Of Holograms and Storage Areas: Modernity and Postmodernity at Vienna's Jewish Museum

Matti Bunzl
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

In many ways, Vienna's Jewish Museum is an inconspicuous place. Located on a quiet side street in the city's first district, it lacks the grandeur of comparable institutions, such as the recently opened Berlin museum, for example, which dazzles its audience with daring architecture and unrivaled resources.[1] The visitor of Vienna's museum is greeted by a modest exhibit space created on four floors of the Palais Eskeles, an urban mansion that became the institution's permanent home in 1993, following three years at a makeshift facility on the premises of Vienna's Jewish Community Center. It was not until 1996, however, that the Jewish Museum received its definitive form. Prior to that date, it had only housed temporary exhibits, but following a thorough renovation of the physical space housing the museum, its curators ventured into the creation of permanent exhibits. Although temporary shows continue to be staged by the institution with great regularity, it is the permanent viewing areas that have, over the years, come to define the character of Vienna's Jewish Museum.

Working in a cultural context in which the oppression of Jews looms large from the past, the museum's curators face complex challenges of representation. The critical question for them is how to represent the complexity of the Jewish past and present without reverting to an essentialization of Jewish existence. The staff meet these challenges with innovative, even radical, designs that are not always well received by the museum's different audiences. The city's Jewish community is particularly irritated. But so is the museum's principal sponsor, the Viennese municipality and by extension the Austrian state. Members of the Jewish community and government officials alike complain that the institution fails to live up to its proper task of celebrating Austria's Jewish past and present. These expressions of dissent are more than merely institutional skirmishes. When read against the historical layers of Austrian anti-Semitism, memory, and nationness, the sentiments colliding in Vienna's Jewish Museum begin to reveal a much larger story that can be told about fundamental shifts in Central Europe's

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political and cultural fields. It is against this background that my ethnographic analysis unfolds.

In my discussion below, I argue that in their shared opposition to the museum's exhibits, the Jewish Community and the Austrian state have formed an alliance in a common project of cultural reification in which celebrations of Jewish difference have become a means to incorporate Jews into Austria's public sphere. This alliance gestures toward a fundamental historical transformation—a shift from the exclusionist project of the modern state in which Jews were abjected as the nation's constitutive Other to their more recent inclusion in the wake of the nation-state's imminent dissolution. In the context of the European Union, Jews now find themselves as part of the in-group of an emerging supranational polity. An analysis of Jörg Haider's Freedom Party demonstrates that even Europe's right-wing movements no longer challenge the effective integration of Jews into the national community. In fact, they have become useful in Austria and elsewhere for the postmodern constitution of a European Self effected through the violent exclusion of a new set of Others—Muslims and Africans foremost among them. Located at the intersection of Austrian modernity and postmodernity, Vienna's Jewish Museum embodies and dramatizes this larger development to the extent that reactions to its exhibitionary practice exemplify the processes shaping Europe today.

Permanent Anti-Exhibits

Since its renovation in 1996, Vienna's Jewish Museum has been home to a number of unusual permanent exhibits. Its unconventional approach to museum design is announced prominently on the first floor of the institution. There, in a soaring, spacious auditorium used for special events, can be found New York artist Nancy Spero's challenging "installation of memory"—a complex meditation on Austrian-Jewish history that takes the form of images stamped onto the surface of the walls. These faint impressions, placed at varying levels and documenting scenes of everyday life and Jewish persecution, appear to float around the room. This installation is accompanied by a large glass case positioned at the head of the auditorium. In the case is a selection of ritual objects from the Max Berger collection (a private collection of Austrian Judaica partially bequeathed to the museum) displayed in functional groupings entitled "Torah," "Shabbat," and "Passover" (Jüdisches Museum Wien 1996:17–52). Located as they are in the large open space of the auditorium, the Spero installation and Berger collection would seem to lie at the center of the museum's exhibit space. However, the hall's infrequent use renders them subordinate to the museum's other exhibit spaces.

The galleries located on the upper levels of the building are the ones most frequented, and the permanent installations displayed there are nothing short of remarkable. Daring feats of museum design, they are self-consciously aestheticized anti-exhibits, refusing the expositional logic of conventional displays. Resisting object-bound museology, the third floor of the Palais Eskeles is home to a set of 21 holograms. Under the title "Jewish Vienna: A Holographic

Approach," the exhibit invokes Walter Benjamin to announce the impossibility of genuine historical reconstruction: "The true image of the past is fleeting. It can only be seized at the moment when it flashes up only to be lost from view forever after" (Jüdisches Museum Wien 1996:112–113) (see Figure 1). As a medium, holograms stunningly capture this flashing up movement. They come in and out of view, appearing and disappearing, as observers move past or position themselves for the purpose of fixing the image for a longer look.

This disruption of conventional narrativity is therefore quite deliberate. As the museum's catalogue explains, "neither conceptual nor formal realization can veil the fact that no historiography can ever be complete" (Heimann-Jelinek 1996a:61). History is always already partial and perspectival, reflecting the "interests" of those who create it. Transposed onto the plane of museum representation, this means that "every historical exhibit is the expression of a presentist view and interpretation of history" (1996a:61). For the curators of Vienna's Jewish Museum, awareness of these dynamics required a new approach to historical representation, one that eschewed the implicit positivism of conventional exposition. The holograms constitute the "aesthetically effective" vehicle for this refusal of narrative closure. Rendering the fact that "objects" merely "deceive" viewers into thinking they constitute a "piece of the past," the fleeting images dramatize the inherent impossibility of a "true" historical reconstruction. In this light, the "visitor should not view the historical exhibition as a copy of history, but as a memory aid, as one of the places necessary for the stimulation of remembrance" (1996a:61–62).



Figure 1
The holograms at Vienna's Jewish Museum (all photographs by author).

The 21 holograms cluster and juxtapose images into an inherently fragmentary history of Austrian-Jewish experience. In this manner, the theme of "Worship," for example, brings together Torah shields from the early 19th century with Kiddush cups from the 1930s.[2] Similarly, the theme of "Expulsion" is rendered by juxtaposing a 17th-century Viennese Torah curtain with a film box of Billy Wilder's movie *Some Like It Hot* (see Figure 2). The former item signifies the expulsion of Vienna's Jews in 1670, while the latter invokes Austrian-Jewish emigration in the wake of the Nazi rise to power.[3]

Other holograms are built around such themes as "Enlightenment" (with busts of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn),[4] "Loyalty and Patriotism" (featuring a Hannukah lamp with a portrait of Emperor Joseph II),[5] "Fin de Siècle" (with items invoking Karl Kraus, Arthur Schnitzler, and Arnold Schönberg),[6] "Shoah" (displaying material used to cut "Jewish badges"),[7] and "Zionism" (with two portraits of Theodor Herzl).[8] Along with brief captions that identify the represented objects, each hologram is complemented by a short quotation. Often taken from literary sources, these quotes are designed to further provoke the work of remembrance. The text on "Loyalty and Patriotism," for example, features an aphorism by Ludwig Börne: "Yes, I was not born into any fatherland; therefore, I desire a fatherland with much greater passion than you do."[9] No additional information is provided, leaving the visitor

Figure 2
The hologram on "Expulsion" with Billy Wilder's film box in front of a Torah curtain.

to contemplate the meanings of loyalty and patriotism in the intertextuality set up in the relationships between the separate images. A brief timeline, mounted on a cube at the center of the holograms, functions as the only anchor in conventional historicity.

The holographic display is only one of two remarkable anti-exhibits at Vienna's Jewish Museum. The other can be found on the fourth floor of the building, which was designated as a "Viewable Storage Area" (see Figure 3). True to its name, the space contains thousands of items, most of them ritual objects, displayed in loose clusters classified according to religious function. Dozens of silver crowns and shields, traditional ornaments of the Torah scroll, are unceremoniously massed together alongside Menorahs, while countless Shofar horns, used on New Year and the Day of Atonement, are found next to the various cups for ritual blessings and washings. The overall effect is arresting. Although the objects in the glass cases possess an eerie beauty, their massed presence is acutely unsettling. Again and again, I have witnessed expressions of profound confusion by visitors as they approach this display. In stark contrast to more conventional exhibits, as in the display of the Max Berger collection on the first floor, items are not treated in their individuality. Indeed, as noted in the museum catalog, some objects are "brought to the fore" to be "described precisely" while others are pushed to the back, rendering them "less and less recognizable" (Kohlbauer-Fritz 1996:120). In their random interchangeability—

Figure 3
The "Viewable Storage Area" at Vienna's Jewish Museum.

