, working-class groups, or a really concrete rendering of the popular purchase of new right ideologies. They are limited, in other words, by reliance upon, for the most part, the “public” knowledges of the media and of formal politics. Something more is required than this, especially if we are to go beyond critique to help in producing new political programmes and movements.

This argument may be capped if we turn to Walter Benjamin. Benjamin certainly took a more open view of the potentialities of mass cultural forms than Adorno. He was excited by their technical and educational possibilities. We urged cultural producers to transform not only their works, but also their ways of working. He described the techniques of a new form of cultural production: Brecht’s “epic theatre.” Yet we can see that all of these insights are primarily the comments of a critic upon the theories of producers, or take the standpoint of production. It is here, still with the creator, that the really revolutionary moves are to be made. It is true that Benjamin also had interesting ideas about the potentiality of modern forms to produce a new and more detached relationship between reader and text, but this insight remained abstract, as optimistic, in the same rather *a priori* way, as Adorno’s pessimism. It was not rooted in any extended analysis of the larger experience of particular groups of readers.

Our first case (production) turns out to be an interesting instance of an argument the general form of which will recur. Of course, we must look at cultural forms from the viewpoint of their production. This must include the conditions and the means of production, especially in their cultural or subjective aspects. In my opinion it must include accounts and understandings too of the actual moment of production itself—the labour, in its subjective and objective aspects. We cannot be perpetually discussing “conditions” and never discussing acts! At the same time, we must avoid the temptation, signalled in marxist discussions of determination, to subsume all

other aspects of culture under the categories of production-studies. This suggests two stages in a more sensible approach. The first is to grant independence and particularity to a distinct production moment—and to do the same for other moments. This is a necessary, negative, holding of the line against reductionisms of all kinds. But once the line is held in our analysis, another stage becomes quite evident. The different moments or aspects are not in fact distinct. There is, for instance, a sense in which (rather carefully) we can speak of texts as “productive” and a much stronger case for viewing reading or cultural consumption as a production process in which the first product becomes a material for fresh labour. The text-as-produced is a different object from the text-as-read. The problem with Adorno’s analysis and perhaps with productivist approaches in general is not only that they infer the text-as-read from the text-as-produced, but that also, in doing this, they ignore the elements of production in other moments, concentrating “creativity” in producer or critic. Perhaps this is the deepest prejudice of all among the writers, the artists, the teachers, the educators, the communicators and the agitators within the intellectual divisions of labour!

Text-Based Studies

A second whole cluster of approaches are primarily concerned with cultural products. Most commonly these products are treated as “texts”; the point is to provide more or less definitive “readings” of them. Two developments seem especially important: the separation between specialist critics and ordinary readers, and the division between cultural practitioners and those who practice, primarily, by commenting on the works of others. Both developments have much to do with the growth and elaboration of educational and especially academic institutions, but it is interesting that the “modernisms” which have so deeply influenced cultural studies, had their origins as producer’s theories, but are now discussed most intensively in academic and educational contexts. I am thinking particularly of the theories associated with Cubism and Constructivism, Russian formalism and film-making, and, of course, Brecht on theatre.³¹

Much of what is known about the textual organisation of cultural forms is now carried in the academic disciplines conventionally grouped together as the humanities or the arts. The major humanities disciplines, but especially linguistic and literary studies, have developed means of formal description which are indispensable for cultural analysis. I am thinking, for example, of the literary analysis of forms of narrative, the identification of different *genre*, but also of whole families of genre categories, the analysis of syntactical forms, possibilities and transformations in linguistics, the formal analysis of acts and exchanges in speech, the analysis of some elementary forms of cultural theory by philosophers, and the common borrowings, by criticism and cultural studies, from semiology and other structuralisms.

Looking at it from outside, the situation in the humanities and especially in literature seems to me very paradoxical: on the one hand, the development of immensely powerful tools of analysis and description, on the other hand, rather meagre ambitions in terms of applications and objects of analysis. There is a tendency for the tools to remain obstinately technical or formal. The example I find most striking at the moment is linguistics, which seems a positive treasure-chest for cultural analysis but is buried in a heightened technical mystique and academic professionalism, from which, fortunately, it is beginning to emerge.³² Other possibilities seem perpetually cooped up in the “need” to say something new about some well-thumbed text or much disputed author. This sometimes encompasses a free-ranging amateurism whose general cultural credentials apparently sanction the liberal application of some pretty common sense judgments to almost everything. Yet the paradox is that humanities disciplines, which are pre-eminently concerned with identifying the subjective forms of life, are already cultural studies in embryo!

Forms, regularities and conventions first identified in literature (or certain kinds of music or visual art) often turn out to have a much wider social currency. Feminists working on romance, for example, have traced the correspondences between the narrative forms of popular romantic fiction, the public rituals of marriage (e.g. the Royal Wedding) and, if only through their own experience, the subjective tug of the symbolic resolutions of romantic love.³³ Provoked by this still-developing model, a similar set of arguments and researches are developing around conventional masculinity, the fighting fantasies of boy-culture, and the narrative forms of epic.³⁴ As if on a prompter’s cue, the Falklands/Malvinas conflict crystallised both of these forms (and conjoined them) in a particularly dramatic and real public spectacle. There is no better instance, perhaps, of the limits of treating forms like romance or epic as merely *literary* constructions. On the contrary, they are among the most powerful and ubiquitous of *social* categories or *subjective* forms, especially in their constructions of conventional femininity and masculinity. Human beings live, love, suffer bereavement and go off and fight and die by them.

As usual, then, the problem is to appropriate methods that are often locked into narrow disciplinary channels and use their real insights more widely, freely. What kinds of text-based methods, then, are most useful? And what problems should we look for and try to overcome?

The Importance of Being Formal

Especially important are all the modernist and post-modernist influences, particularly those associated with structuralism and post-Saussurean linguistics. I include the developments in semiology here, but would also want to include, as a kind of cousinhood, once-removed, some strands in “Anglo-American” linguistics.³⁵ Cultural studies has often approached these strands quite gingerly, with heated battles, in

particular, with those kinds of text-analysis informed by psycho-analysis,³⁶ but the fresh modernist infusions continue to be a source of developments. As someone coming from the other historical/sociological side, I am often surprised and uncritically entranced by the possibilities here.

Modern formal analysis promises a really careful and systematic description of subjective forms, and of their tendencies and pressures. It has enabled us to identify, for example, narrativity as a basic form of organisation of subjectivities.³⁷ It also gives us leads—or more—on the repertoire of narrative forms existing contemporaneously, the actual story-forms characteristic of different ways of life. If we treat these not as archetypes but as historically-produced constructions, the possibilities for fruitful concrete study on a wide range of materials is immense. For stories obviously come not merely in the form of bookish or filmic fictions but also in everyday conversation, in everyone's imagined futures and daily projections, and in the construction of identities, individual and collective, through memories and histories. What are the recurrent patterns here? What forms can we abstract from these texts most commonly? It seems to me that in the study of subjective forms, we are at the stage in political economy which Marx, in the *Grundrisse*, saw as necessary but primitive: "when the forms had still to be laboriously peeled out from the material."

