

CREATIVE CITIES: THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS

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ABSTRACT. The aim of this article is to critically examine the notion that the creative class may or may not play as a causal mechanism of urban regeneration. I begin with a review of Florida's argument focusing on the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings. The second section develops a critique of the relationship between the creative class and growth. This is followed by an attempt to clarify the relationship between the concepts of creativity, culture and the creative industries. Finally, I suggest that policy-makers may achieve more successful regeneration outcomes if they attend to the cultural industries as an object that links production and consumption, manufacturing and service. Such a notion is more useful in interpreting and understanding the significant role of cultural production in contemporary cities, and what relation it has to growth.

Key words: creative class, creative city, cultural industries, urban regeneration.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to critically examine the role that the notion of the creative class plays, as a causal mechanism, in urban regeneration. Specifically, I want to offer a response to Florida's (2002, 2004, 2005) thesis which posits the creative class as the motor of urban regeneration. My specific concern is to examine critically the mechanism presumed for regeneration, and to judge precisely what potential is claimed to be inherent in the creative class. I will argue that the idea of the creative class is far from new; in fact it is a revival of hi-tech boosterism and place marketing. It is in this latter sense that I accept, for the most part, the tenor of Peck's (2005) trenchant criticism of Florida focused on place competition and consumption. However, I want to open up a further line of critique that addresses what I regard as a weakness in both Peck's argument as well as much work in economic geography that ignores the productive dimensions of the cultural industries. The topic of the creative class is commonly elided with the notion of creative cities. It is not my intention here to discuss, nor should this elision be confused with the concept of,

the creative city (Landry 2000) which has another intellectual justification and trajectory. Nevertheless, we have to accept that lay usage of Florida's work is commonly deployed as the means by which cities may be made creative. Moreover, the ideas of the creative class and the creative city should not be confused with the city of culture (a policy pursued by the European Commission) (Paddison 1993). Despite the important differences which are discussed in this article these concepts do have one commonality: they are instrumental policies which seek to use culture or creativity to achieve specific non-cultural ends. This article argues for the need to develop non-instrumental policies that specifically seek to develop the cultural industries. The cultural industries are, it is argued, one of the potential motors of urban growth and regeneration in their own right.

In the article I argue that both Florida's line of argument, as well as Peck's critique, has sidetracked other important arguments concerning the role and potential of culture in cities. At first sight such a claim seems strange, and contemporary debates about urban policy are littered with culture and creativity. In particular, the trajectory I want to stress is the focus on cultural production rather than on "culture policy" that focuses on consumption (cultural and otherwise). It is not that I have any ideological or economic problems with consumption per se (this is, in part, what I believe drives Peck's argument); in fact, I see production and consumption as a false dualism, and in practice we need to reintegrate analyses of production and consumption (Pratt 2004a). This is why the cultural industries are such an emblematic site of debate and practice; they are a practical example of the hybrid and complex relationships between production and consumption, the symbolic and material.

Moreover, reacting to the placelessness of much debate about place marketing, I want to stress that culture is produced in particular places and times: and that context is important in, or perhaps more accurately constitutive of, social, cultural and eco-

conomic fields. I will consider how this debate has sidetracked other important arguments concerning the role and potential of culture in cities. The article has three lines of critique. First, the mis-identification of causality (the creative class and urban change); second, the issues of operationalizing the measure of the creative class; and finally, the focus on consumption at the expense of production (that is, presenting it as a dualism rather than as a notion that includes the whole cycle for production through to consumption).

I argue that the existing line of thought has prioritized consumption or/and idealized culture; it has also preserved the dualism of manufacturing and services, as well as that of production and consumption. In so doing researchers and policy-makers have overlooked, and discounted, the significance of the growth in importance to economies, and society more generally, of cultural production. In particular the trajectory I stress is the potential for an alternative focus on cultural production rather than cultural or creative policy that focuses on consumption (cultural and otherwise). In the conclusion I seek to draw attention to the issue of cultural production and its role in urban regeneration.

I begin with a review of Florida's argument focusing on the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings. The second section develops a critique of the relationship between the creative class and growth. This is followed by a disentanglement and clarification of the relationship between the concepts of creativity, culture and the creative industries. Finally, I propose a need to focus on the cultural industries as a process that links production and consumption, manufacturing and service. Such a concept is more useful in interpreting and understanding the significant role of cultural production in contemporary cities, and what relation it has to growth.