Yearbook for Jewish History, Culture and Museum Affairs (Feldman 1994/95; Katriel 1995/96; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1994/95; Young 1997/98). In particular, the museum's head curator Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek has registered deep skepticism regarding the conventional fixing of Jewish religious and historical specificity (Heimann-Jelinek 1993, 1996a, 1996b, 1996/97, 1997/98). If unreflexive representations of Jewish alterity are being interrogated within critical Jewish museology more generally, then it is even more an issue given Vienna's past history. In the shadow of the Holocaust, it is simply impossible merely to catalog the peculiarities of Jewish ritual tradition or celebrate the cultural accomplishments of Austrian Jewry. At the same time, the museum's curators feel that they must counter its potential ossification as simply a Holocaust memorial.

In this context, Heimann-Jelinek and the other curators have decided to render the process of remembrance itself the main topos of Vienna's Jewish Museum. Both the holograms and storage area were designed as open-ended sites of memory. Pierre Nora's concept of *lieux de memoire* is, in fact, explicitly invoked, particularly his notion of remembrance as an interstitial act, "not quite life, but not yet death, like shells on a beach when the sea of living memory recedes" (Heimann-Jelinek 1996a:62). As Heimann-Jelinek remarked in an interview (May 12, 2000), the curators refused to regard the museum as a site of "enlightenment and pedagogy." Rather than being imagined as a "school" where one would go to "obtain passive information," the exhibits are designed to foster an active and ongoing process of critical reflection. The anti-exhibits' refusal to issue "ready answers" is thus part of a larger strategy that frustrates the viewer's expectation for authoritative narratives (Heimann-Jelinek 1996b:129). Whereas conventional Jewish museums present Judaism's "truth," Vienna's museum encourages visitors to grasp history and culture as ongoing constructions—the results of "unfinished thinking processes" (1996b:133). Therefore, Vienna's Jewish Museum is not designed to enable encounters with a Jewish Other but to compel the ongoing negotiation of a contingent Self.

This discussion does not exhaust the conceptual challenges posed by the museum's holographic and material intertextuality; however, the museological efficacy and aesthetic qualities of the exhibits are perhaps better discussed by scholars in museum studies. As an ethnographer of Central European Jewry, I am drawn to the museum's anti-exhibits as one of the most interesting sites of cultural contestation in contemporary Vienna, and for that very reason, they compel further contextualization within a larger sociocultural field. The critical reaction aroused by the museum's anti-exhibits reveal seminal shifts in Austrian-Jewish history and culture that have resulted in the museum's negotiation with, and appropriation by, its various publics. These negotiations and appropriations are the focus of my discussion below.

Jews at the Museum

Austrian-Jewish attitudes toward Vienna's Jewish Museum are complex. When the project was launched in the late 1980s by Vienna's Social Democratic mayor Helmut Zilk, there were serious reservations expressed by both the community's political leadership and the Jewish population at large. Events relating to the presidential election of 1986 had shocked and alarmed Austria's Jewish community of ten thousand people (nearly all of whom reside in Vienna). Living in a "land of the perpetrators,"[12] the country's Jews were, of course, well aware of the widespread existence of latent anti-Semitism. However, the presidential candidacy of former UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim unleashed a new quality of politically motivated antagonism (Mitten 1992; Wodak et al. 1990). Confronted with revelations in the press of his previously undisclosed military involvement in the Balkans as well as his possible membership in two National Socialist organizations, Waldheim dismissed the questions about his past as slander. In so doing, he not only recast himself as a victim, but he also transformed the election campaign into a frantic "search" for those seeking to tarnish not only his own reputation but Austria's as well. Using a culturally intelligible idiom, Waldheim suggested that he had been targeted by Jews who held him responsible for the UN's Middle-East policies, an accusation that was eagerly seconded by the leading politicians of Waldheim's Christian Conservative People's Party. According to them, the allegations against Waldheim emanated from the "dishonorable cohorts" of the World Jewish Congress who orchestrated a "manhunt" using "Mafia-like methods." The investigation into Waldheim's past was readily constructed as a Jewish conspiracy, and a vote for Waldheim was figured as a "patriotic deed." This invocation of patriotism in which Jews were set up as an alien threat became all the more evident in light of Waldheim's main campaign slogans: "We Austrians elect who we want" and "Now more than ever." (Wodak et al. 1990:97, 119, 162, 187, 190; cf. M. Bunzl in press).

Austria's Jews were appalled and frightened by the nation-state's symbolic separation from a Jewish Other, not least because the campaign rhetoric of the People's Party resulted in a significant rise of anti-Semitic incidents. But if Jews hoped for support and protection from Austria's Social Democratic Party, the country's largest political group and the main opponent of the People's Party, they were severely disappointed only two years later, when a progressive gesture by Vienna's Social Democratic mayor Helmut Zilk produced new pain and consternation.

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Anschluss, Zilk had commissioned sculptor Alfred Hrdlicka to create a "Monument against War and Fascism" (M. Bunzl 1995). The design was made public in early 1988, and it featured in its four-part structure the figure of a "Street-Washing Jew," commemorating the humiliations Vienna's Jews had to endure in the weeks following Austria's annexation by Nazi Germany (see Figure 4).[13] The Jewish response to this design was overwhelmingly negative. Not only was its overt depiction of Jewish degradation felt to be insensitive to survivors and their

Figure 4
The Street-Washing Jew.

descendents, but in the wake of the Waldheim affair, it was feared that the statue might occasion new taunts and insults. These Jewish concerns, however, went unheard. Zilk had excluded the Jewish community from the decision-making process, and when Hrdlicka's monument was unveiled in the fall of 1988, Austria's Jews were faced with a permanent monument to their subordination.

When Zilk advanced his proposal for the creation of a Jewish museum, these previous events were behind much of the wariness expressed in the Jewish press as well as privately. This time, however, the dynamic played out quite differently. From the very beginning, Zilk insisted that the museum be a showcase for the achievements of Vienna's Jews, as was expressed in the 1989 advertisement for the position of director, which stated that "for centuries, Jewish citizens have made an indispensable social contribution to Austria" (Wantoch 1989). Even more importantly, Zilk invited the Jewish community to play a central role in the museum's governance. With the appointment of three official community representatives to the seven-person board, the election of another community member as chair, and the choice of an Israeli art historian as the museum's first director, Jewish concerns quickly receded.[14] Financed entirely by the City of Vienna, the museum should be properly regarded as a state institution.[15] However, in light of its representational dynamics, Austria's Jews came to see it as an extension of Jewish community interests and this view was further reinforced by the museum's provisional location in Vienna's Jewish Community Center in the years immediately following its establishment in 1990.

When the museum moved to the Palais Eskeles in 1993, relations with the Jewish community remained intact, not least because the relocation was perceived as an affirmative expression of Jewishness in Vienna's urban landscape due to the proximity of the Palais to the city's center. By the time I commenced fieldwork in 1995, the museum had clearly become a principal site of the city's Jewish topography. Many of my Austrian-Jewish interlocutors regularly attended exhibit openings, and an even greater number voiced their fondness for the museum's other amenities such as its excellent bookstore and a popular café. Most importantly, however, Austria's Jews appreciated the mere fact of the museum's existence in Vienna's public culture. For example, a student in his early twenties expressed his hope that the museum would contribute to the "dismantling of stereotypes." Another visitor, a professional in his late forties, went even further, crediting the institution with achieving an unprecedented "normalization" of Jewishness due to its status as a "state-run and public establishment." Views such as these were typical of those I heard from others. In the wake of decades of hostility and neglect, the most recent expressions of which were found in the Waldheim affair and the Hrdlicka monument, the recognition given to the Jewish community, which was implied by state sponsorship of the museum, gestured toward a positive shift in Austria's sociopolitical field.

This general approval for the existence of the institution, however, does not mean that Jews particularly like what is displayed therein, especially after 1996, the year in which the permanent anti-exhibits were installed. In interview after interview conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, I was told by Austrian Jews that they were disappointed with the displays. They were seen as cold and analytical, lacking the warmth of Jewish culture and tradition. Many Jews cannot understand why Austrian-Jewish history has been represented through the ambiguous play of holographic images confounding a conventional narrative and why ritual objects of their everyday life are displayed in a storage facility. "Abgehoben [aloof]" is a frequent characterization not only of the museum's permanent displays but of numerous other temporary exhibits designed in keeping with their deconstructive spirit. In a particularly heated conversation that followed a visit to a highly abstract exhibit on the history of the future in Judaism,[16] one exasperated friend bitterly decried the work of the curators. "This museum has no *neshome* [soul]," she concluded.[17]

Other Viennese Jews were more sympathetic to the curators' intellectual project, but even such appreciation cannot fully overcome the more general disappointment with displays that deliberately frustrate the expectation of a celebratory showcasing of the grandeur of the Viennese-Jewish past. For those Jews who came of age in post-Holocaust Austria, that past—associated first and foremost with the Jewish cultural efflorescence of fin-de-siècle Vienna—served as the crucial site of affirmative subjectification in an overwhelmingly anti-Semitic social field (M. Bunzl 1996). Even more, the phantasmatic identification with late imperial Vienna allowed the children of Eastern European immigrants who made up most of Vienna's postwar Jewish community to imagine themselves as integral parts of Austria's cultural history. In my interviews

with them, members of the postwar generation would relate that the absence of fin-de-siècle Vienna, including such culture heroes as Sigmund Freud, Gustav Mahler, and Joseph Roth, seemed to them to be an inexplicable lacuna. A Jewish museum that does not celebrate Vienna's famous Jews, I was told in countless ways, hardly deserves the name.