There are a number of inhibitions here. One powerful one is an opposition to abstract categories and a terror of formalism. I think that this is often quite misplaced. We need to abstract forms in order to describe them carefully, clearly, noting the variations and combinations. I am sure that Roland Barthes was right when he argued against the quixotic rejection of "the artifice of analysis":

Less terrorised by the spectre of "formalism," historical criticism might have been less sterile; it would have understood that the specific study of forms does not in any way contradict the necessary principles of totality and History. On the contrary: the more a system is specifically defined in its forms, the more amenable it is to historical criticism. To parody a well-known saying, I shall say that a little formalism turns one away from History, but that a lot brings one back to it.³⁸

Admittedly Barthes' "History" is suspiciously capitalized and emptied of content: unlink marxism, semiology does not present us with a practice (unless it be Barthes' little essays) for reconstituting a complex whole from the different forms. But I am sure we do end up with better, more explanatory, histories, if we have comprehended, more abstractly, some of the forms and relations which constitute them. In some ways, indeed, I find Barthes' work not formal enough. The level of elaboration in his later work sometimes seems gratuitous: too complex for clarity, insufficiently concrete as a substantive account. In these and other semiological endeavours do we mainly hear the busy whirl of self-generating intellectual systems rapidly slipping out

of control? If so, this is a different noise from the satisfying buzz of a really “historical” abstraction!

Radical structuralisms excite me for another reason.³⁹ They are the furthest reach of the criticism of empiricism which, as I suggested earlier, founds cultural studies philosophically. This radical constructivism—nothing in culture taken as given, everything produced—is a leading insight we cannot fall behind. Of course, these two excitements are closely related, the second as a premise of the first. It is because we know we are not in control of our own subjectivities, that we need so badly to identify their forms and trace their histories and future possibilities.

What is a text anyway?

But if text analysis is indispensable, what is a text? Remember the Mini-Metro as an example of the tendency of “texts” to a polymorphous growth; Tony Bennett’s example of the James Bond genres is an even better case.⁴⁰ The proliferation of allied representations in the field of public discourses poses large problems for any practitioner of contemporary cultural studies. There are, however, better and worse ways of coping with them. Often, I think, it is a traditional literary solution that is reached for: we plump for an ‘author’ (so far as this is possible), a single work or series, perhaps a distinctive genre. Our choices may now be popular texts and perhaps a filmic or electronic medium, yet there are still limits in such quasi-literary criteria.

If, for example, we are really interested in how conventions and the technical means available within a particular medium structure representations, we need to work *across* genre and media, comparatively. We need to trace the differences as well as the similarities, for example, between literary romance, romantic love as public spectacle and love as a private form or narrative. It is only in this way that we can resolve some of the most important evaluative questions here: how far, for instance, romance acts merely to seal women into oppressive social conditions, and how far ideologies of love may nonetheless express utopian conceptions of personal relations. We certainly do not *have* to bound our research by literary criteria; other choices are available. It is possible for instance to take “issues” or periods as the main criterion. Though restricted by their choice of rather “masculine” genre and media, *Policing the Crisis* and *Unpopular Education* are studies of this kind. They hinge around a basically historical definition, examining aspects of the rise of the new right mainly from the early 1970s. The logic of this approach has been extended in recent CCCS media-based studies: a study of a wide range of media representations of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in October 1981⁴¹ and a study of the media in a “post-Falklands” holiday period, from Christmas 1982 to New Year 1983.⁴² This last approach is especially fruitful since it allows us to examine the construction of a holiday (and especially the play around the public/private division) according to the

possibilities of different media and genre, for example, television soap opera and the popular daily press. By capturing something of the contemporaneity and combined “effects” of different systems of representations, we also hope to get nearer to the commoner experience of listening, reading and viewing. This form of study, based upon a conjecture which in this case is both historical (the post-Falklands moment of December 1982) and seasonal (the Christmas holiday), is premised on the belief that context is crucial in the production of meaning.

More generally, the aim is to decentre “the text” as an object of study. “The text” is no longer studied for its own sake, nor even for the social effects it may be thought to produce, but rather for the subjective or cultural forms which it realises and makes available. The text is only a *means* in cultural study; strictly, perhaps, it is a raw material from which certain forms (e.g. of narrative, ideological problematic, mode of address, subject position, etc.) may be abstracted. It may also form *part* of a larger discursive field or *combination* of forms occurring in other social spaces with some regularity. But the ultimate object of cultural studies is not, in my view, the text, but *the social life of subjective forms* at each moment of their circulation, including their textual embodiments. This is a long way from a literary valuing of texts for themselves, though, of course, the modes in which some textual embodiments of subjective forms come to be valued over others, especially by critics or educators—the problem especially of “high” and “low” in culture—is a central question, especially in theories of culture and class. But this is a problem which subsumes “literary” concerns, rather than reproducing them. A key issue is how criteria of “literariness” themselves come to be formulated and installed in academic, educational and other regulative practices.

Structuralist Foreshortenings

How to constitute the text is one problem; another is the tendency of other moments, especially of cultural production and reading, but more generally of the more concrete, private aspects of culture, to disappear into a reading of the text. Around this tendency, we might write a whole complicated history of formalisms, using the term now in its more familiar critical sense. I understand formalism negatively, not as abstraction of forms from texts, but as the abstraction of texts from the other moments. For me this distinction is critical, marking the legitimate and excessive concerns with form. I would explain formalism in the negative sense in terms of two main sets of determinations: those that derive from the social location of “critic” and the limits of a particular practice, and those that derive from particular theoretical problematics, the tools of different critical schools. Although there is a clear historical association, especially in the 20th century, between “criticism” and formalism, there is no necessary connection.

The particular formalisms that interest me most—because there is the most to rescue—are those associated with the various structuralist and post-structuralist discussions of text, narrative, subject positions, discourses and so on. I include here, in a necessarily compressed way, the whole sequence that runs from Saussure’s linguistics and Levi-Strauss’ anthropology to early Barthes and what is sometimes called “semiology mark 1”⁴³ to the developments set in train by May 1968 in film criticism, semiology and narrative theory, including the complicated intersection of Althusserian marxism, later semiologies and psycho-analysis. Despite their variations, these approaches to “signifying practices” share certain paradigmatic limits which I term the “structuralist foreshortening.”

They are limited, in a very fundamental way, by staying within the terms of textual analysis. In so far as they go beyond it, they subordinate other moments to textual analysis. In particular they tend to neglect questions of the production of cultural forms or their larger social organisation, or reduce questions of production to the “productivity” (I would say “capacity to produce”) of the already existing systems of signification, that is the formal languages or codes. They also tend to neglect questions of readership, or subordinate them to the competencies of a textual form of analysis. They tend to derive an “account” of readership, in fact, from the critic’s own textual readings. I want to suggest that the common element in both these limits is a major theoretical lack—the absence of an adequate post-structuralist (or should I say post-post-structuralist) *theory of subjectivity*. This absence is one that is stressed within these approaches themselves; in fact, it is a major charge against old marxisms that they lacked “a theory of the subject.” But the absence is supplied most unsatisfactorily by twinning textual analysis and psycho-analysis in an account of subjectivity which remains very abstract, “thin” and un-historical and also, in my opinion, overly “objective.” To sum up the limitations, there is not really an account or accounts here, of the *genesis* of subjective forms and the different ways in which human beings *inhabit* them.