The rise of the creative class revisited

Richard Florida's work on the creative class has focused on a means of measuring, and hence ranking, what he argues are the most significant characteristics that make cities creative. Actually, the variables used are those that Florida argues will endear an area to the creative class: technology, talent and tolerance. The "3 Ts" do not make creativity, creative cities or workers; they are simply posited as factors of attraction (or proxies of them). The creative class is defined as those whose occupations range from artists and software designers (the su-

per-creative core) to management and legal experts (the creative professionals).

Florida argues that these occupations are the magnets to which mobile, high-tech and high-growth firms are drawn. In turn, it is argued that what draws the people who populate these critical occupations is tolerant or liberal communities, and work environments plus a bohemian consumption space. So, to be clear, Florida is making an argument for attracting particular labour, or occupations, to a place; which in turn, it is claimed, if they are in short supply, will cause hi-tech industries to move to that location to be close to such a labour pool. Logically, what is not being argued here is that there is an intrinsic value in culture that attracts the creatives. Nor, it may be argued, that there is intrinsic value in the cultural practices they (the creative class) are either engaged in, or attracted to. In fact, culture and the creative industries are in this formulation an instrumental sideshow that in turn attracts the workers, which attracts the hi-tech investors. In this sense, the argument has little to differentiate it in principle from traditional behavioural and environmental determinist arguments, or from property-led strategies.

In short, it is an exercise in place marketing, except that now a Bo-Bo (Bourgeois Bohemian) downtown is the magnet whose primary objective is to attract a labour pool, which will in turn attract hi-tech industries, and lead to growth. This new version is not primarily about stimulating consumption multipliers as an employment knock-on effect. In its own terms the hypothesis begs the question of the relationship between a defined Bo-Bo-ness and between the presence of the creative class and economic growth. In broad terms this is what Florida seeks to achieve in his analysis using a range of proxies; however, while the numbers look convincing the underlying concepts are woolly. It depends on how one defines the 3 Ts and which variables one uses, and what relationship they have to target variables: this is not something that Florida examines, nor discusses, critically. Moreover, much rests on the definition of the creative class itself; again, this is not opened up to debate. These are important empirical issues, but they are not the main burden of my critique; the conceptualization of process is.

Creative boosters

Florida taps into a rich seam of envy and aspiration for city boosters by constructing an index of these

qualities that simply ranks one city against another, and points to simple policy fixes to help a city better itself.¹ Florida's initial ranking was confined to the USA; however, it has been fabricated for Europe as a whole (Florida and Tingali 2004), and many nations have also sought to deploy the methodology for their own territories (Andersen and Lorenzen 2005). The reasons for the popularity of Florida's methodology for ranking cities in terms of creativity are clear. Who would not want their city to be scientifically ranked as the coolest on earth: the most creative city? It makes the residents feel good, politicians feel even better, and makes outsiders envious: so much so that they might even visit. Such desires are the stock in trade of the snake oil salesperson. Those peddling culture or creativity follow a long line of previous potions: environment, safety, liveability, hi-tech, bio- or nano-industry. To be clear, it is not the moniker that matters for the exercise but what it is suggestive of: growth.

Why has growth (and competition) become the watchword of the late twentieth-century urban manager? The answer lies in the fact that traditional manufacturing activities have declined in the developed world. To be correct these industries did not decline, they are growing faster than ever; what they did was to move away to cheaper (and more suitable) properties, and to cheaper labour sources. The former industrial cities became hollowed out; a vacuum that has been filled by financial services activities and stimulated new building. Shortly after, (back, or routine) offices were relocated to the peripheries and cities have once again begun to struggle; likewise, retail has moved out of town. The problem was that many of the manufacturing workers remained, unemployed. Others, previously out of the labour market, were drawn into cleaning, security and retailing (Logan and Molotch 1987; Castells 1989; Harvey 1989a, 1989b; Sassen 2001). An influential line of argument suggests that the competitive advantage of cities is their experience; hence the discussion of promoting creativity and the consumption experience, the commercial version of which is represented in Pine and Gilmore's book *The Experience Economy* (1999). It is precisely this strategy that Peck, after Harvey (1989b), so despairs of.