The State at the Museum

In a remarkable homology, the Jewish reaction to the museum was echoed by the state and its non-Jewish citizens. Anticipated in the institution's original design as philosemitic consumers of Jewish specificity, they too find their expectations frustrated by the museum's anti-exhibits. This collective disappointment was made evident to me on countless visits. Inevitably, I encountered Austrians wandering the exhibit spaces with a degree of disorientation. The holograms, in particular, would routinely stump museum-goers, and I was approached on numerous occasions with questions seeking to understand their order and meaning or merely asking for basic facts such as the size of Austria's Jewish population before the Holocaust as compared with the present. The situation is the same in the viewable storage area where the sheer mass of artifacts often leaves visitors confused and in search of illumination, both with regard to the functions and uses of particular pieces and Judaism's religious system in general. Traces of these sentiments can also be found in the museum's guest books. Inviting visitors to record their impressions before leaving the premises, they are full of bitter complaints. "I learned nothing about the Jews of Austria," is a frequent critique.

However, there are differences in the ways criticism is voiced by different audiences. Austrians and Germans usually attribute their disappointment to bad museum design, questioning for example, whether the "concept of the permanent exhibit" is at all likely to "counteract revisionism and antisemitism." In contrast, visitors from the English-speaking world, many of whom are Jewish, often read the presentations as an instance of continuing anti-Semitism. Judging by the guest books, visitors from the United States are particularly offended. The following is a typical comment: "Not only is there precious little about famous Austrian Jews—i.e., Freud—also there is nothing of the Holocaust. . . . You need to visit the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C. You are still blind." Another museum visitor wrote, "A Jewish Museum should show the history and tradition of the 100,000s of Jews who once lived in Vienna."

But Austrian and international visitors are not the only ones who expect conventional displays on Judaism's religious principles and the history and cultural accomplishments of Austrian Jewry. The Austrian state itself makes its discontentment felt, and numerous stories of negative reactions among municipal and federal officials circulate among the museum's curators, occasioning bemusement but also a certain anxiety about the withdrawal of state funding. Typically, these reactions are characterized by an annoyance with the curators' refusal to present upbeat constructions of an Austrian-Jewish symbiosis. What often follows are stern lectures on the need for accurate representations of

Austrian-Jewish history and culture, replete with reminders that Vienna's Jewish Museum exemplifies and therefore ought to exhibit the state's commitment to honor and celebrate its Jewish citizens.

A placard in the museum's entrance hall enunciates the state's thwarted expectations most prominently.[18] In sharp contrast to the curators' intent to refuse the fixing of social memory in their exhibit design, the placard presents a highly conventional narrative of the institution's purpose. From the state's perspective, Vienna's Jewish Museum is first and foremost a "memorial to the millions of Austrian Jews who over the centuries have left an indelible impression on this country." "Without their distinguished contributions in all fields of human endeavor," the text goes on to note, "Austria would not have come to be what it was and what it is today." Adding that the museum also functions as a memorial for all the Jews who have been persecuted and murdered in the course of Austrian history, the placard closes on a presentist note that addresses contemporary Jews as the subject of the museum. The institution is thus figured as "a memorial to thousands of Austrian Jews who again settled in Vienna after 1945. Their efforts were and are a decisive factor in the progress of this city and of this country. May that continue to be so in the future."

Although it should not be particularly surprising that Vienna's Jews would hope for the museum to celebrate their existence as an integral part of Viennese history and social life, the fact that the Austrian state shares this sentiment so fully, however, is in need of explication—particularly in light of the subordinate status Jews occupied until well into the 1980s. This can only be understood in the context of postwar Austrian history, marked by the realities of anti-Semitism and the state's peculiar ways of dealing with its past.

Central to this history is, of course, the question of Austria's role in the Third Reich. Austrians had overwhelmingly welcomed the 1938 Anschluss, annexing the country to Nazi Germany, and they had been prominently represented in the Nazi machinery. However, as a nominally antifascist entity apparently overrun by a hostile neighbor, Austria was allowed to claim victim status for itself in the postwar period—a claim regarded today as the founding myth of Austria's Second Republic.[19] The year 1945 was thus represented as the end of foreign oppression, allowing the reconstructed state and its citizens to disavow any responsibility for the Holocaust (Meissl et al. 1986; Pelinka 1998; Pelinka and Weinzierl 1987).

The narrative of Austrian victimization thrust Jews into a particularly vulnerable position. Although the country's National Socialists were readily integrated into postwar Austria's body politic, the essential absence of "denazification" left anti-Semitic sentiments more or less unchallenged. As various surveys conducted in the course of the Second Republic attest, a majority of Austrians continued to adhere to anti-Semitic stereotypes, preventing the acceptance of the country's Jews as genuine members of the postwar national community (J. Bunzl and Marin 1983; Pauley 1992). In the official and popular imagination, Jews remained a foreign entity that continued to be constructed as inherently antagonistic to the Austrian state. More than anything

else, these sentiments cohered around the question of restitution, which the neutral state resisted on the cynical grounds that Austria had not been a perpetrator of the Holocaust (Bailer 1993; Knight 1988).

In this light, the very presence of Jews in postwar Austria represented an immediate challenge to the country's founding myth. As the true victims of Nazi oppression, Austria's Jews, whose numbers were decimated from 200,000 before the Shoah to less than 10,000, functioned as the embodied signs of the country's complicity in the Holocaust, thereby threatening to undermine Austria's postwar equanimity. Since any assertion of the specificity of Jewish experience would have upset the volatile balance of Austria's founding myth, the Jewish presence in and of itself became antithetical to the logic of the postwar state. The systematic silencing of Jews occurred on numerous levels, from the official politics of memory, which subsumed the Jewish experience into the supposed suffering of all Austrians, to an informal quid pro quo that promised Jews greater tolerance for desisting from pleas to directly confront the past (M. Bunzl in press). For the purposes of the present analysis, however, the dynamic is best exemplified by the history of the Jewish Museum itself.

Prior to its most recent incarnation, Vienna's Jewish Museum already had a long and distinguished history, as do other Jewish institutions in Austria. Originally founded in the 1890s, Vienna's museum was the very first of its kind worldwide. Originally not a state institution but a private endeavor run by a voluntary association within the Jewish community, the museum's collection contained hundreds of ritual objects displayed according to an emancipatory logic that hoped to cultivate ethnic and religious tolerance in recognition of Jewish cultural accomplishments (Kolb 1967). Much as with other aspects of the so-called German-Jewish symbiosis, this expectation proved futile. In 1938, immediately following the Anschluss, Vienna's Jewish Museum was shut down; its objects were confiscated, packed up in boxes, and stored, for the most part, in the city's anthropology museum (Purin 1995).

This symbolic violence continued after World War II when the fate of the collection contributed to the erasure of Jews from Austria's public sphere. Although ownership of the stored objects was acknowledged in the immediate aftermath of the war, the Austrian state expended no efforts to effect their immediate restitution, let alone ensure their public display. It was not until the 1950s that the Jewish community was able to reclaim the collection; and when they decided to exhibit some of the objects in the early 1960s, the Austrian state neither expressed interest nor offered financial support for such a project. Indeed, when the Jewish community opened the doors of its new museum in the fall of 1964, the tiny display area—a single room in a dilapidated building in Vienna's second district—fully expressed the structural exclusions of the Cold War period. The exhibit did contain a part of the prewar museum's collections and featured a "memorial corner" to commemorate the victims of Nazism. In the absence of federal or municipal funding, however, it could only open its doors three afternoons per week; and even then, it drew more or less exclusively a Jewish audience. Ignored by the country's mass media and the public

at large, the museum remained marginal to Vienna's urban landscape. If anything, its marginality expressed the enforced invisibility of Austrian Jewry in Vienna's postwar public sphere; and in this light, its closing in 1967 was neither surprising nor remarkable (Prokisch 1998; cf. M. Bunzl in press).