The Neglect of Production

This is the easier point to illustrate. It is the difference, for example, between cultural studies in the CCCS tradition, and especially the CCCS appropriation of Gramsci’s accounts of hegemony and, say, the main theoretical tendency in the magazine of film criticism associated with the British Film Institute, *Screen*. In the Italian context the comparison might be between the “pure” semiological and cultural studies traditions. While cultural studies at Birmingham has tended to become *more* historical, more concerned with particular conjunctures and institutional locations, the tendency of film criticism in Britain has been, rather, the other way. Initially, an older marxist concern with cultural production, and, in particular with

cinema as industry and with conjunctures in cinematic production was common both in Britain and in France. But like the French film magazines, *Screen* became in the 1970s, increasingly pre-occupied less with production as a social and historical process, and more with the “productivity” of signifying systems themselves, in particular, with the means of representation of the cinematographic medium. This move was very explicitly argued for, not only in the critiques of realist theories of the cinema and of the realist structures of conventional film itself, but also in the critique of the “super-realism” of (honoured) marxist practitioners like Eisenstein and Brecht.⁴⁴ It formed part of a larger movement which placed increasing emphasis on the means of representation in general and argued that we had to choose between the virtual autonomy and absolute determinacy of “signification” or return to the consistency of orthodox marxism. As the elegant one-sided exaggerations put it, it is the myths that speak the myth-maker, the language which speaks the speaker, the texts which read the reader, the theoretical problematic which produces “science,” and ideology or discourse that produces “the subject.”

There *was an* account of production in this work, but a very attenuated one. If we think of production as involving raw materials, tools or means of production, and socially-organised forms of human labour, *Screen's* accounts of film, for instance, focussed narrowly on some of the tools or means of production/representation. I say “some” because semiologically-influenced theories have tended to invert the priorities of older marxist approaches to production, focussing only on some of the *cultural* means, those, in fact, which political economy neglects. Film theory in the 1970s acknowledged the “dual” nature of the cinematic circuit, but was mainly concerned to elaborate cinema as “mental machinery.”⁴⁵ This was an understandable choice of *priorities*, but often pursued in a hyper-critical and non-accumulative way. More serious was the neglect of labour, of the actual human activity of producing. Again this may itself have been an exaggerated reaction against older fashions, especially, in this case *auteur* theory, itself an attenuated conception of labour! The neglect of (structured) human activity and especially of conflicts over all kinds of production seems in retrospect the most glaring absence. Thus, although the conception of “practice” was much invoked (e.g. “signifying practice”) it was practice quite without “praxis” in the older marxist sense. The effects of this were especially important in the debates, which we shall come to, about texts and subjects.

This criticism can be pushed, however, one stage further: a very limited conception of “means.” In *Screen's* theory there was a tendency to look only at the specifically cinematographic “means”—the codes of cinema. The relations between these means and other cultural resources or conditions were not examined: for example, the relation between codes of realism and the professionalism of film-makers or the relation between media more generally and the state and formal political system. If these elements might be counted as means (they might also be thought of as social

relations of production), the raw materials of production were also largely absent, especially in their cultural forms. For cinema, like other public media, takes its raw materials from the pre-existing field of public discourses—the whole field that is, not just from the bit called “cinema”—and, under the kind of conditions we have examined, from private knowledges too. A critique of the very notion of representation (seen as indispensable to the critique of realism) made it hard for these theorists to pull into their accounts of film any very elaborate recognition of what an older, fuller theory might have called “content.” Cinema (and then television) were treated as though they were, so to speak, only “about” cinema or television, only reproducing or transforming the cinematographic or televisual forms, not pulling in and transforming discourses first produced elsewhere. In this way the cinematic text was abstracted from the whole ensemble of discourses and social relations which surrounded and formed it.

One further major limitation in much of this work was a tendency to refuse any explanatory move that went behind the existing means of representation, whether this was the language system, a particular “signifying practice” or, indeed, the political system. The account was foreshortened to textual means and (just) textual “effects.” The means were not conceived historically, as having their own moment of production. This was not a local difficulty in particular analyses, but a general theoretical absence, to be found in the earliest influential models of the theory. The same difficulty haunts Saussurean linguistics. Although the rules of language systems determine speech acts, the everyday deployment of linguistic forms appears not to touch the language system itself. This is partly because its principles are conceived so abstractly that historical change or social variation escapes detection, but it is also because there is no true production moment of the language system itself. Crucial insights into language and other systems of signification are therefore foreclosed: namely, that languages are produced (or differentiated), reproduced and modified by socially-organised human practice, that there can be no language (except a dead one) without speakers, and that language is continually fought over in its words, syntax and discursive deployments. In order to recover these insights, students of culture who are interested in language have had to go outside the predominantly French semiological traditions, back to the marxist philosopher of language Voloshinov or across to particular researches influenced by the work of Bernstein or Halliday.

Readers in Texts; Readers in Society

The most characteristic feature of later semiologies has been the claim to advance a theory of the production of subjects. Initially, the claim was based on a general philosophical opposition to humanist conceptions of a simple, unified “I” or subject, standing unproblematically at the centre of thought or moral or aesthetic evaluation.

This feature of structuralism had affinities with similar arguments in Marx about the subjects of bourgeois ideologies, especially about the premises of political economy, and with Freud's anatomisation of the contradictions of human personality.

"Advanced semiology" presents several layers of theorisation of subjectivity which are difficult to unravel.⁴⁶ This complicated set of fusions and tangles combined fine leading insights with theoretical disasters. The key insight, for me, is that narratives or images always imply or construct a position or positions from which they are to be read or viewed. Although "position" remains problematic (is it a set of cultural competences or, as the term implies, some necessary "subjection" to the text?), the insight is dazzling, especially when applied to visual images and to film. We can not perceive the work which cameras do from a new aspect, not merely presenting an object, but putting us in place before it. If we add to this, the argument that certain kinds of texts ('realism') naturalise the means by which positioning is achieved, we have a dual insight of great force. The particular promise is to render processes hitherto unconsciously suffered (and enjoyed) open to explicit analysis.

Within the context of my own argument, the importance of these insights is that they provide a way of *connecting* the account of textual forms with an exploration of intersections with readers' subjectivities. A careful, elaborated and hierarchised account of the reading positions offered in a text (in narrative structure or modes of address for instance) seems to me the most developed method we have so far within the limits of text analysis. Of course, such readings should not be taken to negate other methods: the reconstruction of the manifest and latent themes of a text, its denotative and connotative moments, its ideological problematic or limiting assumptions, its metaphorical or linguistic strategies. The legitimate object of an identification of "positions" is the *pressures* or *tendencies* of subjective forms, the *directions* in which they move us, their *force*—once inhabited. *The difficulties arise*—and they are very numerous—if *such tendencies are held to be realised in the subjectivities of readers, without additional and different forms of inquiry.*

The intoxications of the theory make such a move very tempting. But to slip from "reader in the text" to "reader in society" is to slide from the most abstract moment (the analysis of forms) to the most concrete object (actual readers, as they are constituted, socially, historically, culturally). This is conveniently to miss—but not explicitly as a rational abstraction—the huge number of fresh determinations or pressures of which we must now take account. In disciplinary terms we move from a ground usually covered by literary approaches to one more familiar to historical or sociological competences, but the common new element here is the ability to handle a mass of co-existing determinations, operating at many different levels.