Returning to the point about new economies we might ask where the money stops; or who eventually enjoys the benefits of the investment? Attracting mobile companies can result in little local investment and little guarantee that the company will not move as soon as it can find somewhere cheaper. In this dis-

course neither the creative city, nor the creative class, is concerned with the creative economy. The creative city is presented as a city that is attractive to, and populated by, a creative class who works in the new economy, or more likely in high-tech and bio-tech. The Bo-Bo city is the magnet for migrant educated labour that works in the hi-tech industries. The creative city is an in-town speciality shopping centre. Of course, it is simply a revisioning of the liveable cities (via Quality of Life (QoL) indicators) that have been promoted for so long (to attract middle and higher management of TNCs who have to relocate staff). The notion of QoL comes from rational choice economics which suggests that consumers of local state services vote with their feet (Tiebout 1956). This notion has been developed into numerous indicators that urban authorities can compare themselves with one another (Myers 1988; Luger 1996).

The creative economy?

Thus we can see that, along with the international mode of economic production notably mobilized via outsourcing or remote manufacturing, cities lose their own manufacturing jobs and potentially seek to compete to attract new ones. Culture may be viewed as the latest bauble that is offered to attract CEOs. Specifically, it is cultural consumption that is prized. Inter alia this has resulted in investment in cultural facilities; usually large-scale (hence visible) infrastructures that are targeted at elite consumers. Such a strategy brings with it inherent contradictions of capital versus revenue funding (where buildings are paid for, but not the activities to populate them), prestige versus ordinary culture, infrastructure versus networks and training, and one-off versus strategic development.

Somewhere along the line many cities² stopped processing raw materials and became ideas reproducers. The problem is that ideas can be relocated more easily than heavy plant, especially if those ideas are traded online. Some of these ideas and knowledge activities are significantly embedded in local cultures of production; others less so. Thus these activities are commonly viewed as the mobile fairy dust of the modern city: if only the dust sprinkles on them they will be happy and grow. This is not to suggest that mobility is all – but where it is cities that compete with one another for investment as in one gross beauty pageant. It is as if cities and regions have lost the faith in generating their own wealth and have begun to believe that wealth could only come from elsewhere.

This line of thought suits those of a neo-liberal persuasion who view cities and regions as players in a global market: competition is all. Remarkably, such experts on competition seem to overlook the costs of competition (Porter 1995), and the fact that competitions have only one winner and many losers (again, not a sensible resource allocation model as cities cannot be permitted to simply slide into liquidation).

The neo-liberal line on manufacturing relocation is simple: move into knowledge business; it's the next big thing. Of course, with the legacy of past investment in education, developed countries are likely to do well. Hence the push for a stake in the new economy, knowledge economy, the competitive economy or the creative economy (Garnham 2005). There is nothing wrong per se with the knowledge economy as better or worse than any other concept. The problem is with in the teleological argument that simply presents the creative economy as a higher (and critically, the next) form of development. As I will point out below, this is a fundamental conceptual confusion common in the analysis of the service sector generally that fails to see the manufacturing component of services. We might see the cultural industries as part of the service sector; however, my point is that the service industries and manufacturing are integrated, one and the same. I, along with others (e.g. Walker 1985), would oppose the claim that services (or, in extremis, the cultural industries) are simply the icing on the cake of the "real economy".

Daniel Bell, class and values

The fact that a North American academic has a best-selling book extolling the positive impact of a particular class may seem surprising. Clearly, Florida is not using a Marxian mode of class analysis here; there is no sensible way that the creative class occupies a unique and common position in relation to the means of production, or that it is in any way conscious of itself. Nor is Florida seeking to suggest that the creative class is a new class fraction such as that discussed under the rubric of the service class (a fragment of the bourgeoisie) (Goldthorpe 1982).