By the time Vienna's Jewish Museum was resurrected as a municipal institution, the situation could not have been more different. In stark contrast to the effective erasure of Jews during the postwar decades, the Austrian state of the late 1980s and early 1990s aggressively sought to anchor them in the country's public sphere. This radical reversal was a function of profound structural transformations occasioned by the international and geopolitical forces affecting Austria at that time. The first of these was a direct result from the fallout of the Waldheim affair. Until 1986, Austria's myth of victimhood had remained fundamentally unchallenged. Under the intense glare of worldwide media attention, however, the country's image as an "island of the blessed" quickly crumbled (Mitten 1992). Rather than be seen as a quaint haven for classical music and alpine charm, Austria now seemed to be at best a nation unable to confront its past or at worst, a nation that harbored a resurgence of Nazi sentiment. Austria's political elite was keenly aware of this new perception. In light of Austria's dependency on international trade, especially tourism, the state began to invest considerable energy into enhancing Austria's reputation in the world. In this context, the country's Jewish community, both past and present, came to be seen as an asset and an opportunity. What better way, after all, for a state to dispel allegations of Nazism and anti-Semitism than by showcasing its Jewish heritage and contemporary Jewish culture?

Such a celebration contradicted the exclusionary logic of Austria's founding myth. As it turned out, however, the perpetuation of this myth became less and less important in light of geopolitical transformations. The victim myth, after all, had been a quintessential product of the Cold War era. Instigated by the Allied forces in efforts to prompt anti-Nazi resistance and foster a sense of Austrian national identity, it safeguarded the country's independence in Europe's postwar order. As the perpetrator of World War II, Germany became an occupied and divided territory. Due to its status as a victim of German aggression, Austria, by contrast, was restored to sovereignty according to its pre-1938 borders and was rewarded in 1955 with a neutral status between the two Cold War camps. With the escalation of Cold War tensions, the importance of neutrality grew even greater, a situation that further made Austrian national autonomy contingent on sustaining the fiction of victimization.

All this changed in 1989 with the fall of the Iron Curtain. In the post–Cold War geopolitical order, Austria's neutrality seemed like a vestige from a bygone era and quickly lost its political salience. The state's immediate efforts to join the European Union, which the Soviet Union had disallowed as a breach of neutrality, were the most immediate consequence of the new situation. As the pressure on Austrian neutrality eased, however, so did the necessity to retain the victim myth as a foundational narrative of Austrian nationness.

The deemphasis of Austrian neutrality and its myth of victimhood created unprecedented openings for the state's reimagination of its Jewish citizens. That process proceeded rapidly as Austria moved to join the European Union. Negotiated in the early 1990s, Austria's entry into the New Europe occurred at a time when the EU was shifting from its original design as an economic union of nation-states to a political federation.[20] In this process, the organization came to identify itself as the bearer and champion of fundamentally liberal principles, tolerance and pluralism being foremost among them. As a supranational entity, the EU was inherently constituted in opposition to the principles of exclusionary nationalism, and in its codification of "European values," it treated Nazism as a baseline of negative identification (Burgess 2000; Sidjanski 2000).

In this context, the Austrian state experienced new pressures, and it responded by intensifying its efforts to affirm the presence of Jews in the country's public sphere. After all, no other group could signify the state's commitments to the European values of tolerance and pluralism to quite the same degree. In practical terms, the state's altered position resulted in countless initiatives, ranging from the creation of institutes for Jewish history and culture and lavish support for Jewish arts festivals to policies encouraging more inclusive representation on state-run television and unprecedented efforts to address Austria's complicity in the Holocaust (M. Bunzl in press).

By far the most important and enduringly visible result of these efforts was the (re)founding of the Jewish Museum of the City of Vienna. More than any other Austrian institution, it was designed to enunciate the altered relation of the state to its Jewish citizens. The geopolitical urgency of that project prompted the museum's swift realization in 1990 and accounted for its successful relocation, rapid expansion, and exceedingly generous funding in subsequent years. For the state, the institution was an investment in Austria's European future. And as the literal commodification of a multicultural vision, the museum became all the more viable in light of its quick embrace by the Jewish community. For decades, the Austrian state had silenced Jews in the interest of maintaining the country's status as a victim. Now, it was ready to celebrate Vienna's Jews, as anchors of a newly pluralized polity, to the cheers of community members themselves—and only the curators of Vienna's Jewish Museum complicated the endeavor.

Modernity/Postmodernity

The creation of Vienna's Jewish Museum signals a watershed in the history of Central European modernity, one that is made fully visible in the essentialist collusion between the Austrian state and its Jewish citizens. Their alliance against the museum's curators may be, in some respects, an aspect of mundane institutional politics. Transposed onto the larger theater of Central Europe's political and cultural fields, however, it reveals a truly profound shift in the hegemonic construction of Jewish alterity. From the late 19th century onward, the construction of a Jewish Other was intimately tied to the exclusionary

project of nation-building—a project that mobilized "the Jew" as the constitutive Other in German nationalism's fiction of ethnic purity.

Jews emerged in their modern configuration in this very crucible. Such a late-19th-century dating might seem far-fetched: Jews, after all, have not only existed for millennia, but their entry into the modern world is usually linked to the Jewish Enlightenment *(Haskala)* of the late 18th century. It was at that point that Jews began to enter Central European society as part of a larger emancipatory effort at social transformation (Katz 1973; Sorkin 1987). Characterized by a quest for cultural normalization, this effort was supported and aided by enlightened German authorities hoping to harness Jewish resources for the greater good. The resulting ideology of German-Jewish emancipation centered on a logic of acculturation. Although Jews were seen as debilitated by centuries of rabbinic solipsism and the harsh life of the ghetto, they could be reformed through education, which would render them productive citizens of the German cultural nation. Jews themselves embarked on this process of transformation with great zeal, and by the second half of the 19th century, they had become fully German—and nowhere more so than in the realm of the Habsburg Monarchy, where this constellation produced the cultural heyday of fin-de-siècle Vienna (Beller 1989; Kaplan 1991).

German Jews continued to adhere to the emancipatory ideals of the late 18th century. German support for Jewish normalization, however, was eroding. In the context of the economic transformations associated with modernization (e.g., the rise of rationalized manufacturing and the consequent pressure on traditional trades) and the financial crisis following the 1873 stock market crash, Jews came to be seen as a principal embodiment of modernity's perils. By the end of the 19th century, the ideology of German-Jewish emancipation was under siege by full-fledged anti-Semitic movements in both Germany and Austria-Hungary (Lichtblau 1994; Pulzer 1964). In place of the progressive program that envisioned Jews as potential equals, the new ideology regarded them in terms of essentialized and pathologized difference. This is not to say that Jew-hatred was entirely a modern phenomenon. On the contrary, in the European realm it had persisted for centuries, fueled by Christian doctrine and various local arrangements that placed Jews outside the social sphere (Poliakov 1965–85). But premodern society had been inherently more segmentary, rendering Jews one group among several whose connections to the body politic were intrinsically tenuous. Moreover, even if Jews existed on the margins of the social order, Christian dogma allowed for a more or less ready recuperation in the event of their conversion.

What ultimately distinguished the late-19th-century's modern variant of anti-Semitism from its antecedents was its constitutive anchoring in the concept of race (Mosse 1978). A function of modernity's striving toward rational classification, the idea of race transformed the notion of Jewish Otherness from a religious and cultural model of explanation to one grounded in the immutable destiny of biology. As Hannah Arendt put it, "Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape"

(Arendt 1951:87). In this context, "the Jew" came to be figured as a new type of being, forever standing outside the constitutive boundaries of respectability and therefore antithetical to the emerging ideal of German nationness (Mosse 1985). Codified as an ethnically homogeneous entity, the German nation, in turn, presupposed the presence of its constitutive Other to allow its operative narration. It was in that sense that the creation of the new Jewish type was foundationally tied to the rise of nationalism and the nation-state. In a dialectical process, Jews were imagined as the principal bearers of racial impurity, while the stereotypes so generated were marshaled to demarcate the symbolic space of the nation. In early modern times, Jews had not signified in relation to the constitution of a national body politic. It was only with the rise of nationalism that they came to function in this way. Giving coherence to the fiction of German nationness, Jews were thus the abject by-products of modernity's normalizing process that defined the late 19th century.