It would take us into a long and complicated exploration of 'reading' to try and gauge the full enormity of the leap.⁴⁷ There is only room to stress a few difficulties in treating reading, not as reception or assimilation, but as itself an act of production. If

the text is the raw material of this practice, we encounter, once again, all the problems of textual boundaries. The isolation of a text for academic scrutiny is a very specific form of reading. More commonly texts are encountered promiscuously; they pour in on us from all directions in diverse, coexisting media, and differently-paced flows. In everyday life, textual materials are complex, multiple, overlapping, co-existent, juxta-posed, in a word, “inter-textual.” If we use a more agile category like discourse, indicating *elements* that cut across different texts, we can say that all readings are also “inter-discursive.” No subjective form ever acts on its own. Nor can the *combinations* be predicted by formal or logical means, nor even from empirical analysis of the field of public discourse, though of course this may suggest hypotheses. The combinations stem, rather, from more particular logics—the structured life-activity in its objective and subjective sides, of readers or groups of readers: their social locations, their histories, their subjective interests, their private worlds.

The same problem arises if we consider the tools of this practice, or the codes, competences and orientations already present within a particular social *milieu*. Again these are not predictable from public texts. They belong to private *cultures*, in the way that term has usually been used in cultural studies. They are grouped according to “ways of life.” They exist in the chaotic and historically-sedimented *ensembles* which Gramsci referred to as common sense. Yet these must determine the longer and shorter-range results of particular interpellative moments, or, as I prefer, the forms of cultural transformation which always occur in readings.

All this points to the centrality of what is usually called “context.” Context determines the meaning, transformations or salience of a particular subjective form as much as the form itself. Context includes the cultural features described above, but also the contexts of immediate situations (e.g. the domestic context of the household) and the larger historical context or conjuncture.

Yet any account would remain incomplete without some attention to the act of reading itself and an attempt to theorise its products. The absence of action by the reader is characteristic of formalist accounts. Even those theorists (e.g. Brecht, *Tel Quel*, Barthes in *S/Z*) who are concerned with productive, deconstructive or critical reading ascribe this capacity to types of text (e.g. “writable” rather than “readable” in Barthes’ terminology) and not at all to a history of real readers. This absence of production in reading parallels the ascription of productivity to signifying systems which we have already noted. At best particular acts of reading are understood as a replaying of primary human experiences. Just as an older literary criticism sought universal values and human emotions in the text, so the new formalisms understand reading as the reliving of psycho-analytically-defined mechanisms. Analysis of the spectator’s gaze, based on Lacanian accounts of the mirror phase, identify *some* of the motions of the way men use images of women and relate to heroes.⁴⁸ Such analyses *do* bridge text and reader. There is a huge potentiality, for cultural studies, in

the critical use of Freudian categories, as critical that is, as the use of marxist categories has become or is becoming. Yet present uses often bridge text and reader at a cost: the radical simplification of the social subject, reducing him or her to the original, naked, infant needs. It is difficult on this basis to specify all the realms of difference which one wishes to grasp, even, surprisingly, gender. At worst the imputations about real subjects come down to a few universals, just as it is now only a few basic features of the text which interest us. There are distinct limits to a procedure which discovers, in otherwise varied phenomena, the same old mechanisms producing the same old effects.

One lack in these accounts is an attempt to describe more elaborately the surface forms—the flows of inner speech and narrative—which are the most empirically obvious aspect of subjectivity. Perhaps it is thought humanist to pay attention to consciousness in this way? But we all are (aren't we?) continuous, resourceful and absolutely frenetic users of narrative and image? And these uses occur, in part, inside the head, in the imaginative or ideal world which accompanies us in every action. We are not merely positioned by stories about ourselves, stories about others. We use realist stories about the future to prepare or plan, acting out scenarios of dangerous or pleasurable events. We use fictional or fantastical forms to escape or divert. We tell stories about the past in the form of memory which construct versions of who we presently are. Perhaps all this is simply pre-supposed in formalist analysis, yet to draw it into the foreground seems to have important implications.⁴⁹ It makes it possible to recover the elements of self-production in theories of subjectivity. It suggests that before we can gauge the productivity of new interpellations, or anticipate their like popularity, we need to know what stories are already in place.

All this involves a move beyond what seems to be an underlying formalist assumption: that real readers are “wiped clean” at each textual encounter to be positioned (or liberated) anew by the next interpellation. Post-structuralist revisions, stressing the continuous productivity of language or discourse as *process*, do not necessarily help here, because it is not at all clear what all this productivity actually produces. There is no real theory of subjectivity here, partly because the *explanandum*, the “object” of such a theory, remains to be specified. In particular there is no account of the carry-over or continuity of self-identities from one discursive moment to the next, such as a re-theorisation of memory in discursive terms might permit. Since there is no account of continuities or of what remains constant or accumulative, there is no account of structural shifts or major re-arrangements of a sense of self, especially in adult life. Such transformations are always, implicitly, referred to “external” text-forms, for example revolutionary or poetic texts, usually forms of literature. There is no account of what predisposes the reader to use such texts productively or what conditions, other than the text-forms themselves, contribute to revolutionary conjunctures in their subjective dimensions. Similarly, with such a weight

on the text, there is no account of how some readers (including, presumably, the analysts) can use conventional or realist texts critically. Above all, there is no account of what I would call *the subjective aspects of struggle*, no account of how there is a moment in subjective flux when social subjects (individual or collective) produce accounts of who they are, as conscious political agents, that is, constitute themselves, politically. To ask for such a theory is not to deny the major structuralist or post-structuralist insights: subjects *are* contradictory, “in process,” fragmented, produced. But human beings and social movements also strive to produce some coherence and continuity, and through this, exercise some control over feelings, conditions and destinies.

This is what I mean by a “post-post-structuralist” account of subjectivity. It involves returning to some older but reformulated questions—about struggle, “unity,” and the production of a political will. It involves accepting structuralist insights as a statement of the problem, whether we are speaking of our own fragmented selves or the objective and subjective fragmentation of possible political constituencies. But it also involves taking seriously what seems to me the most interesting theoretical lead: the notion of a discursive self-production of subjects, especially in the form of histories and memories.⁵⁰

Social Inquiries—Logic and History

I hope that the logic of our third cluster of approaches, which focus on “lived culture,” is already clear. To recapitulate, the problem is how to grasp the more *concrete* and more *private* moments of cultural circulation. This sets up two kinds of pressures. The first is towards methods which can detail, recompose and represent complex ensembles of discursive and non-discursive features as they appear in the life of particular social groups. The second is towards “social inquiry” or an active seeking out of cultural elements which do not appear in the public sphere, or only appear abstracted and transformed. Of course, students of culture have access to private forms through their own experiences and social worlds. This is a continuous resource, the more so if it is consciously specified and if its relativity is recognised. Indeed, a cultural self-criticism of this kind is *the* indispensable condition for avoiding the more grossly ideological forms of cultural study.⁵¹ But the first lesson here is the recognition of *major cultural differences*, especially across those social relationships where power, dependence and inequality are most at stake. There are perils, then, in the use of a (limited) individual or collective self-knowledge where the limits of its representativeness are uncharted and its other sides—usually the sides of powerlessness—are simply unknown. This remains a justification for forms of cultural study which take the cultural worlds of others (often reverse sides of one’s own as the main object.