In fact in Florida's work, class is reduced to taxonomy; moreover, one whose boundaries are not clearly defined (as in the use of middle class in the USA that includes almost everyone). Florida's occupational list is eclectic to say the least; this is further betrayed by the insertion of a super-creative

class within the category. To deploy an income and occupation classification and to read off causality is deterministic. In an attempt to challenge the deterministic interpretation of class and its consumption preferences, writers such as Bourdieu (1979, 1993) have been at pains to separate out cultural capital (gained through education and social conditioning) and money capital. (See also the debates about gentrification and culture: Wynne and O'Connor 1998; Lees 2000, 2003.)

Florida's term of reference is, like Manuel Castells' (1989, 1996) later work, that of the American futurologist Daniel Bell, writer of *The Coming of Post-industrial Society* (1973). Bell's thesis remains attractive to those who accept the notion of economic modernization. Bell points to the emergence of a cadre of scientists, or knowledge workers,³ who will be required to service and create the scientific and technological means of a post-industrial society.⁴ He further argues that the state and market will have to orientate itself to this new group. In effect this group will become both the prime consumer and politically axial group. Thus, far from Marxian class-consciousness and collective action through which they may make their presence felt, rather it is through their spending power and preferences; or, as Florida has it, their values through which they make their social and economic impact felt. What are these values, and where do they come from? Here we have a rather empty silence in Florida's work. It is strange, given its importance as an explanatory factor, that the creative class's values are not interrogated. It seems as if they are read back from the assumed values of their consumption practices.⁵ In Florida's work we simply jump to the fact that these creative class liken bo-ho culture⁶ to the possession of unitary core values of diversity, tolerance.

Perhaps Florida should have read Bell's work more closely; in the *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, Bell (1978) raises the conservative concern that such a group of educated people may want more freedom and turn to radicalism in politics. Bell thus viewed them, or their values, as a threat to post-industrial society: hence the cultural contradictions of capitalism. Frank's (1997) insightful analysis of advertising and fashion industries in the USA in the 1960 to 1970s is a convincing account of how markets were opened up and expanded with new products and materials styled using the notion of rebellion: what Frank calls the conquest of cool. In an earlier manifestation of a similar argument Debord (1994) termed it the so-

ciety of the spectacle. It is important to note that the spectacle was more the 'bread and circuses' that Harvey refers to as characterizing contemporary urban cultural consumption; Debord points to the fact that rebellion and critique are themselves incorporated (recuperated) in the spectacle. Set against such a sophisticated cultural and political analysis it is a little naive to see, as Florida does, an autonomous creative consumer as an agent of change.

Education, mobility and gentrification

Returning to the origins of the creative class argument we need to reprise to economy theory: human capital mobility theory to be precise. Glaeser's (1998) work, on which Florida bases much of his causal process, hypothesizes that there is a relationship between the level of education of labour and the degree of economic growth of cities. Florida develops a line of argument concerning how to attract educated labour and thereby attract high-tech industries, and to achieve growth. Florida argues that high-tech industries are increasingly pulled to labour resources (or where labour will go). Thus, cities attractive to labour (in these industries) will reap the rewards of growth. Florida's hypothesis is that this segment of labour that is in such demand constitutes the creative class and is attracted to locations with particular consumption patterns, as well as a tolerant governance framework (public and private). In Florida's conception education produces culture; however, not in the nuanced manner examined by Bourdieu (1979). Setting on one side Florida's assertion about education and its proxy occupation, we can also underline the fact that the creative class debate is not about the cultural industries or cultural production.

It is worth noting that a pattern observed in cities for many years now, as pointed out in Zukin's (1982) seminal work, is a particular form of cultural gentrification of cities. Here artists colonize cheap and dilapidated property; in time those seeking a bo-bo culture (Brooks 2001; Lloyd 2006) move in so as to be close to the artists. Of course, the key point for cultural entrepreneurs and artists is that as the art galleries and rich loft owners move in the artists are forced out due to rising prices (Shorthouse 2004). This provides us with a strong empirical message as to how consumption-based regeneration is corrosive to production-based versions. Some policy-makers consider that it may be a price worth paying for growth; however, it is cer-

tainly not a good way to promote the cultural industries or the creativity so often valued in them. I will argue that the real challenge is to find an accommodation between production and consumption; rather than seeing them as opposites we should see them as part of the same process. Before this, it is necessary to explore the roots of the binary concepts of production and consumption, manufacturing and service, and what relation the cultural industries have to them.