In his brilliantly provocative book *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989), Zygmunt Bauman proposed to read Nazi ideology in these very terms. Building on Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's argument in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944), Bauman presented the Holocaust as the telos of a modernizing project constituted at the intersection of rationalized classification and social improvement. Opposing the commonly held conception of the Holocaust as a "cancerous growth on the body of civilized society, a momentary madness among sanity," he thus refigured the event in terms of modernity's exclusionary logic (1989:viii). As a moment of total social engineering, the Holocaust thus emerged as the pinnacle of German nation-building. "Separating and setting apart useful elements destined to live and thrive, from harmful and morbid ones, which ought to be exterminated," the Holocaust was intelligible as the systematic effort to cleanse the body politic of those, Jews foremost among them, who were considered wholly irredeemable (1989:70).[21]

In this analytic framework, the first decades of Austria's Second Republic could be regarded as a moment of late modernity. Nazi Germany's defeat did, of course, end nationalism's genocidal actualization, but the cultural logic that constructed the body politic through the abjection of modernity's Other persisted. Postwar Austria may not have been a conventional nation-state,[22] but as a Germanic polity imagining itself as a neutral victim, it reproduced the modern logic of Jewish subordination with greater force than any other European country. Jews could not stand out in a sea of Nazi victims, and as a consequence, the Austrian state expended significant energy to purge them from the public sphere altogether.

It is against this postwar history of state-sanctioned exclusion, marginalization, and silencing that Vienna's Jewish Museum heralds the coming of a new age. Conceived at the end of the Cold War, hastened by international pressure to rethink the basis of Austrian nationness, and completed in the years of the country's move into the European Union, the museum emerges as the signpost of a major historical transition. For if we understand the late-19th-century abjection of Jews as a specifically modern phenomenon, and if we see both the

Holocaust and postwar Austria as articulations of that modernity's exclusionary logic, then we can begin to grasp a moment in which the Austrian state demands and effects the anchoring of Jewish difference in the public sphere as the segue to a kind of postmodernity.[23]

This postmodernity is characterized by a constitutive pluralism. As Central European modernity's abject by-products, Jews were subordinated in the interest of national homogenization. By the turn of the 21st century, however, this exclusionary project was no longer salient. On the contrary, Jews are now celebrated as markers of an affirmatively diversified polity, and the Austrian state expends significant efforts to promote their inclusion in the public sphere. This postmodern emergence of modernity's Others is ultimately predicated on a structural transformation of the nation-state. By the late 20th century, the process of European integration had weakened the nation's integrity, and as Austria was no longer imagined according to the formative principles of nationalism, Jews not only ceased to function as constitutive outsiders but came to symbolize a European entity constructed beyond the exclusionary strictures of the nation-state. This postnational imaginary thus entails a hegemonic shift from homogenizing subordination to heterogeneous reproduction, and it is this development that ultimately sets off the postmodern moment from its modern antecedent.

Theorizing the postmodern in this manner articulates with the dominant formulations that have been offered to describe the phenomenon. Indeed, conceptualizations in aesthetic as well as social terms have emphasized postmodernity's pluralizing logic, its celebration of difference over sameness, and its antihierarchical and antitotalizing qualities (Bauman 1992; Huyssen 1986; Jameson 1991; Lyotard 1984). The genealogy of Vienna's Jewish Museum offers evidence of just such a process in the empirical realm of Central European social life. In a cultural space where the modern metanarrative of the nation occasioned a violent regime of exclusionary homogenization, the turn of the 21st century thus not only brought the narrative's structural disintegration but the affirmation of those it had formerly excluded.

This process, however, is not without an ironic echo of modern coercion. Although the affirmative integration of Austria's Jews constitutes a radical break with the past, what remains unchanged in this shift from a modern to a postmodern regime is the reproduction of Jewishness as a self-evident entity. Jews may no longer sustain the exclusionary project of nationalism; but despite nationalism's *Aufhebung* in a supranational framework, their ontological reality goes unchallenged in a political space marked by the essentialist collusion of a pluralizing state and a previously subordinated minority reveling in the new-found valuation of its seemingly invariant difference.

The anti-exhibits at Vienna's Jewish Museum only become intelligible in this conceptual context in the challenge they pose to the uncritical representation of Jews, rendering visible the inherently processual and radically contingent nature of the creation and re-creation of identity. Insofar as the exhibits disrupt the new pluralist hegemony, they are successful. But in a political

economy in which the collusion between the state and the Jewish community becomes a central building block of Austria's postnational society, the impact is likely to be limited. Indeed, Vienna's Jewish Museum stands quite alone in the country's sociocultural landscape as an institution that interrogates rather than exalts the state's new position.

Europe Today

To speak of a postnational valorization of Jews might seem to contradict widespread reports in American media of European "anti-Semitism arising again" (Krauthammer 2002). To be sure, the onset of the second intifada in 2000, the disintegration of the Middle East peace process in early 2001, the fallout from the attacks on Washington and New York later that year, and the public sentiment mobilized in opposition to the 2003 war in Iraq have all contributed to a shift in Europe's political and social climate. Alongside these events, a number of widely reported acts of anti-Semitic vandalism in France, Belgium, and Germany in the spring of 2002 were taken by American commentators and organizations as evidence for Europe's incorrigible hatred for the Jews. But it is grossly inaccurate to explain the situation in terms of "pent-up anti-Semitism, the release—with Israel as the trigger—of a millennium-old urge that powerfully infected and shaped European history," as Charles Krauthammer has suggested in a 2002 *Washington Post* column (Krauthammer 2002; cf. Anti-Defamation League [ADL] 2002; Jacoby 2002; Foxman 2002).

Aside from the inherent dubiousness of such transhistorical assessments, the interpretation of endemic anti-Semitism obscures the fundamental transformation traced in the present article. Although my immediate focus in this ethnographic analysis has been Austria, the processes charted here are in evidence all over Europe. Across the continent, the late 20th century has witnessed an unprecedented emergence of Jews and Jewish institutions into an increasingly pluralizing public sphere. Different national histories have played out along different trajectories. But a general development from a status of legal and cultural subordination for Jews to a new visibility and valorization can be observed across the continent, championed, as it is, by the various national governments.

Germany, whose negotiation of the Jewish question is of obvious relevance, is a case in point. Much as in Austria, the postwar era in Germany saw the exclusion of Jews from the country's public sphere—a situation that began to change radically in the 1980s, when the West German state commenced vigorous campaigns designed to anchor Jews in the national culture. In the larger context of significant increases in the size of Germany's Jewish population, the creation of dozens of Jewish museums was one of the principal manifestations of this development (Offe 1997), as was the establishment of Jewish Studies centers and sites of Holocaust commemoration (cf. Bodemann 1996; Gilman and Remmler 1994). The situation is not only analogous in western Europe, where Jewish specificity has come to be valorized to an unprecedented degree, but also in eastern Europe, where the officially sanctioned rediscovery and

celebration of a glorious Jewish past has become a central vehicle for modernization according to Europe's postnational norms (cf. Bohlman 2000; Gruber 2002; Webber 1994).

None of this is to suggest that the geopolitics of the new millennium and particularly the situation in the Middle East have left Europe's Jews unaffected (cf. M. Bunzl 2003). But it does put pressure on the common interpretation that Jews continue to function as Europe's constitutive Other and that they are still subject to the genocidal threats of the early 20th century. This is quite simply not the case, since neither states nor political organizations actually define themselves in opposition to Jews, let alone envision or work toward their elimination from the body politic. On the contrary, there is an effective consensus in European politics regarding affirmative integration of Jews into the public sphere.

This consensus includes even Europe's various right-wing movements, a situation that is best illuminated by a return to Austria, where the trajectory of the Freedom Party sheds crucial light on the politics of postmodern Europe. The party of Jörg Haider is widely seen as one of the continent's dominant political forces—the largest of Europe's right-wing movements and the first to be included in a national government—and hence, it is an overt model for groups ranging from Italy's Lega Nord to Belgium's Vlams' Block (cf. Wodak and Pelinka 2002).[24] From an American vantage point, Haider's rise to power has always been understood in terms of his excusatory attitude toward the Nazi past, and his presumed anti-Semitism is commonly figured as the operative core of his political ideology.

Haider, in this view, is more or less an unreconstructed nationalist, either hoping to restore or at least exonerate the Germanic dreams of his Nazi parents or seeking to ensure the ethnic purity of the Austrian nation-state. There are good historical reasons for this widespread interpretation. Haider's political socialization occurred in the context of the virulent German nationalism of Austria's university fraternities, and this was the ideological framework that propelled him to the leadership of the Freedom Party in 1986.[25] For a few years thereafter, the party pursued a resolutely Germanic course, replete with persistent professions of Austria's German nature and tacit demands for the country's renewed Anschluss to the motherland.[26] By the early 1990s, Haider's German nationalism, in turn, gave way to a more distinctly Austrian variant. Forged in the context of the Freedom Party's opposition to Austria's membership in the European Union, Haider's new rhetoric focused on the need to safeguard the integrity of the nation-state in the face of its supranational dissolution.[27] Although the identificatory subject of Haider's nationalism shifted between the late 1980s and early 1990s, his stance retained a number of central components. In addition to downplaying the historical significance of the Holocaust as the defining moment of 20th-century Central European history, these also included the occasional invocation of Jews as the constitutive Other of the imagined national entity (Zöchling 1999; cf. M. Bunzl in press).