We have to keep a discomfited eye on the historical pedigrees and current orthodoxies of what is sometimes called “ethnography,” a practice of representing the cultures of others. The practice, like the word, already extends social distance and constructs relations of knowledge-as-power. To “study” culture forms is already to differ from a more implicit inhabitation of culture which is the main “common-sense” mode in *all* social groups. (And I mean *all* social groups—“intellectuals” may be great at describing *other* people’s implicit assumptions, but are as “implicit” as anyone when it comes to their own.)

The early years of new left research in particular—the 1940s, 50s and early 60s—involved a new set of relations between the subjects and objects of research, especially across class relations.⁵² Intellectual movements associated with feminism and the work of some black intellectuals have transformed (but not abolished) these social divisions too. Experiments in community-based authorship have also, within limits, achieved new social relations of cultural production and publication.⁵³ Even so it seems wise to be suspicious, not necessarily of these practices themselves, but of all accounts of them that try to minimise the political risks and responsibilities involved, or to resolve magically the remaining social divisions. Since fundamental social relations have not been transformed, social inquiry tends constantly to return to its old anchorages, pathologising subordinated cultures, normalising the dominant modes, helping at best to build academic reputations without proportionate returns to those who are represented. Apart from the basic political standpoint—whose side the researchers are on—much depends on the specific theoretical forms of the work, the *kind* of ethnography.

Limits of “Experience”

There seems to be a close association between ethnographies (or histories) based on sympathetic identification and empiricist or “expressive” models of culture. The pressure is to represent lived cultures as authentic ways of life and to uphold them against ridicule or condescension. Research of this kind has often been used to criticise the dominant representations, especially those influencing state policies. Researchers have often mediated a private working-class world (often the world of their own childhood) and the definitions of the public sphere with its middle-class weighting. A very common way of upholding subordinated cultures has been to stress the bonds between the subjective and objective sides of popular practices. Working-class culture has been seen as the authentic expression of proletarian conditions, perhaps the only expression possible. This relation or identity has sometimes been cemented by “old marxist” assumptions about the proper state of consciousness of the working-class. A similar set of assumptions can be traced in some feminist writings about culture which portray and celebrate a distinct feminine cultural world

reflective of woman's condition. The term which most commonly indexes this theoretical framework is "experience," with its characteristic fusing of objective and subjective aspects.

Such frameworks produce major difficulties, not least for researchers themselves. Secondary analysis and re-presentation must always be problematic or intrusive if "spontaneous" cultural forms are seen as a completed or necessary form of social knowledge. The only legitimate practice, in this framework, is to represent an unmediated chunk of authentic life experience itself, in something like its own terms. This form of cultural empiricism is a dead hand on the most important of cultural studies practices, and is one of the reasons why it is also the most difficult to deliver at all.

There is also a systematic pressure towards presenting lived cultures primarily in terms of their homogeneity and distinctiveness. This theoretical pressure, in conceptions like "whole way of life," becomes startlingly clear when issues of nationalism and racism are taken into account. There is a discomfiting convergence between "radical" but romantic versions of "working-class culture" and notions of a shared Englishness or white ethnicity. Here too one finds the term "way of life" used as though "cultures" were great slabs of significance always humped around by the same set of people. In left ethnography the term has often been associated with an under-representation of non-class relations and of fragmentations within social classes.⁵⁴

The main lack within expressive theories is attention to the means of signification as a specific cultural determination. There is no better instance of the divorce between formal analysis and "concrete studies" than the rarity of linguistic analysis in historical or ethnographic work. Like much structuralist analysis, then, ethnographies often work with a foreshortened version of our circuit, only here it is the whole arc of "public" forms which is often missing. Thus the creativity of private forms is stressed, the continuous cultural productivity of everyday life, but not its dependence on the materials and modes of public production. Methodologically, the virtues of abstraction are eschewed so that the separate (or separable) elements of lived cultures are not unravelled, and their real complexity (rather than their essential unity) is not recognised.

Best Ethnography

I do not wish to imply that this form of cultural study is intrinsically compromised. On the contrary, I tend to see it as the privileged form of analysis, both intellectually and politically. Perhaps this will be clear if I briefly review some aspects of the best ethnographic studies at Birmingham.⁵⁵

These studies have used abstraction and formal description to identify key ele-

ments in a lived cultural ensemble. Cultures are read “textually.” But they have also been viewed alongside a reconstruction of the social position of the users. There is a large difference here between a “structural ethnography” and a more ethno-methodological approach concerned exclusively with the level of meaning and usually within an individualistic framework. This is one reason, for instance, why feminist work in the Centre has been as much preoccupied with theorising the position of women as with “talking to girls.” We have tried to ally cultural analysis with a (sometimes too generalised) structural sociology, centering upon gender, class and race.

Perhaps the most distinctive feature has been the connections made between lived cultural ensembles and public forms. Typically, studies have concerned the appropriation of elements of mass culture and their transformation according to the needs and cultural logics of social groups. Studies of the contribution of mass cultural forms (popular music, fashion, drugs or motor bikes) to sub-cultural styles, of girls’ use of popular cultural forms, and of the lads’ resistance to the knowledge and authority of school are cases in point. In other words the best studies of lived culture are also, necessarily, studies of “reading.” It is from this point of view—the intersection of public and private forms—that we have the best chance of answering the two key sets of questions to which cultural studies—rightly—continually returns.

The first set concerns “popularity,” pleasure and the *use value* of cultural forms. Why do some subjective forms acquire a popular force, become principles of living? What are the *different* ways in which subjective forms are inhabited—playfully or in deep seriousness, in fantasy or by rational agreement, because it is the thing to do or the thing *not* to do?

The second set of questions concerns the *outcomes* of cultural forms. Do these forms tend to reproduce existing forms of subordination or oppression? Do they hold down or contain social ambitions, defining wants too modestly? Or are they forms which permit a questioning of existing relations or a running beyond them in terms of desire? Do they point to alternative social arrangements? Judgments like these cannot be made on the basis of the analysis of production conditions or texts alone; they can best be answered once we have traced a social form right through the circuit of its transformations and made some attempt to place it within the whole context of relations of hegemony within the society.

Future Shapes of Cultural Studies: Directions

My argument has been that there are three main models of cultural studies research: production-based studies, text-based studies, and studies of lived cultures. This division conforms to the main appearances of cultural circuits, but inhibits the development of our understandings in important ways. Each approach has a rational-

ity in relation to that moment it has most closely in view, but is quite evidently inadequate, even “ideological,” as an account of the whole. Yet each approach also implies a different view of the politics of culture. Production-related studies imply a struggle to control or transform the most powerful means of cultural production, or to throw up alternative means by which a counter-hegemonic strategy may be pursued. Such discourses are usually addressed to institutional reformers or to radical political parties. Text-based studies, focussing on the forms of cultural products, have usually concerned the possibilities of a transformative cultural practice. They have been addressed most often to *avant-garde* practitioners, critics and teachers. These approaches have appealed especially to professional educators, in colleges or schools, because knowledges appropriate to radical practice have been adapted (not without problems) to a knowledge appropriate to critical readers. Finally, research into lived cultures has been closely associated with a politics of “representation” upholding the ways of life of subordinated social groups and criticising the dominant public forms in the light of hidden wisdoms. Such work may even aspire to help to give hegemonic or non-corporate turn to cultures that are usually privatised, stigmatised or silenced.