From flexible production to flexible consumption

More generally, the tenor of political economic argument of the past 25 years has played down issues of consumption and identity, concentrating instead on production and organization, pointing to the crisis of mass production and the resolution via post-Fordism, or flexible production (Piore and Sabel 1984). Marxists such as Harvey (1989c) point to the falling rate of profit and underconsumption triggered by the oil crisis in 1973.⁷ There is a strong line of debate that seeks to rebuff the notion of a post-industrial or post-manufacturing economy, arguing that manufacturing matters (Cohen and Zysman 1987). Most writers focus on the new production technologies either using computer numerical control (CNC) machinery or the flexible deployment of labour and networks of small firms. Critically, in the sense that the debate has retained old manufacturing taxonomies, such a position also echoes the prejudice of neoclassical economists that the cultural (or the whole service sector) is non-basic, and therefore finally dependent on manufacturing activity. It is this legacy that Peck and Harvey are rooted in. However, the step that writers from such a position commonly fail to take is to reconceptualize the relationship between manufacturing and services, or production and consumption. It was a debate that was a conceptual interest of Marx, who viewed production as a necessary complement of consumption and vice versa: they are co-dependent. Many of the debates about the definition of the service sector raise precisely this issue (Walker 1985; Pratt 2004a).

The shadow of these manufacturing-service, and production-consumption, dualisms also haunts debates about the cultural economy, characterizing it as either the culturalization of production, or the economization of culture (Lash and Urry 1993; Scott 2000; Amin and Thrift 2004); these dualisms need to be transcended. We can see plenty of empirical examples of such hybridization in the cul-

tural economy: multiple versions of the same product, designer versions of a product, or a director's cut, DJ mix, and so forth, seek to stimulate multiple purchase of essentially the same item. Along with multiple products comes the necessary development of retailing, distribution and advertising. To take one recent and iconic example, Jonathan Ive redesigned the Apple Mac, and the iPod, and this design mobilized new consumption and new production, not only in computers, but also across the brand into music. Thus we should perhaps talk of the neo-industrial economy rather than a post-industrial one.

Architecture and technology

Returning to Bell, and in particular to Castells' (1989, 1996) development of Bell's line of thought in both *The Informational city* and *The Network Society*, we can see a strong strand of technological determinism; that is, the assumption that certain technologies deliver particular modes of economic development. Without doubt, Castells sees a massive role for ICTs and envisages that it is these that transform our relationships in particular and predictable ways. Regrettably, it is this line of thought that has propelled many cities and regions to jump on the science bandwagon. With manufacturing gone, the knee-jerk reaction is to get in some science and high technology (the next big thing). Even better, such activities are believed to be biddable as they are footloose. Thus began the round of bidding and subsidies to attract plant relocation; research and development were considered little different aside from the fact that a higher labour market quality was sought. The second wave of marketing was thus aimed at creating science parks that would both incubate new ideas developed in universities (Massey *et al.* 1992), but critically serve as homes for the high-tech industries (the subject of Florida's earlier work; see e.g. Florida and Kenney 1988). Examine any city booster's package and you will see high-tech, bio-tech, nano-tech and (a few years ago) multimedia as investment targets. Capturing science parks appeared to be about creating the right environment. The strategy seemed to be reduced to building a number of plate-glass buildings in parkland with duck ponds: anywhere could be silicon valley/alley/fen. The problem with this sort of competition is that everyone can construct buildings, or, in the cultural vein, opera houses and galleries: but what is it that attracts the staff? If consumption is encouraged then house location and

leisure time begin to play a larger role in the mind of labour, especially in a tight labour market.

As we have noted, a key weapon in the city booster's armoury was that targeted at the chief executives and decision-makers: the selling of high-culture facilities and a good quality of life. Reviews of the trends in urban advertising and promotion may be found elsewhere (Kearns and Philo 1993; Hall and Hubbard 1998; Short and Kim 1998). Suffice it to say that the latest wave of place promotion has used high-culture facilities to differentiate one city from another. The urban managers' response has invariably been to build a cultural facility, especially if a controversial architect could be involved as well (aesthetics aside, if it develops controversy and publicity it has achieved its aim). Thus, the duplication of modern art galleries, opera houses and the like. As advertisers have long known, successful campaigns build upon the identification of the unique selling point (USP) of the product.