Haider's personal ideology may not have changed in the wake of Austria's entry into the European Union, but his rhetoric and strategy have. In the years after 1995, the Freedom Party effectively abandoned the traditional nationalism of the previous decade, and in a development that echoed the historical transformations traced in this article, it went to some lengths to incorporate Jews into the organization's collective imaginary. Haider personally sought to associate himself with Jews and this development was accompanied by the rise to a party leadership position of Peter Sichrovsky, the son of Holocaust survivors and a member of Vienna's Jewish community.[28] After the Freedom Party's entrance into Austria's governing coalition and in the wake of Haider's signing of an official "Preamble" that admitted Austria's "responsibility" for the "horrendous crimes of the National Socialist regime," the party acceded to an agreement for the compensation of Nazi slave laborers, and Haider himself helped negotiate the settlement of restitution for Austria's Jewish community (Die Gemeinde 2001; International Herald Tribune 2000).

To be sure, such developments invited and in fact engendered charges of political opportunism. But whether they were sincere or not, they constituted fundamental transformations in the Freedom Party's basic political position. In its traditional nationalist mode, Jewish participation or even tacit support for Jewish concerns was not merely unacceptable but utterly impossible. By the turn of the 21st century, however, these have become commonplace features of a political movement that no longer constitutes itself in opposition to Jews.

This is not to say, of course, that the Freedom Party has abandoned its exclusionary politics. On the contrary, Haider's party has intensified its segregationist efforts over the last years. Since the late 1990s, however, that discourse has almost never been directed at Jews, targeting instead a new set of Others—African and Muslim immigrants. In the context of increasing population flows and its consequent demographic shifts, particularly in Vienna, the rhetoric of Haider and his party has become outright vicious, seeking to safeguard against the massive arrival of "bush negroes" and abuse by Turkish immigrants of the "generosity of the Austrian welfare state" (Czernin 2000:91–93).[29]

By 1999, the new political position found its paradigmatic expression in the campaign slogan "Stopp der Überfremdung [Stop the Flood of Immigration]," which was paired with a placard displaying Haider and another Freedom Party politician under the heading "Zwei echte Österreicher [Two real Austrians]." The latter slogan echoed a campaign poster from 1970 that had advertised the Christian Social candidate Josef Klaus as "ein echter Österreicher [a real Austrian]." In the modern logic of the postwar era, the slogan had been immediately intelligible as an anti-Semitic invective directed against opposing candidate Bruno Kreisky, whose Jewish ancestry rendered him a suspect member of the imagined national community. In 1999, the FPÖ poster had no such connotations. Although the message was similarly strident, Jews were not the object of exclusion. In fact, the Freedom Party incorporated Jews as members and ran them for political office, mobilizing them in fact for the strategic constitution of newly imagined Others. "Among my Jewish friends," a prominent

Freedom Party politician announced in November of 1999, "there is outrage about the high degree of Islamic presence." In the modern era, the party embodied Austria's concerns about Jewish influence; in the postmodern era, the "justified fear" of the country's Jews was paraded to safeguard the body politic from "Islamic circles" (Die Gemeinde 1999:8).[30]

As a quintessentially modern phenomenon, anti-Semitism was deployed to constitute and protect the imagined community of the nation. The xenophobia of the postmodern age, by contrast, invents the collective Self as an altogether different entity. Having integrated modernity's abject by-products into the new imaginary, the new politics of exclusion no longer define the ideal social body in terms of ethnic purity. Instead, politicians like Haider are demarcating a supranational entity constructed in opposition to those whose distance from a supposed core of Western civilization renders them unassimilable—Africans whose cultural (and racial) makeup is considered inferior and Muslims who are figured as the invariant Other of a valorized Judeo-Christian tradition.[31]

For Haider, as for other European right-wing politicians, "Europe" is the entity to be constituted through these new acts of exclusion. With the inclusion of even Jews into a right-wing organization like Austria's Freedom Party, the historical transcendence of the modern nation-state is becoming a reality. At the same time, however, its successor "Europe" is being constituted along analogous lines of exclusion. If Austria is any indication, Haider's success in forcing Social Democrats and Christian Socials (the parties governing Austria throughout the postwar era) to severely tighten immigration laws in the late 1990s suggests the political potency of a supranational vision that integrates Jews, while excluding a new set of Others (cf. Pelinka 1998).

Predictably, the Freedom Party has continued to pursue its exclusionary agenda in Austria's government. What is more compelling and troublesome, however, is that even as violence against Africans and Muslims is mounting all across the continent, Europe's left-liberal and centrist cabinets are moving in similar directions, implementing xenophobic legislation that further marginalizes migrants from the Middle East and from sub-Saharan and North Africa. As of this writing, the European Union itself has in fact embraced an exclusionary agenda, creating new barriers in the hope of ensuring Europe's internal integration (European Union 2000, 2001). Such measures are designed to appease a far right that once sought to protect the integrity of the nation-state. But as organizations like Austria's Freedom Party reinvent themselves as guardians of a new "fortress Europe," the EU is effectively in danger of doing the far right's bidding for an internally pluralistic, yet tightly bounded Europe—a Europe that would represent little but the vacuous ossification of "Western culture."

I have great respect for Vienna's Jewish Museum. Although the political pressure and skeptical audience response have forced some recent compromises (such as the creation in 2000 of an audio guide providing a more conventional narrative while viewing the museum's displays and a renewed commitment to devote a significant number of the temporary exhibits to the luminaries

of the Austrian-Jewish past), the institution has retained its challenging design. In particular, I appreciate the museum curators' courageous persistence to provide an oppositional commentary to the cultural normalization of Jews. In the face of the essentialist collusion that produces Vienna's Jewish Museum as an officially sanctioned site of Jewish integration, it has resisted the temptation to purvey uncritical celebration. Instead, the museum has consistently dared to frustrate expectations, most prominently through the creation and maintenance of its two permanent anti-exhibits.

Nonetheless, I wish it could do more to challenge the new hegemonies currently emerging, not only in Austria but in Europe at large, that are envisioning and circumscribing a polity whose supersession of the modern nation-state is producing nothing but its postmodern variant—an entity that, while imagined through continental rather than ethnic homogeneity, is similarly exclusionary of those placed at its constitutive margins. A truly political engagement at the present moment would have to address this process and could not stop, therefore, at the disruption of the state's celebratory reproduction of Jewish difference. Rather, it would have to grasp that reproduction as part of a larger and far more pernicious political project in which Jewishness is strategically instrumentalized in the demarcation of the New Europe. To confront this process of supranational exclusion is the call of the day, and although a small institution like Vienna's Jewish Museum may seem an unlikely challenger to the geopolitical trends of the early 21st century, I nonetheless hope that it can make its critical voice heard.

Notes

Acknowledgments. Research for this article was undertaken in the context of a comparative ethnography of Jews and queers in post-Holocaust Vienna during more than 20 months of fieldwork conducted over the years 1994–2002. In the winter of 2000, Karl Albrecht-Weinberger, director of Vienna's Jewish Museum granted me complete access to the institution, including its day-to-day operations, archives, records, and interviews with the staff. I am particularly indebted to head curator Felicitas Heimann-Jelinek who shared her vision of the museum with me. It was through her critical perspective that I came to revisit an earlier analysis that focused on the institution's public reception, particularly during the initial years of operation (M. Bunzl in press). In contrast to that reading and its emphasis on a few widely celebrated temporary displays, the present article focuses on the museum's permanent exhibits and the fissures they reveal, both in the museum itself and in Austria's cultural fields at large. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2000 meeting of the Association for Jewish Studies, a 2001 Jewish Studies Workshop at the University of Illinois, and the conference "Memory and the Invention of Jewish History," held at the University of Maryland in 2002. I received helpful comments and encouragement from Jeffrey Feldman, Alma Gottlieb, Jeffrey Herf, Gershon Hundert, Brett Kaplan, Gary Porton, Marsha Rozenblit, Michael Shapiro, Michael Stanislavski, Adam Sutcliffe, Billy Vaughn, and James Young. I am particularly indebted to my colleague Andy Orta whose incisive reading of the piece prompted key revisions. Finally, I benefited greatly from the thoughts of *Cultural Anthropology*'s anonymous reviewers and the insightful comments of Ann Anagnost.