It is important to stress that the circuit has not been presented as an adequate account of cultural processes or even of elementary forms. It is not a completed set of abstractions against which every partial approach can be judged. It is not therefore an adequate strategy for the future just to add together the three sets of approaches, using each for its appropriate moment. This would not work without transformations of each approach and, perhaps, our thinking about “moments.” For one thing there are some real theoretical incompatibilities between approaches; for another, the ambitions of many project are already large enough! It is important to recognise that each aspect has a life of its own in order to avoid reductions, but, after that, it may be more transformative to rethink each moment in the light of the others, importing objects and methods of study usually developed in relation to one moment into the next. The moments, though separable, are not in fact discrete, therefore we need to trace what Marx would have called “the inner connections” and “real identities” between them.

Those concerned with production studies need to look more closely, for example, at the specifically cultural conditions of production. This would include the more formal semiological questions about the codes and conventions on which a television programme, say, draws, and the ways in which it reworks them. It would also have to include a wider range of discursive materials—ideological themes and problematics—that belong to a wider social and political conjuncture. But already, in the production moment, we would expect to find more or less intimate relations with the lived culture of particular social groups, if only that of the producers. Discursive and ideological elements would be used and transformed from there too. “Already” then, in the study of the production moment, we can anticipate the other aspects of

the larger process and prepare the ground for a more adequate account. Similarly we need to develop, further, forms of text-based study which hook up with the production and readership perspectives. It may well be, in the Italian context, where semiological and literary traditions are so strong, that those are the most important transformations. It *is* possible to look for the signs of the production process in a text: this is one useful way of transforming the very unproductive concern with “bias” that still dominated discussion of “factual” media. It *is* also possible to read texts as forms of representation, provided it is realised that we are always analysing a representation of a representation. The first object, that which is represented in the text, is not an objective event or fact, but has already been given meanings in some other social practice. In this way it is possible to consider the relationship, if any, between the characteristic codes and conventions of a social group and the forms in which they are represented in a soap opera or comedy. This is not merely an academic exercise, since it is essential to have such an account to help establish the text’s salience for this group or others. There is no question of abandoning existing forms of text analysis, but these have to be adapted to, rather than superseding, the study of actual readerships. There seem to be two main requirements here. First, the formal reading of a text has to be as open or as multi-layered as possible, identifying preferred positions or frameworks certainly, but also alternative readings and subordinated frameworks, even if these can only be discerned as fragments, or as contradictions in the dominant forms. Second, analysts need to abandon once and for all, both of the two main models of the critical reader: the primarily evaluative reading (is this a good/bad text?) and the aspiration to text-analysis as an “objective science.” The problem with both models is that by de-relativising our acts of reading they remove from self-conscious consideration (but not as an active presence) our common sense knowledge of the larger cultural contexts and possible readings. I have already noted the difficulties here, but want also to stress the indispensability of this resource. The difficulties are met best, but not wholly overcome, when “the analyst” is a group. Many of my most educative moments in cultural studies have come from these internal group dialogues about the readings of texts across, for example, gendered experiences. This is not to deny the real disciplines of “close” reading, in the sense of *careful*, but not in the sense of *confined*.

Finally, those concerned with “concrete” cultural description cannot afford to ignore the presence of text-like structures and particular forms of discursive organisation. In particular we need to know what distinguishes private cultural forms, in their basic modes of organisation, from the public forms. In this way we might be able to specify, linguistically for example, the differential relation of social groups to different media forms, and the real processes of reading that are involved.

Of course, the transformation of particular approaches will have effects on others. If linguistic analysis takes account of historical determinations, for example,

or provides us with ways of analysing the operations of power, the division between language studies and concrete accounts will break down. This goes for the associated politics too. At the moment there are few areas so blocked by disagreement and incomprehension as the relationship between *avant-garde* theorists and practitioners of the arts and those interested in a more grass-roots entry through community arts, working-class writing, women's writing and so on. Similarly, it is hard to convey, just how mechanical, how unaware of cultural dimensions, the politics of most left fractions remain. If I am right that theories are related to viewpoints, we are talking not just of theoretical developments, but about some of the conditions for effective political alliances as well.

NOTES

1. This paper is a revised and expanded version of talks given at the Department of English at Istituto Universitario Orientale in Naples and at the University of Palermo in April 1983. I am grateful to colleagues at Naples, Palermo, Pescara and from Bari for fruitful discussions around the themes raised here. In revising this paper, I have tried to respond to some comments, especially those concerning questions about consciousness and unconsciousness. I am grateful to Lidia Curti, Laura di Michele and Marina Vitale for encouraging the production of this paper and advising on its form, to the British Council for funding my visit, and to friends and students (not mutually exclusive categories) at Birmingham for bearing with very many different versions of 'the circuit.'

2. The key texts are Richard Hoggart, *The Uses of Literacy* (Penguin, 1958); Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society* (Penguin, 1958); Raymond Williams, *The Long Revolution* (Penguin, 1961).

3. For a still useful summary of CCCS responses to Althusser see McLennan, Molina and Peters, "Althusser's Theory of Ideology" in CCCS, *On Ideology* (Hutchinson, 1978).

4. See, for example, Hall, Lumley and McLennan, "Politics and Ideology: Gramsci" in *On Ideology*. But Gramsci's theorisations are a main presence in much of the empirical work from the Centre from the mid-1970s.

5. See McLennan, *Methodologies* and Richard Johnson, "Reading for the Best Marx: History-Writing and Historical Abstraction" in CCCS, *Making Histories: Studies in History-Writing and Politics* (Hutchinson, 1982).

6. These are difficult to represent bibliographically, but key points are marked by CCCS Womens Study Group: *Women Take Issue* (Hutchinson, 1978); CCCS, *The Empire Strikes Back* (Hutchinson, 1982). See also the series on Women and on Race in CCCS Stencilled Papers.

7. This is not a new criticism but given fresh force by the 1970s salience of race. See Paul Gilroy, "Police and Thieves" in *Empire Strikes Back*, esp. pp. 147–51.

8. Some of these, at an early stage, are discussed in *Women Take Issue*, but there is need for a really full and consolidated account of the transformations in cultural studies stemming from feminist work and criticism. See also Angela McRobbie, "Settling Accounts with Sub-Cultures," *Screen Education* No. 34 (Spring, 1980) and the articles by Hazel Carby and Pratibha Parmar in *Empire Strikes Back*.

9. See, for example, Stuart Hall, "Some Paradigms in Cultural Studies," *Anglistica* (1978); Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms," *Media, Culture and Society* No. 2 (1980) (reprinted in part in Tony Bennett *et al.* (eds.), *Culture, Ideology and Social Process* [Open University and Batsford, 1981]) and the introductory essays in Hall, Hobson, Lowe and Willis (eds), *Culture, Media and Language* (Hutchinson, 1980).

son, 1980). These essays are highly compressed versions of the MA Theory Course at CCCS which Stuart Hall taught and which comprised a comprehensive theoretical mapping of the field. See also my own attempts at theoretical clarification, much influenced by Stuart's, especially in, Clark, Critcher and Johnson (eds), *Working Class Culture* (Hutchinson, 1979).

10. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society* and the entry in *Keywords* (Fontana, 1976).

11. For a discussion of "general-historical" abstraction in Marx see, Johnson "Best Marx," p. 172.

12. The diagram is based, in its *general* forms, on a reading of Marx's account of the circuit of capital and its metamorphoses. For an important and original account of this, and of related questions (e.g. fetishism) see Victor Molina, "Marx's Arguments About Ideology," M. Litt. Thesis, (University of Birmingham, 1982). This thesis is currently being revised for submission as a P.D. Also important is Stuart Hall, "Encoding/Decoding" in *Culture, Media, Language*.

13. I am afraid this illustrative case is largely hypothetical since I have no contacts inside British Leyland management. Any resemblance to persons living or dead is entirely fortuitous and a pure instance of the power of theory!

14. This is the division between "structuralist" and "culturalist" approaches Stuart Hall and I, among others, have already discussed, but now in the form of "objects" and methods, rather than "paradigms." See sources listed in note 9 above and add Richard Johnson, "Histories of Culture/Theories of Ideology: Notes on an Impasse," in Barrett *et al.* (eds.), *Ideology and Cultural Production*.

15. My thinking on "the public and the private" is much influenced by certain German traditions, especially discussions around Jürgen Habermas' work on "the public sphere." This is now being interestingly picked up and used in some American work. See Jürgen Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (Neuweid, Berlin, 1962); Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung: Zur Organisationsanalyse von Bürgerlicher und proletarischer Öffentlichkeit*, (Frankfurt am Main, 1972). For an extract of Negt and Kluge's work see A. Matterlart and S. Siegelau (eds.) *Communication and Class Struggle*, vol 2.

16. Paul Willis, "Shop-floor Culture, Masculinity and the Wage Form" in Clarke, Critcher and Johnson (eds.), *Working Class Culture*.

17. There is a very large sociological literature on these forms of stigmatisation, especially of the deviant young. For a cultural studies development of this work see Stuart Hall *et al.*, *Policing the Crisis: "Mugging," the State and Law and Order* (Macmillan, 1978). For more subtle forms of marginalisation see CCCS Media Group, "Fighting Over Peace: Representations of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the Media," CCCS Stencilled Paper, No. 72. For current treatment of the left and the trade unions in the British media see the sequence of studies by the Glasgow Media Group, starting with Glasgow University Media Group, *Bad News*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds), *The Manufacture of News* (Constable, 1973) was a pioneer collection.

18. Among the best close studies of this kind are Philip Elliott, *The Making of a Television Series: A Case Study in the Sociology of Culture* (Constable/Sage, 1972); Philip Schlesinger, *Putting "Reality" Together: BBC News* (Constable/Sage, 1978); Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work* (Constable, 1971); Dorothy Hobson, *Crossroads*.

19. The forms of "political organization" were often not specified in Marx or in the theorists who followed him, up to and including, in my view, Lenin. For Lenin, it seems to me, cultural politics remained a matter of organisation and "propaganda" in quite narrow senses.

20. Althusser's exceptions of "art" from ideology are an instance of the persistence of this view within marxism. It is interesting to compare Althusser's and Gramsci's views of "philosophy" here too, Althusser tending to the specialist academic or "high cultural" definition, Gramsci to the popular.

21. I think the predominant reception of Gramsci in Britain is "anti-leninist," especially among those

interested in discourse theory. But it may be that CCCS appropriations underestimate Gramsci's leninism too. I am grateful to Victor Molina for discussions on this issue.

22. See, for instance, the work of Graham Murdock and Peter Golding on the political economy of the mass media: e.g. "Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations" in Curran *et al.* (eds.), *Mass Communication and Society*; Graham Murdock, "Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications Industries" in Gurevitch *et al.* (eds.), *Culture, Society and the Media*; for a more explicitly polemical engagement with CCCS work see Golding and Murdock, "Ideology and the Mass Media: the Question of Determination" in Barratt *et al.* (eds.), *Ideology and Cultural Production*. For a reply see I. Connell, "Monopoly Capitalism and the Media: Definitions and Struggles" in S. Hibbin (ed.), *Politics, Ideology and the State* (Lawrence and Wishart, 1978).

23. These claims have their proximate origin in Althusser's statement that ideologies have a material existence. For a classic English statement of this kind of "materialism" see Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, *Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977). This is rather different from Marx's argument that under particular conditions ideologies acquire a "material force" or Gramsci's elaboration of this in terms of the conditions of popularity.

24. This applies to a wide range of structuralist and post-structuralist theories from Poulantzas's arguments against class reductionist notions of ideology to the more radical positions of Barry Hindess and Paul Hirst and other theorists of "discourse."

25. In this respect I find myself at odds with many strands in cultural studies, including some influential ones, which opt for an expanded use of ideology rather in the bolshevik sense or in the more leninist of Althusser's (several) uses. Ideology is applied, in Oxford's important popular culture course, for instance, to the formation of subjectivities as such. If stretched thus, I would argue that the term loses its usefulness—"discourse," "cultural form," etc. would do quite as well. On the whole, I wish to retain the "negative" or "critical" connotations of the term "ideology" in classic marxist discourse, though not, as it happens, the usual accompaniment, a "hard" notion of marxism-as-science. It may well be that all our knowledge of the world and all our conceptions of the self are "ideological," or more or less ideological, in that they are rendered partial by the operation of interests and of power. But this seems to me a proposition that has to be plausibly argued in particular cases rather than assumed at the beginning of every analysis. The expanded, "neutral" sense of the term cannot altogether lay to rest the older negative connotations. The issues are interestingly stated in the work of Jorge Larrain. See *Marxism and Ideology* (Macmillan, 1983) and *The Concept of Ideology* (Hutchinson, 1979).

26. See especially Theodore Adorno, "On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Listening" in Arato and Gebhardt, (eds.) *Frankfurt School Reader*; Adorno & Horkheimer, *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (Allen Lane, 1973); Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in *Illuminations* (Fontana, 1973).

27. "Fetish Character in Music," pp. 287–8. Later he gives slightly more rounded pictures of types of consumption of popular music, but even his fans' dancing resembles "the reflexes of mutilated animals" (p 292).

28. For more developed critiques see Dick Bradley, "Introduction to the Cultural Study of Music," CCCS Stencilled Paper, No 61; Richard Middleton, "Reading Popular Music," *Oxford Popular Culture Course Unit*, Unit 16, Block 4 (Open University Press, 1981).

29. CCCS Education Group, *Unpopular Education: Schooling and Social Democracy in England since 1944* (Hutchinson, 1981).

30. The analysis of Thatcherism has continued to be one of Stuart Hall's major concerns. See the very important essays republished in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques (eds.), *The Politics of Thatcherism*

(Lawrence and Wishart/Marxism Today, 1983). "The Great Moving Right Show," written before the 1979 election, proved to be especially perceptive.

31. Particularly useful introductions in English to these combined impacts are Silvia Harvey, *May 1968 and Film Culture* (BFI, 1980); Tony Bennett, *Formalism and Marxism* (New Accents, Methuen, 1979).