Against this, what could be more unique than an historical heritage? So, cities have promoted what it is not possible to replicate: culture and/or heritage. Early efforts mimicked the tourist industry and turned to cultural tourism and heritage (Richards 1996); later that shifted to everyday culture: the cultural quarter. The cultural quarter has a diverse legacy based in neighbourhood regeneration (Bianchini and Parkinson 1993; Bianchini and Santacaterina 1997); but the concept has been used more commonly as a site for (upmarket) consumption (Mommaas 2004): all the better if this attracts moneyed cultural tourists as well as the creative class.

As the critical literature notes, this trend to sell cities using public money is a socially regressive form of taxation; it is also politically divisive (Zukin 1995; Pratt 2000). If one accepts either a consumption-driven version of class or a more socially articulated one, promoting elite culture is going to alienate a large proportion of the electorate. The payoff, supporters would argue, is a trickle-down effect of more jobs and economic growth. The evidence on this is rather thin, as illustrated by the paradigmatic case: Bilbao (Plaza 2000). The following section turns to the consideration of creativity itself as a draw for investors. As I have already pointed out, creativity or the creative class (which is assumed *ipso facto* to be creative) has been identified as the magic ingredient that generates contemporary urban growth. Thus, closer examination of the potential causal powers of creativity is important.

Creative industries and cultural industries

Where does this leave the argument in relation to the creative class, or creativity as a driver of regeneration? Much depends upon what we mean by creativity. Until the late 1990s nobody used the term *creative industries*; after the UK Creative Industries Task Force produced its first mapping document, the creative industries became the flavour of the moment (DCMS 1998). Other countries fell into line with this preferred usage. Previously, the term *cultural industries* had been used to refer to a similar domain of policy and activity (O'Connor 2004; Garnham 2005; Pratt 2005). The term *cultural industries* was a rather amorphous one that was sometimes indicative of commercial activities, sometimes not. As is noted elsewhere, the shift of terminology was not mere semantics but highly political (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005). Output, export and employment measures gave what had been regarded as the "arts" some credibility in an era of downward pressure on policy funds and a results-driven mode of government in the UK. Politically, the creative industries could be distanced from the cultural industries: the former indicating New Labour, the latter Old Labour.

However, the terminology *creative* is politically agile. Creativity is universally seen as a positive characteristic: who wants to be uncreative? Moreover, creativity provides a positive feel as against the ambivalence of culture (which carries with it suspicions of high culture and exclusion, as well as antipathy to business). Moreover, the term *cultural industries* always existed in tension with the arts. One key element about the policy usage of the term *creative industries* is that it was underpinned by an operational definition. Inter alia this created the possibility of placing the creative industries alongside other areas of government policy and providing output measures that were robust. Arguably, it was this step that was the most significant in putting the creative industries on the map (Pratt 2001). For an essentially neo-liberal government such as the UK's New Labour who sought to continue the policy of competition as a watchword for economic strategy these new creative industries made a convenient bedfellow. They also ensured that the economic, commercial and individualist dimensions were emphasized. At the same time, politically, they drove a wedge between the publicly funded and non-commercial-orientated arts sector; a tension that was exacerbated by reduced funding and the exhortation to be more like the creative industries.

Both at the level of the individual, and as a mode of management (Henry 1991; Lampel *et al.* 2000), the term *creativity* had also, at that time, achieved common currency in the fields of business studies and management as the "x-factor" for corporate development (Jeffcutt and Pratt 2002), the notion being that new markets, or even market share, could only be attained via creative solutions. It was as if traditional tools had reached their limits and creative ones would take businesses the extra mile. This line of argument linked very closely to the longer running obsession with entrepreneurship (Garnham 2005). In this sense both to be enterprising and to be creative seem to overlap: both suggest risk-taking, bold and out-of-the box thinking: doing things differently. Again, entrepreneurship could, it was argued, create new market share – to do more with the same. Interestingly, within these fields of expertise creativity and entrepreneurship were reductive definitions: they were qualities of individuals that somehow diffused organizations. Moreover, it followed for many that such notions should be inculcated young. Ken Robinson, an expert on creativity and education (Robinson 2001), and lead author of the report *All our futures* (NACCCE 1999), strongly urged the government to make creativity the watchword of all education.⁸