1. Berlin's Jewish Museum was an instant international sensation when its building was completed in 1999. Designed by architect Daniel Liebeskind, the structure's extraordinary design sought to reenact the modern German-Jewish experience in all its contradictions. Following a period in which the public could only visit the building itself (exhibits had not yet been installed), the museum was officially opened on September 9, 2001.

2. Torah shields are an ornament for the Torah scrolls, invoking the dress of the High Priest in the ancient Temple. Kiddush cups are used in rituals praising God for his presence in the holidays. At the start of Shabbat, the Kiddush is recited over a cup of wine.

3. From the medieval period of original settlement until 1867, Vienna's Jews were subject to recurring pogroms and repeated expulsions (Tietze 1987). As the hologram suggests, the years after 1938 can be seen as a continuation of that history. The director Billy Wilder was among thousands of Austrian-Jewish émigrés, many of whom continued or went on to important careers in science and the arts abroad (Stadler 1987).

4. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) was the quintessential figure of the German Enlightenment. Preaching rationality and belief in progress through the vehicle of literature, he was the author of the seminal play on religious tolerance, *Nathan the Wise* (1779). In the play, the central character was modeled on Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), the founder of the Jewish Enlightenment and a paradigmatic figure for Jewish integration into modern German society. A close friend of Lessing's, Mendelssohn is a towering figure, both in 18th-century German and Jewish letters.

5. Joseph II (1741–90), the oldest son of Maria Theresia, reigned from 1765 until his death (until 1780 as co-regent with his mother). A paradigm of enlightened absolutism, he championed wide-reaching administrative reforms. In an effort to make his subjects more useful to the state, he issued the Patent of Tolerance (1781/82), which granted Habsburg's Jews unprecedented (if not full) rights.

6. Fin-de-siècle Vienna denotes the moment of unparalleled artistic and scientific creativity in late imperial Austria-Hungary. A frequent subject of quasi-imperial nostalgia, it has also become a central site of Jewish memory due to the many notable Jews found among the era's culture heroes. Karl Kraus (1874–1936), the leading journalist, satirist, and language theorist, is a key figure of European modernism, as are the writer and Freud doppelgänger Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931) and the composer Arnold Schönberg (1874–1951), the widely influential inventor of twelve-tone music.

7. In the context of ever increasing ostracization under the Nazis, Austria's Jews were forced to wear yellow badges in the shape of the Star of David whenever they ventured in public (Rabinovici 2000).

8. Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), the Hungarian-born founder of the modern Zionist movement, was a journalist for Austria's leading *Neue Freie Presse* when he conceived his plan for a Jewish state. During his lifetime, few of his fellow assimilated Viennese Jews took his idea seriously (Kornberg 1993).

9. The journalist, writer, and editor Ludwig Börne (1786–1837) was among the leading German-Jewish intellectuals of the early 19th century. Born Juda Löw Baruch, he was influenced early on by the ideas of Mendelssohn and the Jewish Enlightenment. In 1818, he was baptized, less an act of religious than political conviction. An ardent German nationalist, he, like many other Jews, regarded the movement as the logical hope for democratic reform.

10. The Anschluss refers to Austria's incorporation into Nazi Germany in March of 1938. Although a violation of Austrian sovereignty, the Anschluss was welcomed

with open arms by the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as large parts of the country's political and clerical elite (Bukey 2000). Immediately following the annexation, Jews were subject to public humiliation and systematic ostracization (which had already been underway in Germany for several years). Kristallnacht (night of crystal), which occurred November 9 and 10, 1938, took the violence against Jews to a new level. Centrally organized but staged as a "spontaneous" act of revenge for the murder of a German diplomat, it led to the destruction of nearly all of Germany's synagogues, the toll being particularly heavy in Vienna. Kristallnacht is usually viewed as the first act in the destruction of Germany's Jews. In Austria, the numbers were staggering. Of the nearly 200,000 Jews who lived (mostly) in Vienna on the eve of the Anschluss, about 65,000 perished in the Holocaust. Of the survivors, very few returned to a postwar community of about 10,000 made up mostly of eastern European displaced persons and refugees of Stalinism (Embacher 1995; Rabinovici 2000).

11. The Austrian (and German) system of public culture relies almost exclusively on the public sector for financial support. In consequence, curators, artists, and others employed by state-run institutions have enormous freedom to pursue their creative agenda independently of such economic considerations as marketability and profit. This system, operative in such domains as opera, theater, museums, as well as large parts of television and radio, has engendered a tradition of creative integrity and aesthetic innovation. But it has also led to a certain politicization of the high cultural field. Although curators and artists are not beholden to their audiences, they are subject to review and reappointment by the governing parties, a fact that renders any artistic choice a more or less overtly political act.

12. "Land of the perpetrators" is the translation of the German "Land der Täter," a phrase widely used among Jews to designate Germany as well as Austria.

13. In the days prior to the Anschluss, supporters of the Austrian government—a totalitarian Christian Social regime that had abolished the country's democratic institutions in the wake of the 1934 civil war—had painted Vienna's streets with slogans promoting Austria's continued independence. Jews were made to wash off these graffiti on their hands and knees, surrounded by taunting and jeering crowds. This forced labor was part of a deliberate and highly symbolic politics of humiliation. As enemies of the Nazi state (less because of their political stance than their "racial" identity), Jews were put into their place by removing any tangible opposition to the German state (and its takeover of Austria).

14. Art historian Danielle Luxembourg directed the museum until 1993, when she left due to differences regarding the institution's new location. She was succeeded by the German-Jewish historian Julius Schoeps, who headed the museum from 1993 to 1997. When Schoeps resigned to devote more time to his directorship of the University of Potsdam Program in Jewish Studies, head curator Karl Albrecht-Weinberger was then appointed as his successor. An Austrian historian with extensive interests in Jewish history, Albrecht-Weinberger is the institution's first Austrian and non-Jewish director.

15. In the original financial design, the institution was to be funded equally by federal, municipal, and private sources (the latter to come out of a foundation). After a reconceptualization, the museum ended up being funded entirely by the municipality (which, in turn, receives the bulk of its financial support from the state of Austria). As a result, the institution is officially known as the Jewish Museum of the City of Vienna.

16. The exhibit was titled "Eden•Zion•Utopia: On the History of the Future in Judaism." On display from November 24, 1999, to February 20, 2000, it sought to bring such varying

items as depictions of prophesy, projects of Jewish statehood, and visions of Jerusalem into provocative juxtaposition.

17. *Neshome* is a Yiddish term (a loan word, in turn, from Hebrew). The fact that my friend used the Yiddish expression in place of the German "Seele" is significant in that it carried an additional layer of meaning. In metalinguistic terms, Yiddish (or select expressions thereof) is often coded as a language of cultural authenticity and organic attachment. German, by contrast, can denote the cultural alienation associated with the 19th-century abandonment of Yiddish as the Jewish language of everyday life. The fact that my friend also thinks of the museum as a *yekkische* institution (*yekke* being the disparaging Yiddish term for the supposedly cold and calculating German Jews) only highlights this interpretation.

18. By the spring of 2002, the text was no longer displayed on a placard. Instead, it was projected onto the wall of the entrance hall.

19. The "First Republic" designates the Austrian state of the interwar period. In extension, the reconstructed state of the post-1945 period is known as the "Second Republic."

20. After several years of preparatory work and campaigning, the referendum on Austria's EU membership was held in June of 1994. Over 60 percent of the electorate voted in favor of membership, leading to Austria's formal joining of the European Union on January 1, 1995.