32. See, for instance, the work of a group of "critical linguists" initially based on the University of East Anglia, especially: R. Fowler *et al.*, *Language and Control* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). I am especially grateful to Gunther Kress, who spent some months at the Centre, and to Utz Maas of Osnabruck University for very fruitful discussions on the relationship of language studies and cultural studies. See also Utz Maas, "Language Studies and Cultural Analysis," Paper for a Conference on Language and Cultural Studies at CCCS, December 1982.

33. Much of this work remains unpublished. I very much hope that one of the next CCCS books will be a collection on romance. In the meantime see English Studies Group, "Recent Developments" in *Culture, Media, Language*. Rachel Harrison, "Shirley: Romance & Relations of Dependence" in CCCS Women's Studies Group, *Women Take Issue*; Angela McRobbie, "Working-Class Girls and Femininity," *ibid.*; Myra Connell, "Reading and Romance," Unpublished MA Dissertation (University of Birmingham, 1981); Christine Griffin, "Cultures of Femininity: Romance Revisited," CCCS Stencilled Paper, No. 69; Janice Winship, "Woman Becomes an Individual: Femininity and Consumption in Women's Magazines," CCCS Stencilled Paper, No 65; Laura di Michele, "The Royal Wedding," CCCS Stencilled Paper, forthcoming.

34. Much of this work is in connection with the work of the Popular Memory Group in CCCS towards a book on the popularity of Conservative nationalism. I am especially grateful to Laura di Michele for her contribution in opening up these questions in relation to "epic," and to Graham Dawson for discussions on masculinity, war, and boy culture.

35. Especially those developing out of the work of M.A.K. Halliday which includes the "critical linguistics" group. For Halliday see Gunther Kress (ed.), *Halliday: System and Function in Language* (Oxford University Press, 1976).

36. See especially the long, largely unpublished critique of *Screen* by the CCCS Media Group, 1977–78. Parts of this appear in Stuart Hall *et al.* (eds.), *Culture, Media, Language* (Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 157–173.

37. I take this to be the common message of a great range of work, some of it quite critical of structuralist formalism, on the subject of narrative in literature, film, television, folk tale, myth, history and political theory. I am in the middle of my own reading list, delving into this material from a quite unliterary background. My starting points are theories of narrative in general—compare Roland Barthes, "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" in Stephen Heath (ed.), *Barthes on Image, Music, Text* (Fontana, 1977) and Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as A Socially-Symbolic Act* (Methuen, 1981), but I am most interested in work, at a lesser level of generality, that specifies the types or *genres* of narrative. Here I have found much stimulus in work on filmic or televisual narratives, see especially the texts collected in Tony Bennett *et al.* (eds.), *Popular Television and Film* (BFI/Open University, 1981), but also on "archetypal" genre forms—epic, romance, tragedy, etc.—as in Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism* (Princeton University Press, 1957). My particular concern is with the stories we tell ourselves individually and collectively. In this respect the existing literature is, so far, disappointing.

38. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Paladin, 1973), p. 112.

39. By which I mean "post-structuralism" in the usual designation. This seems to me a rather misleading tag since it is hard to conceive of late semiology without early, or even of Foucault without Althusser.

40. Tony Bennett, "James Bond as Popular Hero," *Oxford Popular Culture Course Unit*, Unit 21,

Block 5; "Text and Social Process: The Case of James Bond," *Screen Education* No. 41 (Winter/Spring, 1982).

41. "Fighting Over Peace: Representations of CND in the Media," CCCS Stencilled Paper, No. 72.

42. This project is not yet completed; provisional title: "Jingo Bells: The Public and the Private in Christmas Media 1982."

43. This term has been used to distinguish "structuralist" and "post-structuralist" semiologies, with the incorporation of emphases from lacanian psycho-analysis as an important watershed.

44. The relation of *Screen's* theory to Brecht and Eisenstein is rather odd. Characteristically, quotations from Brecht were taken as starting-points for adventures which led to quite other destinations than Brecht's own thinking. See, for example, Colin MacCabe, "Realism and the Cinema: Notes of Some Brechtian Theses" in Bennet *et al.* (eds.), *Popular Television and Film*.

45. "The cinematic institution is not just the cinema industry (which works to fill cinemas, not to empty them), it is also the mental machinery—another industry—which spectators "accustomed to the cinema" have internalised historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films." C. Metz, "The Imaginary Signifier," *Screen* vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer, 1975), p. 18.

46. What follows owes much to the CCCS *Screen* critique cited above (note 36).

47. There seem to be two rather distinct approaches to reading or "audiences," the one an extension of literary concerns, the other more sociological in approach and often growing out of media studies. I find David Morley's work in this area consistently interesting as an attempt to combine some elements from both sets of preoccupations, though I agree with his own assessment that the Centre's early starting-points, especially the notions of "hegemonic," "negotiated" and "alternative" readings were exceedingly crude. See David Morley, *The Nationwide Audience*; "The Nationwide Audience: A Postscript," *Screen Education* No. 39 (Summer, 1981).

48. See the famous analysis in terms of "scopophilia" in Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* vol. 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1975).

49. Is it significant, for instance, that Barthes does not mention "internal" narrative in his view of the omnipresence of the narrative form, *Image-Music-Text*, p. 79. Does this absence suggest a larger structuralist difficulty with inner speech?

50. The ideas of the last few paragraphs are still in the process of being worked out in the CCCS Popular Memory Group. For some preliminary considerations about the character of oral-historical texts see Popular Memory Group, "Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method" in CCCS, *Making Histories*. I have found some of the essays in Daniel Bertaux, *Biography and Society: The Life History Approach in the Social Sciences* (Sage, 1981) useful to argue with, especially Agnes Hankiss, "Ontologies of the Self: on the Mythological Rearranging of One's Life History."

51. Some of the best and most influential work in cultural studies has been based on personal experience and private memory. Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* is the most celebrated example, but, in general, students of culture should have the courage to use their personal experience more, more explicitly and more systematically. In this sense cultural studies is a heightened, differentiated form of everyday activities and living. Collective activities of this kind, attempting to understand not just "common" experiences but real diversities and antagonisms, are especially important, if they can be managed, and subject to the caveats which follow.

52. This is forcefully argued by Paul Jones in an article in *Thesis Eleven* (Monash University, Australia, 1983).

53. See Dave Morley and Ken Worpole (eds.), *The Republic of Letters: Working Class Writing and Local Publishing* (Comedia, 1982). For a more external and critical view see "Popular Memory" in *Making Histories*. Also instructive is the debate between Ken Worpole, Stephen Yeo and Gerry White in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *People's History and Socialist Theory* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).

54. Some CCCS work is not exempt from this difficulty. Some of these criticisms apply, for instance, to *Resistance through Rituals*, especially parts of the theoretical overviews.

55. What follows is based, in rather too composite a way perhaps, on the work of Paul Willis, Angela MacRobbie, Dick Hebdige, Christine Griffin, and Dorothy Hobson and on discussions with other ethnographic researchers in the Centre. See especially, Paul Willis, *Learning to Labour*, Paul Willis, *Profane Culture* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); Angela MacRobbie, "Working-Class Girls and Femininity" and Dorothy Hobson, "Housewives: Isolation as Oppression," in *Women Take Issue*; Dick Hebdige, *Subculture*; Christine Griffin, CCCS Stencilled Papers, Nos. 69 & 70. For an all-too-rare discussion of method in this area see Paul Willis, "Notes on Method" in Hall *et al.*, *Culture, Media, Language*.