A long-running critique of notions of enterprise and creativity, as well as associated terms like innovation, has been that they have been characterized as individualistic and not social (Pratt 1997). The response, grounded in a range of work about learning economies, has been that these activities are all socially embedded (Lundvall 1992; Grabher 1993; Pinch *et al.* 2003). To put it simply, being creative in a vacuum is not productive. An idea is nothing without production, and goods need distribution and consumption. Placed in a context of artists, critics and galleries the art takes on social meaning and value, and becomes embedded. Again, the common phrase about genius being 1 per cent inspiration and 99 per cent perspiration rings true in the sense that ideas have no value until they are applied and operationalized. Moreover, researchers point to the processes of making, applying and operationalizing that require iterative and heuristic, feedback and interaction (learning). In short they are collective enterprises. This acts as a caution on running away with idealized and asocial notions of creativity, culture, innovation and enterprise. It is noteworthy that the research on the economic clustering of cultural activities stresses the socio-eco-

nomics of location; this work itself draws upon a longer tradition of the social production of cultural goods (see Peterson 1976; Becker 1984; Pratt 2004b).

Creative occupations

It is within the narrow context of enterprise and competition that the analysis of creative industries and creative occupations makes sense. In fact in this case Florida's notion of the creative class is a better fit than the creative industries. If one were to try to orientate Florida's narrow vision to production one might seek out the key creative occupations (a narrower list than Florida's for sure). This is precisely what the arts sector in the UK did in the early 1990s (O'Brien and Feist 1995; Casey *et al.* 1996). However, the problem with the notion of creative occupations is that – in some more neo-classical interpretations – it may place undue stress on individual or decontextualized notions of production; one that is isolated from other businesses, institutions and society more generally. It can also reinforce the commonsense notion of assuming that “front-line” artists or cultural workers are the only ones who create value. As noted above, one needs to appreciate the interrelationships of the whole production chain, and its ways that it is variously embedded in space. A body of recent work by Markusen (2006; Markusen and Schrock 2006) avoids these pitfalls and shows how an analysis of occupation can provide insight into training and career development of artists. From a different perspective recent analyses of the cultural industries have sought to demonstrate how important close relationships between parts of the production chain are in different industries (Pratt 2006). Without doubt, both approaches have analytical value but are differentiated by the particular set of policy objectives they interrogate.

The notion of the creative industries is compromised; in this article, in an effort to stress the contrast, the term *cultural industries* has been reserved for approaches that use a production chain approach. An alternative is thus to seek an understanding of how industry, and not simply occupation, can open up the idea of situated cultural production (that includes artists and non-artists: but who rely upon one another). As noted above, until recently definitions of artists and the creative industries have been based occupation, then on industries tied to occupational practice (DCMS 1998, 2001); it is only with the last revision of methodol-

ogy that a production chain approach has been adopted by policy agencies to understand the cultural industries (DCMS 2003; Burns Owens Partnership, with Pratt and Taylor 2006).

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to critically evaluate Florida's notion of the creative class and the associated mechanisms he posits for urban regeneration and growth. Florida's argument owes much to place-marketing strategies; the key difference is that instead of simply attracting tourists, or chief executive officers to invest in a location, the creative class is used as a magnet that it is hoped will draw in hi-tech industries keen to find the right labour. The implication is that cities must adapt themselves to the values and mores of the creative class. This article has pointed out several problems with this argument.

First, the fact that place-based competition for mobile investment is a zero-sum game. Second, the reification of the relationship between, and separateness of, production and consumption. Third, the concept of the creative class, and their values, was shown to be reductive to occupation. Fourth, Florida's reuse of Glaeser's ideas where a particular skill replaces educational attainment is not tested: the levels of skills are reduced to a taxonomy of occupations. Fifth, the conceptual basis of focusing on occupations strips out the necessarily embedded relationships with industries and with production and consumption; essentially it individualizes what is a complex and hybrid phenomenon: a key point that has emerged from work on the cultural industries in recent years (Grabher 2001). On this basis, the relationship between the cultural economy and the city, and growth, is misplaced and thus needs to be recast. In particular, the recent evidence of the huge growth in the cultural production sector needs to be addressed and explained rather than being swept under the carpet or dismissed as “consumption”. A recent report for the London Development Agency noted that the cultural sector was the third largest sector of the London economy (GLA Economics 2004).