21. To figure the history of anti-Semitism and modern Jewish experience in these terms is a deliberate analytical choice. Broadly speaking, there are two interpretive agendas in the study of anti-Semitism. The first treats the hatred of Jews as a transhistorical phenomenon, constructing, in the most extreme cases, an unbroken history from Pharaoh's Egypt to the Holocaust and beyond. Serious scholarship in this mode does differentiate specific modalities of Jew-hatred, of course; but the overarching tendency is the stress on continuity and similarity. This mode of thought has been challenged, indeed supplanted, by an approach to the study of Jew-hatred that emphasizes historical specificity and cultural contingency. Central to this mode of analysis is the differentiation between what is usually called "anti-Judaism," defined as religiously motivated hostility against Jews (of which the Christian tradition is the central example), and "antisemitism," whose coinage in the late 19th century signals its inherently modern genealogy. The resulting distinction between "traditional" and "modern" forms of Jew-hatred has, in turn, been theorized according to two broad paradigms. The first, which was pioneered in some fashion by Karl Marx (1978), emphasizes the figuration of "the Jew" in economic terms. Stressing the long-standing association of Jews with the money trade, it sees them as the principal subject/object of capitalist modernity, an argument presented most forcefully (and with an overtly anti-Jewish agenda) by the early-20th-century sociologist Werner Sombart (1951). More recently, a number of interesting attempts at recuperating economic interpretations of modern anti-Semitism have been made. But the majority of arguments have been advanced according to a competing paradigm, one that stresses the cultural and symbolic nature of modern anti-Semitism. Prefigured implicitly by such early theorists of nationalism as Ernest Renan (1947) and Otto Bauer (2000), it has been fully articulated in the post-Holocaust era by scholars like George Mosse (1978) and Zygmunt Bauman (1989), who have emphasized the strategic deployment of a somatic conception of Jews in the demarcation of a homogeneously racialized (German) national sphere. Insofar as that project of nation-building was a modern phenomenon and insofar as the recourse to the "scientific" concept of race betrayed a decidedly post-Enlightenment worldview, this paradigm has been uniquely successful in elucidating the inherent modernity of the anti-Semitism that emerged in Europe in the late 19th century. Even more importantly,

this paradigm has a unique explanatory power in regard to the Holocaust. Whereas neither the transhistorical mode of interpretation nor the focus on capitalism can offer powerful explanations for the Holocaust, the cultural/symbolic approach can offer a ready interpretation anchored in a vision of national purification—a vision whose theoretical articulation in the late 19th century became the genocidal practice of the mid-20th century. I find this analytic specificity compelling, which is why I locate my analysis squarely in the cultural/symbolic approach to the study of anti-Semitism and modern Jewish experience.

22. Postwar Austria existed apart from the principal German nation-states (the FRG and GDR). Much as with earlier periods, however, this configuration never impugned the country's fundamentally Germanic nature. To be sure, the state had its roots in the multiethnic polity of the Habsburg Monarchy. By the late 19th century, however, that polity was marked less by the Empire's supranational formation than the nationalist movements that led to its eventual breakup. In the German-speaking areas of Austria-Hungary, variants of German nationalism dominated the political landscape, imagining the region as part of a larger Germanic entity. The Austria that came into existence in the wake of World War I was thus less the remainder of a dissolved Monarchy than its German successor state—a concept that was captured in the country's official name, German-Austria (Jásci 1929; Judson 1996; Hanisch 1994).

23. Elsewhere, I advance a parallel argument in regard to the trajectory of Austria's lesbians and gay men, in which the late 19th century can be regarded as a moment of originary abjection, followed by decades of systematic subordination that had its catastrophic telos in the Holocaust (M. Bunzl in press). The late modernity of the postwar period continued violent exclusion of homosexuals from the national sphere—a situation that began to change in the pluralizing context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the gradual emergence of queers into Vienna's social landscape. Figuring the abject production and constitutive subordination of homosexuals as another dimension, alongside anti-Semitism, in the modern technology of national self-definition, I take the recent emergence of queers into Austria's public sphere (along with the state's role in the phenomenon) as additional evidence for the transition from a national modernity to a supranational postmodernity (M. Bunzl in press).

24. In the fall 1999 elections to Austria's national assembly, the Freedom Party took almost 27 percent of the vote, coming in second behind the Social Democratic Party (33 percent) and just in front of the Christian Social People's Party (a close third at nearly 27 percent). Rather than continuing the long-standing "grand coalition" between Social Democrats and Christian Socials, the latter opted for a coalition with the Freedom Party that took office in February 2000. Haider, himself, was not nominated as a member of the coalition government; and within weeks of the decision, he formally stepped down as party leader, ceding the position to Susanne Riess-Passer who also served as the government's vice chancellor. Haider, however, continued to function as the party's de facto leader while serving as provincial governor of Carinthia. The coalition lasted until the summer of 2002 when a contentious discussion on tax reform caused its termination. Elections were held in the fall of 2002, resulting in a triumph for the People's Party (at over 42 percent) and a strong setback for the Freedom Party, which was widely seen as responsible for the government breakup and was reduced to a little over 10 percent of the vote. Despite that result, the coalition between People's Party and Freedom Party was revived in 2003, leaving the political constellation and Haider's (indirect) power essentially unchanged. Over the long run, Haider's influence might actually be on the wane,

but at this point, it is simply too early to tell whether the Freedom Party's popularity among the electorate is merely in a temporary lull or has been permanently damaged.

25. Historically, the Freedom Party has its roots in Austria's German Nationalist third camp (Socialists and Christian Socials being the other two), deriving its ideology, in turn, from the dual legacy of the 1848 revolution. At once liberal and national, the movement has always oscillated between the divergent poles of libertarian cosmopolitanism and extreme nationalist conservativism (cf. Riedelsperger 1978). Before Haider came to power in the Freedom Party, it was under the leadership of its liberal wing, which had secured the 1983 entry into Austria's governing coalition (as junior partner of the Social Democratic Party). Haider was in vehement opposition to the coalition, and in the years prior to his takeover of the party, he attacked its leadership from an explicitly German nationalist perspective.

26. Most famously in this regard, Haider referred to the "Austrian nation" as an "ideological miscarriage" since it decoupled *Volkszugehörigkeit* (belonging to the *Volk*) from *Staatszugehörigkeit* (belonging to the state). This utterance, which challenged the very basis of Austrian nationness, caused a political scandal when it was spoken on Austrian television in 1988 (Czernin 2000:20).

27. When Haider came to power in the FPÖ, he was a strong advocate of Austria's entry into the then European Community. In part, this reflected the EC's structure as an economic confederation of strictly delimited nation-states. In part, it was seen as an attempt to move Austria closer to Germany in line with Haider's (then) German nationalist project (Czernin 2000:57–64).

28. Many commentators have noted Haider's persistent attempts to associate himself with Jews. An early example was his highly publicized acquaintance with the therapist Viktor Frankl. Haider's most prolonged and widely discussed Jewish association was with Peter Sichrovsky, a member of the postwar generation and early critic of Austria's ways of dealing with its Nazi past (Sichrovsky 1987). Haider and Sichrovsky met in the early 1990s, and their friendship, which solidified in the context of the former's political about-face, resulted in Sichrovsky's remarkable career that took him into the Freedom Party's inner circle by the year 2000. By the summer of 2002, however, Sichrovsky had drawn particularly close to Susanne Riess-Passer, the vice chancellor of the governing coalition and Haider's nominal successor as Freedom Party leader. When Haider and Riess-Passer fell out over issues of taxation and political style, Sichrovsky joined the group of politicians who left the Freedom Party. Although Sichrovsky's Jewishness had clearly been at the heart of his meteoric rise in the party, it played no apparent role in his departure.

29. Other groups, too, have come to figure as rhetorical targets of Freedom Party campaigns. Although limited immigration from North Africa has kept the focus in regard to Muslims on Turks, there has been a prominent strand of anti-eastern and southeastern European sentiment. Much of this rhetoric has been articulated in regard to the prospect of EU expansion into Eastern Europe. Over time, this expansion will give citizens of the new member countries access to work and residence permits in Austria—a situation that members of the Freedom Party have likened to an uncontrolled "wave of Slavs" whose European pedigree is seen as dubious. In consequence, the Freedom Party has been decidedly cool to the prospect of EU expansion (without actually opposing it, however).

30. The quote is from Harald Ofner, a former secretary of justice and one of the most influential ideologues in the Freedom Party. Haider himself has made similar comments on numerous occasions. His anti-Islamic and anti-Arab attitude, however, is far from consistent. Fond of stirring up controversy, Haider has visited Libya's

Muammar Gadaffi on several occasions and even met with Iraq's Saddam Hussein in early 2002. Ultimately, such trips to the Arab world, however, have not diminished Haider's central goal of keeping Muslim immigrants out of Austria. The Freedom Party's enduring position is captured by a recent comment of Bishop Kurt Krenn. Speaking in the summer of 2002, the Haider sympathizer characterized the current moment as a "third Turkish siege," referencing the years 1529 and 1683 when Ottoman invasions into Central Europe were halted at the gates of Vienna.

31. Among Europe's right-wing leaders, it was the Netherlands' Pim Fortuyn who articulated this position in the most explicit terms. In such texts as *Against the Islamicization of our Culture* (1997), he constructed Jews as a constitutive part of a Judeo-Christian tradition, the integrity of which needed to be protected against the current Muslim threat. On a less overtly ideological level, similar developments have been reported from France, where candidates of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front have sought to enlist Jewish votes in what is figured as a common struggle against Islam.

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