Rediscovering the cultural industries: production

This final section offers some pointers towards a reconceptualization of the role of culture in urban growth and change. First, we need to examine, rather than idealize, cultural production in full,

and to conceptualize its relationship to production and consumption (Pratt 2004a). Second, we must also be open to the flows across the public and private sectors, and between social, economic and cultural domains. In this sense the cultural industries are a field of policy. There seem to be three challenges here: (1) to understand the operation of the cultural industries; (2) to identify local strengths and weaknesses, and (3) then to consider how, if at all, it is sensible to intervene to change matters. Implicit in this consideration is the relationship of profit and not-for-profit activities and their interdependence.⁹

Without doubt, as numerous cultural industries mapping documents have shown, the cultural industries are an economic as well as a cultural presence in the world (KEA European Affairs 2006); what is more they are growing, and they employ significant numbers of people in developed countries. Within the context of declining economies this is enough to attract policy-makers to the table. The issue is how to engage with the cultural industries. Are they, for example, just the same as any industry and thus susceptible to generic industrial policies? To what extent should issues of cultural exceptionalism and national identity be taken to justify support for these activities? Furthermore, as many studies have shown, the cultural industries and the arts can play a significant role in addressing issues of social exclusion and community support – however, this does not produce great art or lots of money. A common confusion exists between policy affecting the cultural sector and their various discrete, and often conflicting, objectives. Moreover, is any of the above a substitute for “old” arts and cultural policies?

The great strength of the concept of the cultural industries is that it has had a firm basis in production, and that it is a socialized concept. This does not mean that the consumption dimensions can be ignored; in fact they need to be integrated. It is only at this point in the argument that it is safe to bring back the city as context for such socialized production. In such an argument the city is a “high-touch” environment whereby ill-defined and fuzzy knowledges are exchanged – it is a varied informational field within which actors negotiate and filter, and produce, knowledge in a very uncertain wider environment. Unlike other areas of the economy, some aspects of cultural production (and consumption) can be codified and normalized, but many cannot; arguably, these are the most valuable ideas to this industry. Thus, key high-value-added inter-

actions will continue to embed cultural production in a small number of unique parts of cities. Ironically, as cultural production is based upon a fashion model – a rapid turnover of product and a winner takes-all-marketplace – only some places will benefit from the economic activity and the social and cultural benefits. However, the elaboration of such a concept of the cultural industries and associated policies are beyond this article (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005; Pratt 2005). What is clear is that the notion of creative class contributes little to such an understanding, nor does it form a sound basis for policymaking.

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Notes

- 1 See, for example, the liveability rankings produced by Mercer Consulting (Mercer 2007).
- 2 Crucially, not all.
- 3 See also Reich's (2000) development of the same theme in the new economy: the symbolic analysts.
- 4 Of course, it is unacknowledged that the focus here is the rich developed world. As noted above, manufacture happens elsewhere. Bell's point is that manufacture will take up less of our productive time, leaving time and resources for design and research. The point I referred to above, and the point that scholars of the service industries make is that the manufacturing-service divide is a false one. Services are manufacture (Gershuny and Miles 1983; Walker 1985).
- 5 We might recall Bourdieu's (1979) work again, in particular the linkage between education and taste.
- 6 Bell has some rather withering criticisms of the development/destruction of culture alongside this highly rationalized regime of leisure and education. See Bell (1978).
- 7 In parallel Weberians such as Ritzer (1993) have pointed to the nature of the organization of work and the subtle shifts of control from simple top-down hierarchies to “self-management”. Somewhere in between is the redesignation of almost every employee occupation as a manager of some sort.
- 8 Of course this is a hugely problematic notion. The report's authors, in part, sought to use the report to argue for more legitimacy for cultural activities in the curricular (as opposed to a narrow 3Rs: Reading, Writing and Arithmetic).
- 9 This is particularly tricky as policy is normally the responsibility of government departments: activities that stray across boundaries are not well served. Culture is a prime example spanning the Departments of Culture, Industry and Regeneration.

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